Forums

Historians of all stripes seem to think that after Napoleon won at Waterloo, the campaign was over. However, the more I think about this the more I have to question that line of reasoning.

Let's assume that after a hard fight, Napoleon's Imperial Guard fights it's way through the British line and opens the road to Brussels. This might win the battle, but does it win the war?

Reports of a French victory at Waterloo would have certainly caused panic and a corresponding weakening of the Allied cause and an increase in French national morale. But in the short term tactical outlook, it appears to me that by advancing on Brussels with the rest of his badly mauled army Napoleon would only have been sticking his head further into the noose. Indeed it is doubtful whether Napoleon could have moved on Brussels at all. Night had fallen and his army was tired, hungry and in a shambles. Ordering an advance on brussels would have been well nigh impossible.

Napoleon already had/ a long and tenuous supply line that after the battle would have been threatened by the Prussians on one side and the Anglo-Allied on the other. Taking a look at the numbers alone gives an idea of how precarious Napoleon's situation was. Before Waterloo, Napoleon's Army numbered 77,000 (excluding Grouchy's 30,000), the Prussians 100,00 (of which 53,000 were actually engaged at Waterloo) and the Anglo-Allied army 72,000 (excluding 17,000 men at Hal). Napoleon suffered 25,000 casualties, Blucher 7,000 and Wellington 15,000.

Napoleon is then out numbered three to one with little hope of being re-inforced or relieved by Grouchy. His Prussian opponents out number him two to one, are relatively fresh and most importantly are led by a fighter in Blucher who has a free hand in his handling of the Prussian army.

The Anglo-Allied army was in worse shape and would probably have suffered many desertions and defections among the Dutch and Belgians in the event of a French victory. However, the British contingent made up of tough Peninsular War veterans would soon have rallied around Wellington after their defeat. Wellington also had 17,000 fresh British troops within easy marching distance to the west at Hal. Wellington is also a fighter but he did not have Blucher's free hand, as he was under the direction of the British government. I don't know what instructions Wellington had from the government in the event of an English defeat, but assuming he did stick around to fight, Napoleon would been in a real pickle.

Any one care to comment on this?

Wellington, would have had to retreat to the coast, and possibly evacuate. Blucher would have been forced to withdraw to protect his LOC.

All that said, the fall would have seen a replay of the 1814 campaign and Napoleon loosing, yet again.

A French victory at Waterloo means more deaths over the next twelve months with the same results.

al

I would have to agree with Al.

Napoleon's campaign at Waterloo was an effort to by time to forestall the coming allied invasion of France to depose him. The monarchy's in Europe were united in preventing Republican ideals being exported from France. They were certainly united in not having Napoleon on the stage of European politics in any form. A weakened and docile France was all they were interested in after decades of war.

If Napoleon won at Waterloo he would have done so by breaking that "thin red line". Thus the core of the Anglo-Allied Army would have suffered much larger casualties in the British contingent as result of that line being broken and the eventual retreat / route? Conversely the French would not have suffered as many casualties and disruption to thier army that resulted from their historical rout.

Wellington and Blucher would have retired to fight another day. The forces gathering in Hapsburg and Romanov empires would have eventually made their way west to form a ring around France.

The most curious question would be for me, is could Napoleon broker a peace before the Allied ring was formed that left him in power in France? What divisions in the coalition could he have exploited to buy such a peace? This political aspect would have been his best chance to rebuild France, its military, and treasury to fuel his ambitions at a later date.

Dog Soldier

(07-31-2011, 05:31 PM)D-Day_Dodger Wrote: [ -> ]Reports of a French victory at Waterloo would have certainly caused panic and a corresponding weakening of the Allied cause and an increase in French national morale. But in the short term tactical outlook, it appears to me that by advancing on Brussels with the rest of his badly mauled army Napoleon would only have been sticking his head further into the noose. Indeed it is doubtful whether Napoleon could have moved on Brussels at all. Night had fallen and his army was tired, hungry and in a shambles. Ordering an advance on brussels would have been well nigh impossible.

Just on this point; you need to remember that at the time there was no such thing as "Belgium." Napoleon and his army would have advanced to Brussels which was a French city. Plenty of new recruits would have come over too, many of whom were fighting the French the day before. From that central location with the Brits and Prussians in retreat; L' Emperor would have awaited developments in a friendly city. jonny :smoke:

Interesting thread, thanks guys.

Some points:

The 17000 man Halle detachment contained only one brigade of (non Peninsular War veteran) British troops.

Napoleon gave the Allies a run for their money in 1814 with much smaller forces than would have been available after a french victory against Wellington and Blucher. And he had Davout in Paris, training his reserves.

Wellington and Blucher were Napoleon's most successful and determined opponents. The Saxon mutiny in the spring of 1815 suggests less than universal enthusiasm for the Allied cause among former Confederation of the Rhein members. Potential rifts between the Russians, Prussians and Austrians suggest Napoleon would have had a chance in 1815 after a victory in the Waterloo campaign.

Napoleon once said, "I am France, and France is me!" Well in 1815, not so much. He was on a very short leash politically. Any victory would have given him only a brief 'bump in the polls'. The Allies would never stop coming at him. In the end Napoleon looses. I think by the end of '15, but the whole mess could've strung out until '17, but I doubt it.

Interesting question, although in the 1814 campaign Napoleon had won a series of battles this had only stalled the Allied advance and the campaign was won by the French being ground down by sheer weight of numbers, i have no reason to believe the campaign of 1815 (and maybe into 1816) would have been any different, one thing that united the Allies was that they knew after 20 years of fighting they could not allow Napoleon to establish himself in France again, so they would have thrown everything possible man at him.

A lot has been made of the forces in the North with maybe 500,000 Allied troops facing 200,000 French, a situation that Napoleons brilliance might have coped with, but a study of the forces in the south paints a very bleak picture for the French, 80,000 Spanish/Portuguese forces being faced by only 15,000 French and Suchet at Lyon had only 23,500 troops facing 100,000 Allied troops, it is hard to see how the French could have prevented large areas of France being occupied?

The last and maybe most important factor is that Napoleon showed a noticeable drop in his abilities in the Hundred Days campaign, a severe bout of Hemorrhoids was preventing him from ranging over the battlefield on horseback and his delegation of tactical decisions to other commanders proved fatal at Waterloo, no doubt he could have still achieved victories over the forces of Barclay de Tolly and Schwarzenburg, but in the end the chips were stacked too high against him i believe.

I suppose any argument that Napoleon could have won against all the Allies in 1815 includes the implied, "if he was at the top of his game."

(08-02-2011, 09:44 PM)FM WarB Wrote: [ -> ]I suppose any argument that Napoleon could have won against all the Allies in 1815 includes the implied, "if he was at the top of his game."

....and his rear end didn't hurt too much. :cheeky: