Forums

Hi All

I have spent the past few months (actually almost a year) doing some research on the German army. I hope this provides some inspiration for LCGS and scenarions :)

From 1938-1945 a philosophical debate raged in the German army regarding the organization of the German army divisions. One thing is clear, the disorganization and the creation of 3 different departments fielding ground units in the German armed forces is probably the most overlooked cause of the German defeat in World War 2. If you look for the evidence there exists a wealth of information that conclusively proves that had the German Armed forces coordinated their resources and manpower more effectively through standardization of equipment and TOES it is very conceivable that the German army even in 1944 might been able to force a stalemate on the Eastern Front.

There were from 1941-through 1945 essentially 3 arguments running in the German army:

General Guderian: Less panzer divisions and bigger Panzer divisions. Guderian recognized the critical weakness of the German army. Logistics. The German army simply was not capable of providing the necessary logistics for the war on the eastern front. The Russian army won at a terrible price, but one wonders why was it so difficult for the Russian army to defeat an army that was constantly running the logistics systems to the breaking point, not to mention poorly coordinating its equipment and resources.

General Balck: Smaller is better. The argument from his side was for bigger divisions but smaller units at the Battalion level and company level. In fact the 1944 Panzer Division was created from General Balcks 1943 concept panzer division. The major components of General Balcks 1943-Panzer division was as follows:

1x Panzer Brigade:
3x Panzer Battalion, 1x Panzer Grenadier Battalion (SPW), 1x Flak Battalion, 1x Artillery Battalion, 1x Engineer Company, 1x Recon Company, 1x Assault Gun/Tank Destroyer Company

2x Panzer Grenadier Brigades
1x Assault Gun Battalion, 3x Panzer Grenadier Battalion (mot), 1x Flak Battalion, 1x Artillery Battalion, 1x Engineer Company, 1x Recon Company, 1x Anti-Tank Company

Adolf Hitler: Like it or not. Hitler’s move in 1940 to increase the number of Panzer Divisions was the correct move in terms of TOE (the modern US marine division for all practical purposes is an exact copy of the 1944 Panzer Division). It created by accident the ideal balance of infantry and armor. Unfortunately it also created a logistical nightmare for which the German army was not prepared for and would never recover from. It was beyond the capacity of the German armed forces to provide the necessary logistical lift to ensure a quick victory in 1941. Adolf Hitler’s bet was to win the war in the east before December –1941, he lost the bet and as such after that it was a matter of time before the German army committed a fatal error. That came at Stalingrad. If you look at the underlying reasons for the German defeat at Stalingrad it was quite simple: Logistics.

In 1943 Balck and Guderian were arguing for less and larger Panzers divisions for different reasons. There were some other issues that came up with the Panzer divisions. The Recon battalion was seen to be successful by Rommel however others saw it robbing the Panzer and Grenadier regiments of their own integral recon capability. The anti-tank battalion was overstaffed and not useful unless it paired up with other infantry units. Finally the Panzer battalions were never designed for independent operations mostly because of the limited logistics capability.

The German army may not have been impressed with the US tactical performance in Africa however they were very impressed with the standardization of equipment, which finally convinced the German army to get its house in order. The US Combat commands for all practical purposes closely mirrored the Kampfgruppes of the Panzer Divisions except with a more formalized structure. The CCA and CCB were useful however the CCR was next to useless as it was to small. Its no wonder in 1944 US army commanders were aruguing for 3 combat commands.

One of the issues with the Kampfgruppe concept was that there was no permanent HQ staff so command staff would have to be pulled together from various units who have never worked together. The result must of been total chaos. The lack of officers and NCOs in the German Army was already a serious problem AFTER THE POLISH CAMPAIGN in 1939. The division of German Panzer divisions in 1941 created a serious shortfall of qualified staff and NCOs to run the organizations. With the manpower losses from 1941-1943 once can easily see why the quality of the German army declined so rapidly in 1944.

