THE FOURTH STRATEGIC ATTACK 1944

A scenario for Norm Koger’s The Operational Art of War III by Matrix Games

HISTORICAL BRIEFING & SCENARIO NOTES

Introduction

The winter war in 1939-1940 is quite well known even outside Finland, whereas the Finnish Front of 1944 remains unstudied. In 1939 the events in Finland made people throughout the western world hold their breaths merely because it was the only theater of war at the time. On the contrary in 1944 Finland presented a relatively bad image of being an ally of Hitler’s evil Third Reich. Its theater of war was an obscure sideshow somewhere in the north, overshadowed by concurrent major military events in France and Byelorussia, which dominated the world news during the summer of 1944. In Finland however, the fourth strategic attack by the Soviet Red Army is studied as much, if not more, as the events of the winter war. Those two separate campaigns actually have quite a lot in common with each other. Political discussions ended in vain and the Soviet Union concentrated massive a force for main attack at Karelian Isthmus, which was supported with an offensive in East Karelia. The most obvious distinctions were of course the season and Soviet level of intelligence, propaganda, and material preparations. Furthermore by 1944 the Finnish Army had stood immobile at the frontline for years and even though the troops were better equipped if compared to 1939, they were lacking the same fighting spirit and readiness. The dreary static war had evidently taken its toll. Meanwhile the Red Army had spent the very same years in perfecting their operational art theories into practice against the most capable opponent they could have – the German Wehrmacht. In 1939 Finns had faced an unmotivated and green army marching headlong into battle whereas in 1944 the antagonist was an effective, drilled, veteran military force that knew exactly what it was supposed to do and what it could expect from the enemy. Nevertheless, the outcome of the summer campaign became somewhat analogous.

Political events PRIOR TO the attack

After the German defeat at Stalingrad during winter 1942-43 the Finnish political and military leadership begun to think seriously how Finland could depart from proximity of Hitler’s seemingly sinking Reich. In the same time Stalin demanded unconditional surrender from Finland, although he was later ready to tone down this strict demand apparently due to influence of Churchill who was willing to maintain independent democracy in Finland also after the war. The general idea of the Finnish supreme command was that Finland could keep the regions, which she had before the winter war. Stalin however, as a bare minimum, sought back the borderline of the 1940 peace agreement. According to V. Molotov it was impossible that Finland could keep the areas annexed to Soviet Union in the winter war because: "The land areas are bought with Soviet blood". The truth is of course that quite a lot of the annexed land were never literally captured in the war, but instead taken in the peace agreement.

Negotiations for armistice and peace began in early 1944. At the same time the Soviet Air Force rigorously bombarded the Finnish capital Helsinki, obviously to demonstrate their power and pressure Finns toward peace on Soviet terms. Even though the Finnish Marshal Mannerheim was pessimistic regarding defending possibilities against a major attack by the Red Army, Finnish politicians – as they did before the winter war – stubbornly refused to agree with conditions the Soviet government proposed. As a consequence the peace discussions ended during the spring of 1944. The Soviet Union demanded back the areas annexed in the 1940 peace agreement and in addition the Petsamo region. The Finnish army would have to retreat back behind the 1940 border during April 1944 and demobilize the field army to peacetime strength during July 1944. All Soviet prisoners would have to be relieved immediately and reparations worth of 600 millions US Dollars paid during the next five years. Finally, Finland would have to break all connections to Nazi Germany and by April 1944 intern or expel all German troops located on Finnish territory. For the Finnish government these conditions were too hard to accept.

”Finns are particularly unintelligent and stubborn people. They need to be taught with a hammer.” J.Stalin

MILITARY PRECONDITIONS

In early summer 1944 the overall strategic situation on the eastern front seemed promising to the Soviet Union. The Western Allies had finally set up a second front to France with a remarkable invasion at Normandy. Clearly this made German east front even more vulnerable than before – and it was crumbling already. Soviet army planned to crush the German Army Group Center with a gigantic strategic offensive called Bagration. Stalin wasn’t certain however whether the Overlord was a serious attempt or just a feint, and he didn’t want to launch his major operations prior to he could be sure the Allies are serious at Northern France and not planning major maneuver to the Balkans for instance. Stalin on the other hand had assured the Allies that he would start an offensive at the same time with the Overlord. An attack to Finland seemed to be an excellent way to fulfill this promise. Additionally it would help to cover up preparations of the far more important operation Bagration, eventually shorter the frontline and thus relieve troops on German front, re-open a sea route to the Baltic for the Red Banner Baltic Fleet that had been closed to operate at bay of Leningrad since 1941, and finally if Stalin left Finland alone until eventual surrender of Germany he would possibly face a similar difficult foreign political situation what he had during the time of the winter war. Finland was never in war with the United States, and the war with the Great Britain was essentially theoretical. In June 1944 Stalin could “take care” of Finland in silence without jeopardizing his relationship with the western allies.

