The Competition & Teaser Thread

[ComradeP]

I see...so the basis for giving most Sov units D morale is that "several [German-biased] books" and (German) "records" show that even in 1944 the Red Army was automatons incapable of attacking at less than 7:1 odds? Oddly enough, reading Sov sources gives a distinctly different impression...

I guess Volcano Man's/David's explanation might have been a bit simplistic, but flawed doctrine is at the core of the Soviet problem. Whereas Soviet behaviour on the strategic level improved significantly from 1941 to 1945, they were still hindered by an inferior doctrine which handicapped tactical prowess. Even if a unit had a core of veterans, high casualties resulting in complete overhauls of the division's manpower every couple of months worth of fighting and the conscription of untrained men from liberated territory would ensure that many of the men would be recruits with only rudimentary training.

Centralization of support assets, inflexible air support and logistics also meant that there were few consistent force multipliers to enhance the performance of the frontline ground units. After the initial very impressive opening barrage for an offensive, there might be literally no artillery support from anything bigger than the division's 122mm howitzers for days, depending on how quickly the artillery could be moved forwards and how important the army command thought your objectives were.

Even in 1945, the Soviets mostly suffered low to average casualties when fighting an encirclement battle, which is where German strategic doctrine significantly hindered the Germans by gluing them in place.

Attacks against prepared German positions remained costly because of the inflexible doctrine. If the plan called for you to assault across a minefield to remove the Germans from their bunkers, you did so even if the neighbouring formation had just achieved a breakthrough you could take advantage of. Soviet staff studies are actually quite honest about this if you can see through the euphemisms.

They clearly describe the Soviet plan and when you read that an attack "encountered strong opposition", you know the assault troops suffered high losses and didn't get anywhere. As the staff studies are rarely critical of higher echelons, you do have some reading in between the lines, but the information you need is normally there. Do keep in mind that the staffs tended to assume the German formations were full strength and planned for that, this also explains instances in 1944-1945 where massive firepower was deployed against burned out German divisions, with the predictable result that the German frontline folded instantly.

German reports are biased, obviously, but the lower level they are, the more honest they often become. A general like Von Manstein writing his memoirs benefits from representing the Soviets as clumsy amateurs, but a regiment's or battalion's report of a Soviet attack can be quite honest.

As PzC abstracts a number of things and doesn't have a direct leadership effect on combat (the leader quality is irrelevant for the actual combat), some sort of solution needed to be found I guess, so battalions/companies/platoons/sections might perform more poorly than they normally would to account for the flaws in Soviet leadership below corps level, doctrine and the problems of centralization and inferior logistics. Sadly for the average Ivan, his own experience often didn't matter much if his commander was incompetent and the plan for the operation was too simplistic or even suicidal.

On the other hand, provided the replacement system works in favour of the Soviets (as we've seen, this is an issue with Moscow '42), the game models Soviet strengths well I'd say: more tanks, more artillery, more units in general. You already have a serious advantage in being able to direct Soviet units where you want, and waging war with a more "Western" operational plan.

On average, generic German quality ratings (A quality for all mobile units and SS, B for everything else up to a certain point) might be more of a problem than C or D for the Soviets, as having less capable individual units wouldn't be much of a problem if there were not such a gap in capabilities with even regular German infantry units due to better soft attack ratings and quality ratings. In Moscow '42, for me the main challenge is not keeping the Soviet offensive going in terms of casualties sustained/strength left but the speed at which Soviet units disrupt and their often low recovering chance (the modified HQ file helps, though).