The US Army assement of the German Army in 1944 was that it was better equipped in 1944 than it was in 1943-1942. This is true equipment wise and manpower wise, however it was also really the last breath of the German army as well. That being said the modern US army seems to have taken a few lessons from the 1944 Panzer Division

Lets put the armor and infantry units of a modern US Heavy Brigade combat team side by side with a typical German Panzer Kampfgruppe

1942 German Panzer Kampfgruppe vs US Heavy Brigade Combat Team 2010
4x Panzer Company-US BCT-2010-4x Armored Company
3x Panzer Grenadier Company+ Heavy Company- US BCT-2010-4x Mechanized Company
1x Engineer Company- US BCT-2010-2x Engineer Company
1x Artillery Battalion- US BCT-2010-1x Fires Support Battalion
1x Recon Company- US BCT-2010-1x Cavalry Squadron
1x Assault Gun Company
1x Flak Company

Who says people dont learn from history!!

In summary the German army would have been better off maintaining fewer larger Panzer Division by increasing their infantry component and ensuring the formations in the field get priority on replacement and equipment to maintain their strength. General Guderian and Balck were correct in their push for larger divisions, except Guderian got it right on both counts; he realized the serious shortfall of officers and NCO, General Balck did not.

Lets assume had the plan been executed it needs to follow 3 basic concepts:

Every 3rd Panzer Division is eliminated:
Surplus personnel and equipment is used to equip 2 panzer divisions. This would bring them to about 160-200 tanks + 30 tank destroyers each. Also Panzer Grenadier Battalions get 5 companies instead 4. The regiments now get a light recon battalion with a full command staff which can be rapidly expanded to a KG Panzer or PG battalion. The Panzer division now has ability to hold ground (10 extra infantry companies) and operate independently. In addition an officer and NCO reserve is created and trucks are made available for logistics from the disbanded panzer division

Elimination of all Panzer Grenadier divisions
Some surplus personnel and equipment is handed over to the panzer divisions however most personnel would go to the infantry divisions. The assault gun battalion is handed over to the panzer division as well. This would add about 30-40 assault guns per panzer division hence now we have a combat formation with 160-200 tanks and 40-80 assault guns. In addition an officer and NCO reserve is created and LARGE AMOUNT OF trucks are made available for logistics or to create a truck reserve which can than be used to provide the necessary lift to infantry divisions that operate with Panzer Divisions.

Large Battalions: The 1st 2 steps would not have solved the German army’s NCO and officer shortfall after 1939. General Balck was wrong to argue for small battalions, the officer and NCO problem would have remained, hence the solution for the German army was large battalions.

This concept panzer division would have looked something like this:

1x Panzer Regiment with
1 Panzer Battalion (PzV): 4x Pz Company (17-22 tanks each)
1 Panzer Battalion (PzIV): 4x Pz Company (17-22 tanks each)
1 Assault Gun Battalion (SG-III): 3x Assault Gun Company (11-14 each)
1 Recon Battalion (Reserve KG Staff): : 1x Scout Car Company, 1-2 Light Recon Company, 1x Heavy Company
1 Engineer Company, 1 Flak Company, 1 Artillery Battery

2x Panzer Grenadier Regiments with
1 Panzer Grenadier Battalion (SPW): 4x PG Company, 1x Heavy Company
1 Panzer Grenadier Battalion: (Mot): 4x PG Company, 1x Heavy Company
1 Light Recon Battalion (Reserve KG Staff): 1x Scout Car Company, 1-2 Light Recon Company, 1x Heavy Company
1 Engineer Company, 1 Flak Company, 1 Artillery Battery

The light recon battalion in the Panzer and Panzer Grenadier regiment improves on the US CCA, CCB and CCR concept. Most German Kampgruppes were of battalions size, hence it would make sense for the German army to have a KG Reseve that would be a dual purpose Recon battalion with a full command staff so that it could be expanded into a Panzer or Panzer Grenadier Kampfgruppe.