During the late spring Soviet 21^st Army, 3^rd Breakthrough Artillery Corps, 110^th Rifle Corps and various other assets were brought up to Karelian Isthmus. These formations were all already battle-hardened veterans. Yet the assault units began training to attack on typical Finnish defence positions in difficult terrain. The Finnish frontline positions were thoroughly studied from air-photographs and reports of ground reconnaissance. There was also another Soviet army – the 23^rd – that had been in the isthmus since 1941. In Finnish general headquarters at Mikkeli Mannerheim considered the Soviet concentration a feint to weight Finland for peace and in the same time rest and refit units, which soon would be needed against Germans. Indeed he was right anticipating the main Soviet summer offensive that destroyed the German Army Group Center, but in retrospect a mistake was made when the point of main effort of Finnish defence was not decisively at Karelian Isthmus. Although if it was, it would also mean a general withdrawal from the Svir’ River and Maaselkä Isthmus before nothing had actually happened. That wouldn’t be in accordance with Finnish political agenda and thus the Finnish Army was deployed rather equally along the three separate fronts at the Karelian, Aunus (Olonets) and Maaselkä Isthmus. Finnish commanders at frontlines were warned though of probable Soviet assault and it was highly recommended to increase level of training and readiness. To defend Mannerheim we must acknowledge skilful Soviet Maskirovka – deception, that misled Finnish reconnaissance to believe Soviet attack against Germans at Narva and/or Petsamo (Pechenga).

In the Finnish main theater of war at the Karelian Isthmus the defense was based on three lines: main defence line or the frontline, VT-line, and VKT-line. To Soviets these distinct lines represented a single defence system constructed in depth. The main Finnish defence line relied mostly on field fortifications built by the troops and the line wasn’t in good shape after the winter. The VT-line on the other hand was quite complete a system of both field fortifications and concrete bunkers. In fact it was considerably better and stronger than the famous Mannerheim line of the winter war, which didn’t exist anymore in 1944. The VKT-line from Viipuri to Taipale was incomplete, but to some extent difficult terrain of the region – namely the formidable Vuoksi River system and rocky, hilly, and heavily wooded terrain north and northeast of Viipuri, which canalized motorized troops to travel on the roads, compensated the lack of human made obstacles. There was yet one more defense line planned and partially built behind the VKT-line; it was called Salpa. Building of the Salpa line had begun after the winter war, and then paused at 1941 to start again during 1944. Although on map Salpa would protect the entire front up to the arctic, in reality construction was strongly emphasized on region between the Gulf of Finland and Saimaa Lake system. Along the Svir’ (Syväri) River Finns had entrenched positions backed up with constructed PSS-line and behind the pre winter war border U-line, that was still under construction. Maaselkä Isthmus between lakes Ääninen (Onega) and Seesjärvi had relatively strong field fortifications.

Soviet plan

The operational plan of General Govorov was, in typical Red Army fashion, based upon thorough calculations for overwhelming quantitative superiority at the point of main effort. The attack force had to be irresistible. The God of war was the artillery that would simply pulverize the defender, which the riflemen and armour would mop-up afterwards. The Leningrad Front estimated that it would advance approximately 12 kilometers per day. This meant that the first strategic objective Viipuri (Vyborg) would be reached within 10 days, and already by then the Finnish army was to be eliminated – the Soviet commanders estimated it would happen during the initial 4 to 5 days of the offensive.

