The Competition & Teaser Thread

[Strela]

Hello All:

Question re Morale: why are the Russians usually C and D while the Germans are A and B in Tiller games, e.g. PzC. (For example, In David's OOB graphic for PB the Guards are just C morale.) I know as the war went on that the Russians improved. Maybe they will have higher morale later?

Wondering if the morale difference is a game mechanism to allow the Germans to deal with the numerically superior Russians?

Thanks,

Gerry

Hi Gerry,

A very reasonable question. We have worked very closely with Ed Williams (Volcano Man) on all the values in game. Ed had pioneered the 'Alt' scenarios for all of the Panzer Campaign titles and came up with unified values (the McNamara database) that is standardised across the series.

Ed has built all the values for Panzer Battles and they have been implemented in this first title.

One of the decisions Ed put in place was much more standardised morale values.

The PzC manual describes morale ratings as follows;

• A units are the Elite units
• B units are the Superior units
• C units are the Average units
• D units are the Below Average units
• E units are the Inferior units
• F units are the Abysmal units.

These values drive benefits and penalties. A C morale value is in the middle and the vast majority of trained militaries will fit into this value. For example most of the Western Allied forces (other than airborne) would be C morale.

Ed's justification for the C & D values for the Soviets in PzC is as follows;

Standardized Russian and Russian-Guards unit quality ratings. Russian line units are given D quality and Russian-Guards units are given C quality. For the most part this is already true in all PzC titles with the exception of a few units, usually given B quality for play balance purposes. With the McNamara OOB based changes, this is no longer required. Obviously, the quality standardization results in some Guards units changing from B to C but it also resulted in just as many Guards artillery units (and other supporting units) changing from D to C. It also resulted in many Russian units changing from E to D. This was all done for several reasons. Firstly, it is a logical assumption that a Guards division distinguished itself in battle, therefore it should be rated higher. More often than not, Soviet units had high casualty rates so instead of some divisions being high quality, the organizations as a whole remained at a standard level but unit leaders (HQ units) would be higher rated if it was a “good” unit. The other reason it was done is to remove the feeling of uniqueness within the Red Army (where, before, some units would be good quality and some would be terrible quality). Instead the emphasis is placed on quantity, the “horde”, individual unit ratings (of the formidable Russian medium and heavy tanks and their artillery), and HQ unit ratings.

Several books (such as von Mellenthin’s “Panzer Battles”) make the observation that the Red Army lacked individualism which is characteristic of western armies. This lack of individualism produced an almost automaton adherence to doctrine without any creativity whatsoever at the tactical level. The real strength of a unit was in how it was wielded at the strategic level. The individual fighter in the Red Army was, either intentionally or not, submerged into the “crowd” or “herd”. To that end, there is no real justification for Red Army units to be of sporadic quality levels between B and E but, rather, a standard average quality of C and D for combat units and varying quality levels ranging from excellent to terrible for individual HQ, based on their ability. These quality levels for HQs affect many variables and, given that “out of command” or “detached” units produce realistically severe effects (ie. artillery spotting by detached units get reduced artillery strike effectiveness and detached units gain less replacements), these individual HQ ratings can thus be extremely important. As mentioned above, this standardized quality approach takes focus off of individual unit’s (battalions) effectiveness and instead treats them as a collective.

Finally, it is said that even in 1944 the German soldier knew and felt that his unit was superior to his Russian counterpart. However, German divisions were like tiny stones in the midst of a vast ocean of endless Red Army troops. It should be noted that Russian troop quality, as a whole, was indeed improving gradually from 1942 to 1944, but this is inherently reflected in the fact that the number of Guards divisions were increasing as these divisions proved themselves and the organizational changes that improved over time (more artillery, air superiority etc). Records show that German units could stand their own ground even when outnumbered 6:1 but when Russian units are given high quality (B) this becomes impossible. By taking away emphasis of a few “good” units it encourages a Russian player to play with a “horde” mentality.

I'm in complete agreement with Ed's take and have used the same approach in the two PzC's games (Kharkov '43 & Moscow '42) that I have been involved in.

Hope that helps!

David