1 Artillery Regiment with:
1 Panzer Artillery Battalion- Intrestingly enough General Balck and others really did not like SP artillery
2 Motorized Artillery Battalion,
1 Heavy Artillery Battalion (150mm-170mm),
1 Rocket Battalion (150-300mm)

Divisional assets:
1 Mobile Recon Battalion (Standardized with Kublewagens and with really small PG companies of 3 rifle platoons)

Anti-tank Battalion
HQ staff (Admin purposes only, not for tactical employment)
3 Mobile companies ideally with a mix of 75mm and 88mm SP platforms to be parceled out to the regiments
1 towed company (75mm)

1 Engineer battalion
1 Flak Battalion
1 Tiger Company (from all the disbanded Tiger battalions)

Rene (osiris)

:stir: I'll kick off with three points. Yours in italics
1. The lack of officers and NCOs in the German Army was already a serious problem AFTER THE POLISH CAMPAIGN in 1939.
I for one would like to see some evidence for this unsupported statement. The alleged "serious problem" was not evident in 1940/41, I think.
2. If you look at the underlying reasons for the German defeat at Stalingrad it was quite simple: Logistics.
What about the development of a strategic position which allowed a long open flank guarded(?) by allies of doubtful capability? What about Hitler's apparent obsession with Stalingrad?What about the German policy towards the untermenschen? which built up such universal opposition...you use the term "underlying". What about the role in Stalingrad of leaders of great stature...Kruschev? Zhukov? The T-34?
3. Hitler gets a mention for 1940-1. That's all. Presumably he had no role in the structure of the Heer after that time.

(10-06-2010, 02:24 PM)Osiris Wrote: [ -> ]I have spent the past few months (actually almost a year) doing some research on the German army. I hope this provides some inspiration for LCGS and scenarions :)

Rene - thanks for your research - interesting points!

(10-06-2010, 02:24 PM)Osiris Wrote: [ -> ]From 1938-1945 a philosophical debate raged in the German army regarding the organization of the German army divisions. One thing is clear, the disorganization and the creation of 3 different departments fielding ground units in the German armed forces is probably the most overlooked cause of the German defeat in World War 2.

Actually, I'm not sure how "overlooked" the German disorganization and fielding of 3 different departments of ground units... is by modern historians? :chin: In Stephen Ambrose's D-Day June 6, 1944: The Climatic Battle of WWII he writes:

"For all their prattling about the fuhrer principle of ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuhrer (one people, one state, one leader), the Nazis ran the armed services as they ran the government, by the principle of divide and rule. Hitler deliberately mixed the lines of authority so that no one ever knew precisely who was in command of what. This characteristic of the fuhrer's was exacerbated by the natural and universal tendency of air, sea, and ground forces to indulge in interservice rivalry."

"The fragmentation of command reached ridiculous proportions. For example, the naval coastal guns along the Channel would remain under naval control as the Allied fleets approached the coast. But the moment Allied troops began to land, command of the coastal batteries would revert to the Wehrmacht. Bad enough for Rommel, it was never clear whether he or Rundstedt would control the battle. Worst of all, Hitler wanted to command himself. Hitler kept control of the panzer divisions in his hands. They could be committed to the battle only on his orders - and his headquarters was a thousand kilometers from the scene, and those were the divisions Rommel was depending on for a first-day counterattack. It was madness."

(10-06-2010, 02:24 PM)Osiris Wrote: [ -> ]If you look for the evidence there exists a wealth of information that conclusively proves that had the German Armed forces coordinated their resources and manpower more effectively through standardization of equipment and TOES it is very conceivable that the German army even in 1944 might been able to force a stalemate on the Eastern Front.

I would argue that in 1944, the German Armies main problem was they had conquered too much territory and could not defend "everywhere" at once. Then, two major defeats... Stalingrad and Battle of Kursk... eliminated all possibility of a German military victory against the Soviet Union... while the D-Day invasion at Normandy signaled the beginning of the end for the defeat of Germany in the West.

Again, the words of Stephen Ambrose:

"The Germans had taken four years to build the Atlantic Wall. They had poured thousands of tons of concrete, reinforced by hundreds of thousands of steel rods. They had dug hundreds of kilometers of trenches. They had placed millions of mines and laid down thousands of beach obstacles. It was a colossal construction feat that had absorbed a large precentage of Germany's material, manpower, and building capacity in Western Europe."