Once the attack at Karelian Isthmus began affecting, the Karelian Front’s 7^th Army would launch attack across the River Svir’ followed with an assault by the 32^nd Army at the Maaselkä Isthmus. The general idea was that Finns would have to move their reserves from the Aunus region to Karelian Isthmus, which in turn would ease the way for the 7^th Army’s assault across the Svir’ River. This was a good overall plan when everything went well. However, if the Finnish force at Karelian Isthmus wasn’t destroyed during the initial 5 days of the offensive and the reinforcements were successfully arriving from regions behind the Lake Ladoga, the Soviet momentum would be in danger to halt. Why leave open a possibility that the enemy can reinforce defence along your main attack axis? Why not tie up the Finnish reserves for a fight at the secondary direction along the Svir’ river line by conducting simultaneous and active attack operations there? Finally, once the decision was made to allow withdrawal of Finnish reserves from Aunus region, why not interrupt or prevent their movement with the Red Air Force? At now these questions wait unanswered, but in the time-context the Leningrad Front was at the peak of its confidence with successful Leningrad-Novgorod offensive behind and the Soviets calculated methodically that Finnish defense have to collapse in matter of a week – yet in retrospect it seems that the Soviet plan almost searched for troubles to hinder their main effort at Karelian Isthmus.

In contrary to what Soviet propaganda machine told during and after the war, their assault would continue towards Finnish southern heartlands after Viipuri was seized. Kotka Operation – a deep breakout from narrow Karelian Isthmus would become the deathblow to remaining Finnish resistance and eventually end up with the Red Army marching on Helsinki. This is a fact, which Finns have known since 1944, but which Soviet history writing has tried to bury. It seemed to be too embarrassing for the Soviet Union to admit in public that their 4th strategic attack actually failed to accomplish its strategic military objective – occupation of Finland. Fortunately now, as the Soviet archives are opening for scholars, more objective history of the Great Patriotic War can be written.

“Lack of operational imagination and flexibility was ordinary to the Russians during the winter war and was factual also in 1944, hence we were able to make a similar retreat maneuver.” C.G.E. Mannerheim.

Viipuri Operation

According to the plan, heavy artillery concentration and substantial air support were used to create a breakthrough. Preliminary barrage already on June 9^th was constant for 10 hours and the two hour shelling of the following attack day created estimated 200 000 hits on positions of the Finnish 10^th Infantry Division only. Consequently mechanized Red Army simply overran the Finnish main defence line at Valkeasaari. The attack, albeit surprising, wasn’t a shock, but the sheer power of it was. The Soviets were able to concentrate approximately 400 artillery tubes per frontline kilometer at the narrow breakthrough area. It caused a barrage, which “still is in our minds and brains”, as dubbed by a Finnish veteran. In fact a barrage of such a scale caused a lot of mental problems and nerve breakdowns for those who it left alive. Panicked by the circumstance men had to be tied to trees to keep them stable for instance. In addition executions were made within the chaos. The Finnish troops were deployed forward to the main defence line, which was a mistake that was now paid for. Finns had grossly underestimated the enemy capability and ignored German reports that evidently told about increased Soviet tactical-operational skills and that they were capable to punch through even the strongest defence lines. Finns still believed to methods of 1939 and division and corps commanders had constantly assured Mannerheim that “the frontline will stand everything”. Nonetheless, some staff officers of the General HQ studied the German experiences more closely and had suggested a beforehand retreat to the VT-line with the bulk of the forces and leaving only a “curtain” forward. Thus, anticipated heavy enemy artillery barrage would hit on mostly empty ground. Unfortunately Mannerheim believed the overly confident reports from frontline commanders and moreover he was afraid that a retreat in advance might cause the troops and commanders to become nervous and overall morale to decrease. An error was made.

“The ground rose and fell down, boiled and stirred-up. Sky became dark, bright summer morning vanished and the air was full of earth, dust, and splinters.” A Finnish veteran.

Mannerheim issued orders of general retreat to the VT-line. In addition 4^th and 17^th Infantry Divisions, and 3^rd and 20^th Infantry Brigades, that were all deployed in East Karelia, began re-deploying to Karelian Isthmus. The Finnish Armoured Division under Lagus made a counter-attack against the 30^th Guards Rifle Corps demonstrating attack oriented Finnish doctrine, even under, and especially in desperate conditions. The counter-attack failed however because the enemy was simply too overwhelming. It merely confused the Soviet command. On 14^th of June the VT-line was breached at town of Kuuterselkä after the Finnish Cavalry Brigade was defeated. As a consequence, Mannerheim issued orders to relocate 6^th and 11^th Infantry Divisions from the Svir’ River to the Karelian Isthmus. This in turn left the defence line at Svir’ so weak that Mannerheim ordered a general retreat from the river to the PSS-line. Actually now the defence in the Svir’ axis followed what should have been done in the Karelian Isthmus too: a retreat in advance with only a screening force left to man the frontline. Hitler protested this withdrawal and advocated his firm defence concept. I am quite convinced had Hitler’s strategy been carried out there would be a total disaster in the East Karelia as it would lead to a pure material battle on Soviet terms instead of Finnish elastic and thus more rational defence concept.

