The Competition & Teaser Thread

[ComradeP]

Even though the Soviets were certainly not a horde, replacing training in modern warfare with the cohesion of a massed attack was acceptable to both the Soviets and armies like the Chinese army in Korea or even most WWI armies at the start of the conflict.

Given enough time, the Soviets were quite good at strategic and operational level operations by 1945, but they were fighting a foe that was no longer remotely capable of offering prolonged resistance. Personally, I feel a Cold War turned hot scenario would've ended badly for NATO for most of the Cold War until the mid 1980's for the same reason: not enough men to hold the line, even though individual German/NATO units were superior on the tactical and lower command echelon levels.

There were many poor German commanders as well, obviously, but they were at the least trained properly in terms of doctrine which could serve as a partial compensation for flaws in leadership. For the Soviets, even a good leader would be handicapped by doctrine on the tactical level, just like the good German leaders were handicapped by doctrine on the strategic level and Hitler's meddling.

Let's say you're part of a Guards tank corps. Like Allied armoured formations, your organic infantry support is small compared to the number of tanks in the formation. Unlike Allied armoured formations, you have few organic support assets most of the time because even if they would normally be attached you're fighting well below paper strength, limited access to artillery support and little air support. Your flexibility is as such limited.

Shortages of halftracks means most of that infantry support is likely to be riding in trucks or partially on tanks. This means the tanks will soon outrun their infantry support in difficult terrain/difficult weather.

Even if the maintenance of the tanks is up to a high standard, which it often wasn't because unlike in Western armies many Soviet tank crews could only perform the most basic maintenance tasks themselves, poor manufacturing quality might still results in numerous breakdowns. Let's say this doesn't happen and the tanks work fine.

Compared to Western armies, you have an additional command level to deal with as a Soviet tank brigade's tank complement is the size of a Western tank battalion and on the tactical level you're handicapped because your tank platoons are small, so you end up with a lot of chiefs and few indians.

Assuming all of your commanders know what they're doing and you break through the initial German line after the opening artillery barrage, the tank corps is quickly stretched out over a significant area because its components are travelling at quite different speeds. (The Germans faced the same problem for their infantry support in Panzer divisions but the heavier support weapons were often towed by halftracks or on halftracks.)

At that point, your commanders need to make a choice, and making a choice is dangerous in the Soviet army because punishment usually waits if you fail. The choice they need to make is if they keep driving forwards to complicate the German response or not. If they do, a clean breakthrough might very well be the result but your unit is so stretched out that if it meets organized resistance it won't be combat effective until its components meet up. Time and time again, Soviet armoured spearheads were cut off and destroyed because tanks can't control non-clear terrain and there was no infantry to actually hold the terrain.

Your logistics are inefficient and aerial resupply is rare. Artillery support would also be rare aside from accompanying Katyusha's as the artillery's either still supporting the infantry or slowly moving to the front.

Even if you want to advance quickly, provided there's some kind of German reserve in the area your advance is going to be methodical both by design and out of necessity. The success of a deep penetration depends largely on how quickly the infantry can get to you and seal off any encirclements. Even if the initial German frontline is wrecked, that often can't be exploited fully. There were just too many things handicapping the Soviet mobile units to compare them to Western mobile formations, with good organic support in weapons and logistics, effective air support and aerial resupply and in the Allied case mechanized infantry support.