"At Utah, the Atlantic Wall had held up the U.S. 4th Division for less than one hour. At Omaha, it had held up the U.S. 29th and 1st divisions for less than one day. At Gold, Juno, and Sword, it had held up the British 50th, the Canadian 3rd, and the British 3rd divisions for about an hour. As there was absolutely no depth to the Atlantic Wall, once it had been penetrated, even if only by a kilometer, it was useless. Worse then useless, because the Wehrmacht troops manning the Atlantic Wall east and west of the invasion were immobile, incapable of rushing to the sound of the guns."

"The Atlantic Wall must therefore be regarded as one of the greatest blunders in military history."

The lack of officers and NCOs in the German Army was already a serious problem AFTER THE POLISH CAMPAIGN in 1939. I for one would like to see some evidence for this unsupported statement. The alleged "serious problem" was not evident in 1940/41, I think.

I would not make this statement unless I could support it the 3 sources should be sufficient. T

German army expanded 20 fold in a 6 year period-1935-1941

“Such efforts notwithstanding the Heer experienced pre war growing pains. It had a severe and insurmountable ffficer shortage which reinforced the army traiditonal reliance on NCO’s. Yet the shortage in late 1930”s was even more acute. The Heer thus went to war in September 1939 underofficered, a situation that steadily worsened throughout the war”
Clash of Arms How the Allies won Normandy

Other sources

ROTATION -OF GENERAL OFFICERS -AND COMMAND DURATION.
GERMAN GENERAL OFFICER CASUALTIES IN WORLD WAR II -- HARBINGER FOR U.S. ARMY GENERAL OFFICER CASUALTIES IN AIRLAND BATTLE? Major French L. MacLean.

COMMAND CONTINUITY ON THE AIRLAND BATTLEFIELD LESSONS LEARNED,
NEWSLETTER NO. 88-1, CPT Michael Foncannon

Even late in the war the average training time for a German officer was 18 months. Pretty tough to fill those officer slots especially if the average German officer slot in the Heer was filled 9.2 times!!!

2. If you look at the underlying reasons for the German defeat at Stalingrad it was quite simple: Logistics. What about the development of a strategic position which allowed a long open flank guarded by allies of doubtful capability?

This is a tactical issue not covered by the research however I will do my best to answer the question since it is related to the issue above. Stalingrad was not the original target of the Operatio Blau but the oil fields were. Hitler changed his mind midway and decided that Stalingrad should be the main objective. The German manpower and logistic situation could only sustain 1 drive not both. There seems to be general agreement that German Army Groups A and B should have launched an envelopment of the city. There seems to be agreement among historians that had the Germans done this Stalingrad would have fallen much faster. To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942.-Colonel Glantz

As for the German allies they they gave a good account of themselves in most cases. However when 1.5 million Russians hit you with everything they got and your biggest tank gun is a 37mm-than I think this quote by US Infantry will do-If you don’t have any weapons that can stop a tank..Its not obsoloete..The German allies did not have the weapons to fight T-34/s and it was not obsolete!

What about Hitler's apparent obsession with Stalingrad?
This goes back to question2. It was not the original target of the drive until after the operation started. If Hitler wanted Stalingrad so badly he should have never divided the drives. The manpower was not there to do both and the logistics system was stretched to the limit. (When Titans Clashed)

What about the German policy towards the untermenschen? which built up such universal opposition...you use the term "underlying".

Again outside the scope of the research..however the partisan movement at times did have fairly serious effects on German operations. Kursk and Operation Bagration, diversion of manpower to form security divisions instead of infantry divisions.