The Viipuri Operation came to an end on 20^th June when the Soviets occupied the city. The Finnish 20^th Brigade defending Viipuri retreated in panic allowing the Soviets to take the city almost without a fight. However, as a conclusion to the operation, the Leningrad Front failed to accomplish planned destruction of Finnish Army, which had successfully conducted a retreat maneuver to the VKT-Line, excluding the city of Viipuri of course. Moreover, in cooperation with the Karelian Front and the Red Air Force, the Front failed to prevent the re-deployment of Finnish reserves. Four Finnish infantry divisions and two infantry brigades were successfully transferred to block the Soviet main attempt at Karelian Isthmus where every battalion would prove out to be mandatory. By now the Soviet textbook calculations were seemingly flawed.

Kotka Operation

On 21^st June the STAVKA gave orders for Leningrad Front to continue attack on the Karelian Isthmus. Kotka Operation would start again by Gusev’s 21^st Army. Its objective was to achieve Imatra-Lappeenranta line in estimated time schedule of 7 days. Concurrently Tsherepanov’s 23^rd Army would strike to Käkisalmi direction and clean up the northwest corner of the Lake Ladoga. After this was accomplished the Soviet attack would turn west and seize Kotka-Kouvola line. During the same time the Karelian Front under Meretskov would launch offensive over the Svir’ river. In essence the Leningrad Front would severe Finnish connections to north of Lake Ladoga and prepare an advance to Helsinki, whilst the Karelian Front would strike and finish off the Finns remaining in East Karelia. The two Fronts would join northwest of Lake Ladoga. This would become the decisive operation in order to accomplish the strategic objective.

Leningrad Front commander Govorov, now promoted to Soviet Marshal, was already paying attention to his casualties and stiffening Finnish resistance. Hence he asked two additional rifle corps from the STAVKA. The previous “success” in Viipuri Operation had indicated however, that the Finns are already about to rout. Furthermore the attack of the Karelian Front would pressure Finns simultaneously so the STAVKA decided that there was no need yet to reinforce the Leningrad Front with additional forces – requested replacements were delivered nonetheless. Lt.Gen Korovnikov’s experienced 59th Army headquarters, 94^th Rifle Corps and 43^rd Rifle Corps were ready nearby, but they remained under the command of STAVKA. Apparently Lt. Gen. Korovnikov was to conduct the second phase of the Kotka offensive operation from Lappeenranta to Kouvola-Kotka line.

On 22^nd June Gusev’s 21^st Army began the operation by attempting a breakout along the roads of Tali-Ihantala area, northeast of Viipuri. The Soviets found the terrain relatively easy for armour and the dense road network would lead them directly to Lappeenranta and Imatra. However, also the Finns had studied their maps and as the terrain elsewhere was rocky and thus difficult for tanks, the Soviet assault at Tali direction was predictable. Mannerheim had established a new army level headquarters (KaJokE) and appointed an able commander – General Oesch – to supervise the ongoing crisis on the Karelian Isthmus. General Oesch, who commanded troops in Viipuri region also back in winter 1940 and summer 1941, had concentrated all obtainable force, including recently arrived German assault guns, to block the Soviet offensive. Finnish reserves had arrived from the East-Karelia and were now successfully holding the Soviet main attack. In fact the initiative was shifting to Finns by counter-attack of Lagus’ Armoured Division. Finnish artillery once again proved to be very accurate and effective a weapon despite of its small resources and variety of equipment. Indeed in a week the Soviets advanced only about 8 kilometers and actually Finns almost closed a Russian Rifle Corps into a motti, but the last strength needed to complete the counter-offensive was lacking. Govorov had to reorganize his offensive. Units of the fresh 59^th Army were now employed in an invasion over the Bay of Viipuri against the Finnish right flank. Nonetheless Oesch was again anticipating the Soviet maneuver. The archipelago was a Soviet attack axis already in the winter war and on the other hand Finns under Oesch had successfully invaded over the bay during the attack back in the summer of 1941. Finns and Mannerheim’s reserve, recently arrived German 122^nd Infanterie Division “Greif”, held the coastline and by July 12^th the Soviet attack was ultimately stuck. Meanwhile the Soviet 23^rd Army had launched an own assault with intention to cross the Vuoksi River and advance to Käkisalmi. Like in Viipuri area now the defenders seemed to stand firmly in positions, notwithstanding what the Soviets threw against them. Thus the heavy Soviet attack was stopped also on the eastern Isthmus.

