Question about Division numbers (Why so low?) and Casualty Totals

[monkspider]

I have always been under the impression that a division represented around 10,000 people but in the game divisions seem to have considerably less then that, even allowing for multiple people operating the vehicles. Were there really that many people involved in logistics and the like? Or are the missing troops held in reserve somewhere? I guess I am trying to wrap my brain around what each division in Panzer Campaigns represents.

With this in mind, in "real" battles should the projected casualty totals on the victory status screen be multiplied by a factor of two or more to represent the true amount of casualties?

Thanks again for helping out this newbie!

[monkspider]

One other question, totally unreleated. In the manual for Budapest 45 it talks about how there is a small chance of the Hungarians getting a Tiger-equipped regiment in some of the divisions. Does this mean that there is a small element of chance in special reinforcements like this appearing sometimes and other times not at all in other games?

[Ricky B]

For the first question on number of men present, the games only show those at the pointing end, and even more those that are carrying rifles, firing machine guns, etc - those men represented in the man type fighting units. Those men with vehicles or units with guns are not represented at all.

But ultimately, I have seen an estimate before that for the US and maybe close for the British Commonwealth, 60% of the manpower in the army was non-fighting, the Germans had about 40%, and the Soviets only 20% were tied up in non-fighting positions. I don't recall the source and it may be off in specifics, but seems right overall at least. Anyway, based on that you can count on the divisions having quite a few more men than listed, if you want to do math to account for all men lost then boost it by whatever factor you like, there isn't any "one" factor in that case. Also, losses as listed are vague anyway, they include not just casualties and prisoners, but those men separated from their unit and not fighting, for example, part of the manpower that gets recovered when a unit rests.

And finally, both the Soviets and Germans ran their divisions well under strength in most cases, so even with the tail accounted for most of their divisions would not reach 10,000 men. I think the Soviet average for a rifle division was just over 5000 men for most of the latter 2 years of the war, for example.

Rick

[Dog Soldier]

And to add to Rick's response, IIRC, Soviet Rifle division in the second echelon, ie Smolensk, were poorly trained and lead. This would lower the effective number of men in a unit right from the start.

Another reason the early war Soviet rifle units suffered massive prisoner counts. While some Soviet troops fought fanatically, others melted because they were virtually static. Movement to new positions while retaining fighting strength was problematic in fluid front battles of 1941 and the first half of 1942 for the majority of Soviet Rifle Divisions.

Attrition and better officers (replacement officers in the post Stalingrad era were not judged on Stalinist versus Trotsky thinking as they were in the purges of the late 1930's) lead to the change in Soviet effectiveness more than any other factor for the latter half of the war.

Dog Solider

[monkspider]

Thanks for the replies guys. Interestingly, I am currently in the middle of reading Manstein's memoirs and just came across this passage about the state of the German army in 1944.

"In the same connexion we had to report that for the immediate defence of a 440-mile Dnieper front, the three armies left to the Army Group had a total of thirty-seven infantry divisions at their disposal. (This figure included three which were at present on their way out to us. Five divisions whose fighting power was completely spent had been absorbed into other formations.) In other words, every division would be responsible for some 12 miles of front.As against this, the average number of soldiers fit for front-line combat duties per division was now only about 1,000 - a figure which would not rise above 2,000 even after the promised replacements had arrived. Obviously no decisive defence could function on this basis, even from behind the Dnieper."