What about the role in Stalingrad of leaders of great stature...Kruschev? Zhukov?
They won. The only question is why did it take so long for them to defeat a half supplied army in the first place. Kursk Northern Wing-1st week tank and artillery ammunition shortages, Kharkov August 1943- lack of artillery shells force the Germans to retreat because they did not have the manpower to hold the city and surrounding area with out huge amounts of artillery shells (of course the Russians cut the rail line but than again the Germans were unable to reroute the supplies so they abandoned Kharkov for the very last time because they did not have the necessary lift capacity (Decision in The Ukraine)

The T-34?
The list of strategic German intelligence failures is long. The biggest failure was one that any German high school student in 1940 with a half a functioning brain could have solved for the operation planners of Operation Barbarossa- Russia-Population 170+ million

Hitler gets a mention for 1940-1. That's all. Presumably he had no role in the structure of the Heer after that time.

Hitlers primary role was the expansion of the German army. He did not invent the Panzer division. Hitlers obession with numbers is why he divided the panzer divisions in 2 in 1941 for Operation Barbarossa-by accident he created a very fine and balanced formation but that was not his intention. If he could get over his obession with creating new divisions and putting the replacements back into the frontline divisions the manpower issues in the German army might better utilized but Hitler insisted on creating new division even in 1945 when the officer cadre to create such formations simple no longer existed. On Armor- Bruce I. Gudmundsson

enjoy :)

Hi Rene,

Really interesting. Besides the sources you listed above I'd love to know what other materials, books, articles etc. you used for your research. Any especially good reads?

Dave

Hi Dave and everyone else

Here is a few sources;;knock your self out;;hahahahaha!!!!

Books:
Soviet Blitzkrieg-very cool book
East Front Drama-1944-
Bagration 1944
Steel Inferno
Men of Steel
Panzer Operations
Decision in the Ukraine
Operation Zitadelle
Soviet Tank Units 1939-1945
Panzer Tactics
SS Armor on the Eastern Front-mostly pictures-but useful
On Armor
Red Army Handbook-Defenite must have for Soviet TOE-anything else dont count

Online Sources
Kursk Page
East Front Index
Axis History Factbook
Feld Grau
Achtung Panzer

German Units: http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/ger2.html

Panzer Grenadier: in german
(http://www.freundeskreis-panzergrenadier...ft_10.pdf)

TOES German (company level): http://www.wwiidaybyday.com/kstn/kstnmain.htm

Handbook On German Military Forces: for the complete version go here: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Germany/...l#contents

GENERALS BALCK AND VON MELLENTHIN ON TACTICS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO MILITARY DOCTRINE (PDF)-A must read document

Analysis of DEEP ATTACK OPERATIONS: OPERATION BAGRATION
BELORUSSIA 22 JUNE-29 AUGUST 1944 (O;Connor)[/size]

THE ROOTS OF SOVIET VICTORY: THE APPLICATION OF OPERATIONAL ART ON THE EASTERN FRONT, 1942-1943

Kursk Page

Welcome to Panzer Grenadier (incomplete site but useful)

Intelligence Briefing Late war Soviet Army: http://blog.pierrickauger.fr/__oneclick_...soviet.pdf

Soviet Intel Page: http://www.1-33rdar.org/sovietintlt1.htm

ST 100-7-OPFOR Battle Book- Must read for scenario designers
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/docs...index.html

DTIC-Online Information for the Defense Community-some cool stuff in their but down loads are sooo sloooow or na

Chapter 3: Strategic and Operational March: FM-100-61-Global Security.org

The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945)

The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay by David M. Glantz

August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria

Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk-David M Glantz

Omaha Beachhead: http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/1...100-11.htm
Awesome read if you want to know what really happened at Omaha beach

The Long and Winding Road: The US Army Managerial Approach to Command and the Adoption of Auftragstaktik (Mission Comamnd): http://portal.idc.ac.il/He/schools/Gover...0Paper.doc

Order Out of Chaos: A Case Study of the Application of Auftragstaktik by the 11th Panzer Division during the Chir River Battles 7-19 December 1942: http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getReco...=ADA209474

US Army Centre of Military History
US Command and General Staff College-US Army Combined Arms Centre

Fire and Fury Games
Canuck Commander
IMSTRAT PB maps--very awesome and cool site
Naval Warfare Simulations