German help was crucial. First of all by occupying the entire northern Finland the Germans were allowing Finnish Army to commit all available force to the south. Secondly, the German ground, and particularly the air forces provided remarkable help. The elite Kampfgruppe Kuhlmey of the Luftwaffe with approximately 70 airplanes balanced the air battle and provided critical ground support with Stukas. Finally: ammunition, mines, guns, spare parts, and above all, personal AT weapons like Panzerschreck and Panzerfaust were without a doubt playing a significant role in this battle of Finland. Unfortunately the German efforts for the Finnish defense have not always been acknowledged properly by Finnish history literature, but recent studies are paying more attention to this vital issue.

As the Kotka Operation had failed to the start the Soviet high command concentrated on operations at south against Germans. Several formations including Simoniak’s veteran 30^th Guards Rifle Corps were withdrawn from Finnish front during July. Now as the critical moments in the Karelian Isthmus were over, Mannerheim reinforced northern directions that were grossly suffering because of the heavy concentration to Isthmus. In fact the Finns had quite a powerful force of three corps deployed in the Karelian Isthmus, consisting of 11 infantry divisions including a coastal division and the German 122^nd Division, 4 infantry brigades, the Armoured Division and the German 303rd Assault Gun Brigade.

Operations in East Karelia – WILDERNESS COMBAT

On June 21^st, according to an order of STAVKA, Soviet Karelian Front under command of Army General Meretskov launched an offensive at the Svir’ River. Krutikov’s 7^th Army began the Svir’-Petrozavodsk Operation with a characteristic Soviet artillery barrage, this time lasting for 3 hours 32 minutes. A day later the 32^nd Army under Gorelenko joined in the offensive on the Maaselkä Isthmus. Meretskov, who was a Finnish front veteran, placed his point of main effort to the Lotinapelto-Aunus (Lodeinoye Pole-Olonets) axis. This didn’t come as a surprise to Finns at all; a war game of Group Aunus during the spring had clearly indicated that the coastal road, and railroad built during the war, was definitely the most likely Soviet attack direction. First Soviet strategic objectives were Sortavala and Värtsilä.

Finnish force was called Group Aunus, which was initially under command of Gen. Oesch, but because he was ordered to Karelian Isthmus, General Talvela took his place. Talvela’s operational plan was to conduct a fighting withdrawal towards the old Finnish-Russian border. The intention was that Blick’s VI Corps manning the PSS-line would firmly hold the Soviet main attack in order to buy time for retreat of the 7^th Infantry Division. If the PSS-line would collapse, the Russians would have an opportunity to cut off the Finnish force at coast of Onega and large supply depots in Äänislinna as well as the 7^th Infantry Division. The PSS-line held just enough for the necessary time, but it had to be abandoned soon after Soviet naval infantry had made a bold invasion to Tuulos intending to cut off supply and retreat route of the Finnish VI Corps. Finnish reserves were inadequate and hasty counter-operations failed. Thus the Soviets were able to keep their bridgehead and reinforce it, which eventually resulted a general Finnish withdrawal from the PSS-line positions. Impulsive Talvela and the VI Corps commander Gen. Blick had a grave disagreement of the withdrawal. Consequently Mannerheim replaced Blick by Gen. Martola who could better come along with Talvela. To Finns the biggest problem was lack of reserves that were all sent to Karelian Isthmus. Furthermore the bulk of any material like AT-weapons as well as air support went to the Isthmus, while the Finnish east front had to carry on outnumbered and utterly exhausted. On the other hand here the nature of battle was different: extremely difficult terrain and meager “roads” were preconditions for aggressive delaying action and guerrilla activity. Indeed the Soviets were already depleted when they reached the U-line where the attack eventually stopped for good. The vital Finnish objective of the attack back in 1941, the city of Äänislinna – or Petrozavodsk for Russians – was left to Soviets without a fight in late June.

