Reading about the birth and rise of the German FJ and in the book they mention that the first suggested use of airdrop was in 1918 by Willie Mitchell who wanted to conduct a drop behind the lines. The plan was approved in principle but lack of aircraft and parachutes delayed it so long that the war finally ended.
What would have been the outcome I wonder? Mass slaughter most likely as a link up would have been next to impossible, but what an unexpected stroke eh!
(10-28-2014, 11:02 AM)Weasel Wrote: [ -> ]Reading about the birth and rise of the German FJ and in the book they mention that the first suggested use of airdrop was in 1918 by Willie Mitchell who wanted to conduct a drop behind the lines. The plan was approved in principle but lack of aircraft and parachutes delayed it so long that the war finally ended.
What would have been the outcome I wonder? Mass slaughter most likely as a link up would have been next to impossible, but what an unexpected stroke eh!
Interesting topic. I think the concept of airborne operations were in many ways "A Bridge Too Far" in 1918.
Lacking doctrine, aircraft, equipment, logistics, and communications for a mass para drop, I think any attempt at an airborne operation would be an unmitigated disaster. Its one of those things that took another 22 years to work out the doctrine and equipment for such an operation to be successful. Even then, it was really necessary for the conditions to be right to get close to a successful operation.
Only the Russians and Germans were really working on this concept during the inter-war years. Initial Germans successes in this area early in the war, created an Allied requirement to build an airborne capability. After Crete, the German leadership really lost the taste for airborne ops due to the high casualty rate. In contrast, the Allies took it to a whole new plateau due to the massive resources invested in the airborne concept. It was synchronized with amphibious and ground operations on a scale that the Germans would never achieve. Yet, the high casualty rates were always an issue for both sides.
Also, there is a requirement for ground force mobility to move forward to relieve the airborne troops after they jump in. Something that the World War One battlefield was not noted for. Couple that with lack of good field radios and there is very little ability to coordinate/communicate on the extended scale required for successful airborne operations. Once the troops dropped in, there would be no communication or ammunition resupply. For a successful airborne op, it has to be planned out in depth as well as obtain rapid link up with friendly ground forces.
I suspect once the initial shock of troops in the rear was sorted out, the response would overwhelm the exposed light infantry troops of the paras with large artillery bombardments followed by large infantry formations. This is something they could not hope to hold off for very long.
Regards,
Jim vK
Exactly, they would have lost a division of troops for no gain IMO, and I think the slow bombers they would have used (Handleys probably) would have been clobbered by flak and fighters long before the drop occurred.
Still interesting though. Perhaps coupled with a large armoured assault like Cambrai may have worked.
If the logistics and support could be worked out in 1918, AB troops might have had an effect not dissimilar to the German small group Sturmtruppen which did infiltrate and erode the front lines to precipitate the only breakthrough of the war in 1918. Thought the outcome of that final German Western Front offensive was a failure, it achieve the goal of breaking the trench stalemate of the last three years and force a relatively mobile war for a short period period of time and geographic scale.
If the idea of a paratroop drop was to infiltrate the static lines then attack in coordination with a major ground offensive as the Sturmtruppen did, then I can see what the Allied proponents of this idea were trying to achieve. If the Allied planners were willing to accept the same rate of losses with the AB that the German Sturmtruppen suffered, the goal of breaking the stalemate could have been achieved. The losses among the Sturmtruppen was considered by the Germans less than the traditional assault cost which had failed the last three years for both sides.
It may have worked.... we will never know. All the same, the life expectancy of a new Allied AB guy or a German Sturmtruppen in 1918.
Dog Soldier