Finnish II Corps at Maaselkä Isthmus had a similar task along with the Group Aunus: organized, slow retreat towards the old border. There was no rational reason to try to stand and fight there because the defence crumbled in everywhere else. As well as elsewhere in Karelia, the Soviets did not keep only on roads, but continuously small assault groups tried to outflank Finnish defenders through wilderness. In addition to general development of forward detachment and combat groups during the war it seemed that Russians had learned their lesson from the Finnish attack tactics and now used them in practice. The Soviet 289^th Rifle Division and 33^rd Ski Brigade had in fact Finnish commanders. As Mannerheim needed the 6^th Division at Karelian Isthmus the II Corps had only a division and a brigade against three Soviet divisions.

THE final MOTTI: battle of Ilomantsi

By late July Gorelenko’s 32^nd Army had crossed the old Finnish-Soviet borderline and continued advance heading for important road junction Ilomantsi. The Finnish 21^st Brigade was clearly outnumbered and thus forced to retreat. However, by now the battles were calmed down in the Karelian Isthmus and Finns were able to reinforce almost defenseless Ilomantsi direction. The Cavalry Brigade and the 20^th Brigade were transferred to north for a new task force called Group Raappana. In his typical fashion Mannerheim ordered General Raappana to stop the Soviet advance with a counter-attack. In early August the Group made a surprise attack and isolated two Soviet rifle divisions. Russian heavy equipment were captured, but fragments of the Soviet divisions managed to escape through forests and bogs. Although the Finns were not able to completely eliminate the Soviet divisions within the motti, the victory at Ilomantsi cannot be questioned. In its tactical wisdom and flexibility the Finnish counter-attack in Ilomantsi region was a final sign for Russians to not to continue attack anymore. They were bled white at this point.

“Every soldier, officer, or commander wants to be on the main theater of war. On a secondary front the tasks are not so momentous. There will be less troops and war material and it receives less attention. Nevertheless a battle on a secondary front is not easier; it can be even harder.” Gen. S.M. Shtemenko

CONCLUSIONS

Was this campaign a Soviet victory? Answering the question is difficult because it involves so many different viewpoints. If we consider the operations as part of the battle for Leningrad, we can say the Leningrad and Karelian Fronts occupied northern Leningrad region (oblast) and thus secured the city, relieved the bottled Baltic Fleet, opened traffic on Kirov-railroad and Stalin’s canal, and most importantly forced Finland out of the war – victory, in a logic. If we, on the other hand, expand our scope from strictly operational battle to focus on strategic level we realize that Stalin’s ultimate will was not accomplished militarily; the Red Army didn’t “liberate” Helsinki and Finland would not become another satellite state. Those willing to debate upon this issue of Soviet Union’s ultimate strategic aims regarding Finland should read the meticulous and definitive work by Tapio Tiihonen that is based upon research from both Finnish and Russian archives. English speaking readers should dig up and read “The battle for Leningrad 1941-1944” by David Glantz. Albeit being brief and relying largely on Russian sources for obvious reasons, it contains the best English written account I have read about this forgotten summer war in Finland. As for the Finnish point of view, the red steamroller was stopped like had been done before in 1940 – a victory, again in a sense. Land areas liberated during the 1941 attack were lost in the 1944 truce. Casualties were high, Germans in Lapland had to be expelled and above all the nation, worn out by years of war, would have to be rebuilt. But then again by staying independent a bright light in the end of the tunnel remained in sight for the Finns, even if frequently shadowed with ever-present threat of the Soviet Union throughout the following cold-war years. This in particular due to Soviet base at cape of Porkkala just a stone’s throw west of Helsinki. Considering all this perhaps a draw or torjuntavoitto (repel-victory) as Finns generally call this campaign is a decent enough expression on the whole.

GAME EVENTS

German assistance to Finland

1. There is a chance that Luftwaffe sends Group Kuhlmey from Estonia to reinforce the Finnish front. This event can activate automatically regardless of whether the Finnish player triggers his theater option or not. (see below)

2. On turn 10 the Finnish player receives a theater option for requesting help from Hitler. Activating this theater option may provide Finnish player German reinforcements. In practice this means that there exists a strong chance that the 303rd Assault Gun Brigade and the 122nd Infantry Division operating in Estonia are transferred to Finland, but it’s not 100% certain. It will take about a week for the reinforcements to arrive to Finland. Successful or not, using the theater option gives 100 permanent victory points to Soviet player. Historically Mannerheim wrote to Hitler and requested 5 or 6 divisions to southern Finland, Hitler eventually sent the 122^nd ID and 303^rd StuG Brigade. In exchange for military assistance Hitler forced the Finnish President Risto Ryti to sign a promise that he would not sign a truce with the Soviet Union.

Karelian Front

1. Russian player has a theater option on turn 1 that will release Meretskov’s Karelian Front on subsequent turn. This allows experimenting of “what if?” the Karelian Front assaults Finns on the Svir’ river simultaneously with the Leningrad Front’s assault on the Karelian Isthmus. If the theater option was not activated the Karelian Front will be released automatically if Soviets seize Viipuri at Karelian Isthmus or by a sudden chance during turns 2 to 5.

Shock effects

1. Finnish troops have a slight shock penalty for the first two turns. This simulates the initial confusion.

2. Soviet troops will have a positive 109% shock bonus for two initial turns, and 105% shock for turn 3. On turn 4 the shock is leveled to 100% for the rest of the game.

3. If German Group Kuhlmey appears to the game, the Finnish side will receive 110% air shock. This simulates major influence that the Luftwaffe had on the battle, especially on ground support.

Victory & scenario length

1. Soviets win a sudden-death victory by occupying Kouvola (hex 1,74) or Joensuu (hex 42,25) anytime during the game. This assumes that Finnish lines were torn apart and the Red Army is heading deeper into Finland. The Soviet commander can congratulate himself as he has accomplished military preconditions for occupation of Finland.

2. Finnish player will receive 50 permanent victory points of each destroyed Soviet ship of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Rationale behind this is simply to keep Soviet player cautious when using his fleet. It would be unrealistic that Soviets sacrificed an entire fleet only to gain stronger indirect fire support for troops fighting along the coastline.

3. Soviet player will receive 100 extra victory points if he is able to occupy Viipuri before turn 10. This simply is a reward awaiting a player who outperforms operational tempo of the historical Soviet assault.

4. The scenario will end with normal victory point calculation 30 turns after Soviets occupy Viipuri. This unless an “extended game” theater option is triggered before. Also, if Soviets never manage to occupy Viipuri, the game lasts for 70 turns. In case both players agree to play game lasting for full 70 turns the Soviet player should use the “extended game” theater option that will cancel the early end. Obviously the theater option needs to be triggered before Viipuri is captured.

5. There’s a chance that the scenario will end with normal victory point calculation if variable value reach 50%. The chance improves if variable value reaches 70%. Soviets will win if variable value reaches 95%. Soviet occupation of the following locations will increase the variable value as follows:

• Imatra (31,66) 30%

• Sortavala (58,49) 20%

• Lappeenranta (24,68) 30%

• Viipuri (31,78) 40%

• Käkisalmi (51,69) 10%

• Aunus (94,66) 5%.

Finnish re-occupation will not decrease already raised value percentage. My reasoning behind this victory condition event is that as Soviets occupy key locations on Finnish soil, the Finnish politicians are more willing to end the war on whatever peace terms Stalin has to offer.

Supply depots

1. Finnish supply will decrease permanently by 2 if a supply unit is destroyed.

2. Finns have large supply depots located at Äänislinna (Petrozavodsk). Units with the truck symbol are representing these. The units are labeled “Varikko 1”, “Varikko 2”, and “Varikko 3”. If destroyed, each unit will award the Soviet player 70 extra victory points that are permanent. Thus, it is advised that Finnish player will take measures to evacuate and protect these units.

Naval rules

1. This is an honour rule that should be obeyed in order to create more realistic conditions than TOAW engine can offer for seaborne landings. Only Soviet naval infantry units are allowed to land on or attack an enemy controlled location from the sea/lake. Other units can be embarked on sea transport, but they are allowed to land on friendly occupied hexes only. This rule is mandatory due to well-known limitations of TOAW in modeling seaborne landings and coastal defence.

2. Shallow water hexes in the Baltic represent sea-minefields laid by Finnish and German navies that worked in close co-operation during the war. All Soviet vessels (including troops embarked on sea-transport) that are about to sail through the minefields will have to wait for a duration of one turn in adjacent hex to them before proceeding forward.

Considerations for commanders in charge

Soviet Army

You have got a powerful force at your disposal on the Karelian Isthmus, albeit vulnerable to losses because of largely diminished manpower resources of the Soviet Union. Therefore use your large artillery force to the maximum extent and bombard Finnish lines prior to your assaults. Remember also that you get a shock bonus for the first days – take all out of it. Proficient guards units of Simoniak’s experienced 30^th Guards Rifle Corps should bear the bulk of the fighting and create gaps to Finnish lines that your mobile tank and assault gun units can exploit. Even though the scenario is unit dense, try not to stack too much units on the same hex in order to avoid unnecessary casualties. Finnish artillery is highly proficient and can cause you severe losses on orange or red dot stacks. Additionally this will force you to keep some divisions in reserve. Change front line units on a regular basis so you can keep pressing the Finns continuously with fresh regiments. It might be a good idea to set the bulk of your air force on interdiction in order to disrupt strategic movement of enemy reserves. In addition consider bombing some crucial railway bridges with your long-range bomber units.

In East-Karelia you will have a large wilderness with sparse road network ahead of your offensive force. Moreover you will need to cross the formidable Svir’ river and fortified PSS-line of the Finns. Basically you have two options: 1.) Release the Karelian Front early and tie up Finnish reserves or 2.) Await that Finnish reserves begin moving to Karelian Isthmus and attack the remnants. The first option should surprise the enemy and ease the pressure at the natural point of main effort at Karelian Isthmus while the latter choice gives the enemy time to reorganize his defence and conduct an organized withdrawal from the Svir’. On the other hand you might face a weakened and already retreating army behind the Svir’. Whatever choice you make, you will quickly notice how dependent your attack will be to the roads. Keep reserve and rotate your units regularly because supply conditions are poor at best and combat in difficult terrain raise attackers casualties. Consider using the naval brigades for an amphibious landing behind Finnish lines – the enemy’s reserves are obviously limited so there’s a good chance it will cause a lot of trouble to him (REMEMBER THE HONOUR RULES!).

Finnish Army

The situation is chaotic and no matter how you try to view it, you will find the historical Finnish defensive quite rational. In case the Soviet player is clever enough to launch a simultaneous attack with his Karelian Front, you’re in big trouble. It is crucial that you reinforce the Karelian Isthmus as much as and as soon as possible – you can give ground at the vast East-Karelia. Though, you will have to withdraw and only delay the enemy at the Isthmus too. As Sun Tzu says, a skillful commander knows when it is time to retreat and when it is time to stand and fight. That is to mean in this context: be careful of trying to set too strict a defence line too early on. Withdraw, effectively delay, and exhaust the enemy instead, and wait until you are certain that you can stop the red steamroller for good.

In East-Karelia you face the same dilemma as General Talvela did historically: few number of units will have to defend a vast area of land against an overwhelming enemy. Furthermore you will need to take care of transferring reinforcements to Karelian Isthmus and evacuation of supply depots and personnel located in Äänislinna (Petrozavodsk). This will not be easy due to limited capacity of roads and railroads, especially if the Red Air Force tries to pummel the march-routes with full power. Gen. Talvela, albeit acknowledged as a skilled attacker, is sometimes accused of incompetence in defence. However, now facing this situation one begins to look at his enormous task in a different light – actually I would argue that not that many Finnish commanders had the strength to carry out this exhausting mission.

Unit abbreviations

Finnish units:

AK Corps

D Division

E Headquarters

er. Independent

Er.Lin.K Independent fortifying company

Ilmavoimat Finnish Air Force

It.Ptri Anti-aircraft battery

It.R Anti-air regiment

JPr. Jaeger brigade

JR Infantry regiment

Jär.Psto Coarse (super-heavy) artillery battalion

K Company

KaJokE Headquarters of the Isthmus troops

Kev.Os Light detachment

Kev.Ptri Light artillery battery

KKK Machinegun company

KTR Field artillery regiment

Le.R Aviation regiment

Lin.Psto Fortress artillery battalion

Lin.Ptri Fortress artillery battery

P Battalion

Pion.K Engineer company

Pion.P Engineer battalion

&l