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From my M44 alt scenario description:

Quote:-Standardized Russian and Russian-Guards unit quality ratings. Russian line units are given D quality and Russian-Guards units are given C quality. For the most part this is already true in all PzC titles with the exception of a few units, usually given B quality for play balance purposes. With the McNamara OOB based changes, this is no longer required. Obviously, the quality standardization results in some Guards units changing from B to C but it also resulted in just as many Guards artillery units (and other supporting units) changing from D to C. It also resulted in many Russian units changing from E to D. This was all done for several reasons. Firstly, it is a logical assumption that a Guards division distinguished itself in battle, therefore it should be rated higher. More often than not, Soviet units had high casualty rates so instead of some divisions being high quality, the organizations as a whole remained at a standard level but unit leaders (HQ units) would be higher rated if it was a “good” unit. The other reason it was done is to remove the feeling of uniqueness within the Red Army (where, before, some units would be good quality and some would be terrible quality). Instead the emphasis is placed on quantity, the “horde”, individual unit ratings (of the formidable Russian medium and heavy tanks and their artillery), and HQ unit ratings.

Several books (such as von Mellenthin’s “Panzer Battles”) make the observation that the Red Army lacked individualism which is characteristic of western armies. This lack of individualism produced an almost automaton adherence to doctrine without any creativity whatsoever at the tactical level. The real strength of a unit was in how it was wielded at the strategic level. The individual fighter in the Red Army was, either intentionally or not, submerged into the “crowd” or “herd”. To that end, there is no real justification for Red Army units to be of sporadic quality levels between B and E but, rather, a standard average quality of C and D for combat units and varying quality levels ranging from excellent to terrible for individual HQ, based on their ability. These quality levels for HQs affect many variables and, given that “out of command” or “detached” units produce realistically severe effects (ie. artillery spotting by detached units get reduced artillery strike effectiveness and detached units gain less replacements), these individual HQ ratings can thus be extremely important. As mentioned above, this standardized quality approach takes focus off of individual unit’s (battalions) effectiveness and instead treats them as a collective

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Is this really historical or just a stereotype? - how much credit can you give a German general like Mellenthin who was likely predisposed to see the Russians as a faceless horde? Everything I have read by Glantz, Erickson and others points to a wide disparity of unit quality, particularly in the early years of the war - from fanatical resistance on par with the Japanese to disordered mobs. The guards units late in the war should IMO be of comparable quality to the elite units of any army.

Glantz wrote in 1986:

Quote:One of the most influential postwar German war critiques was General von Mellenthin’s Panzer Battles published ln English in 1956. Mellenthin’s work, an operational/tactical account of considerable merit, echoed the criticism of Hitler voiced by Guderian and showed how Hitler’s adverse influence affected tactical operations. Beyond this, Mellenthin’s work adopted a didactic approach in order to analyze operations and hence educate officers. Throughout the book are judgments concerning military principles and assessments of the nature of the Soviet fighting men and officers, most of which have been incorporated into the current “body of truth” about Soviet military capabilities. Hence, Mellenthin made such judgments as these: the Russian soldier is tenacious on defense, inflexible on offense, subject to panic when facing unforeseen eventualities, an excellent night fighter, a master of infiltra- tion, a resolute and implacable defender of bridgeheads, and neglectful of the value of human life. As was in the case of Guderian, Mellenthin’s experiences against the Red Army encompassed the period before spring 1944 and reflected impressions acquired principally during years of German success.

Mellenthln’s work, written without benefit of archival materials, tended to treat tactical cases without fully describing their operational context. Opposing Soviet units, as in Guderian’s work, were faceless. Mellenthin’s classic account of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps’ operations along the Chir River after the encirclement of German 6th Army at Stalingrad stands as an example of the weaknesses of his book. In it he describes the brilliant operations of that panzer corps in fending off assaults by Soviet 5th Tank Army’s units which included first the 1st Tank Corps and later 5th Mechanized Corps. On 7-8 December 1942, 11ch Panzer Division parried a thrust of 1st Tank Corps at State Farm 79 while on 19 December, 11th Panzer checked the advance of 5th Mechanized Corps. Despite the vivid accounts of these tactical successes, Mellenthin only in passing describes the operational disaster that provided a context for these fleeting tactical successes. For, in fact, while Soviet 5th Tank Army occupied XXXXVIII Panzer Corps’ attention, to the northwest Soviet forces overwhelmed and destroyed the Italian 8th Army and severely damaged Army Detachment Hollidt. Moreover, Mellenthin did not mention (probably because he did not know) that Soviet 1st Tank Corps had been in nearly continuous operation since 19 November and was under strength and worn down when it began its march across the Chir.

Similar flaws appear elsewhere in Mellenthin’s work, many of which result from a lack of knowledge of opposing Soviet forces or their strengths.

http://internet128.com/index.php/2006/09...r-battles/

Maj Timothy Wray also criticizes the distorted view of the Soviet army that came from relying solely on German sources:

Quote:the shallow knowledge of Western analysts is often based as much on myth as on fact. A major reason for this is that Western knowledge of the Russo-German War has been unduly influenced by the popular memoirs of several prominent German military leaders. While interesting and even instructive to a point, these memoirs suffer from the prejudices, lapses, and wishful remembering common to all memoirs and, therefore, form a precarious foundation on which to build a useful analysis. For example, even though Heinz Guderian’s Panzer Leader and F. W. von Mellenthin’s Panzer Battles regularly appear on U.S. Army professional reading lists and contain interesting insights into German military operations, each book paints a somewhat distorted picture of the German war against Russia. These distortions are the result of outright exaggeration and misrepresentation (as is common in Guderian’s work) or the omission of important qualifying data and contextual background (as is more often the case in Mellenthin’s book).

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/...y/wray.asp

Well, I am not going to get into a lengthy debate or discussion defending the actions taken in the _Alt (because no approach is perfect), but what it comes down to is: if you don't like the changes made in the _Alt then please don't play it. I must make it clear that I don't mean that in a bad way, I just mean it that the _Alt is an optional experience. I am not going to retool it because this Maj Wray wrote his head turning thesis paper on the topic that von Mellenthin's observations are in fact total nonsense. But I will at least make a lengthy post on why the _Alt design decision was made once and for all. ;)

The fact of the matter is, who says this Maj Timothy Wray is correct? Who says his observations are incorrect? For all we know Wray is a Russophile. That is of course most likely not the case, and for all we know maybe it is true that von Mellethin was making faulty or biased observations. It certainly is an interesting thesis, which is the whole point of a thesis paper to begin with, and we all know how people love to prove or attempt to prove how common belief up until this point is incorrect in order to turn the world upside down, because the source material or person was "too close" to the topic and was somehow biased. However, no disrespect to Maj Wray, Glantz, or anyone else, but I tend to put a more credit in von Mellentin's and von Manstein's observations than someone who lived some 50+ years after the fact. The truth of the matter is, "everyone with a book" has an opinion. As mentioned, the whole purpose of these earth shattering theses is to make an interesting and intellectual argument that challenges the preconceived notions and the common understanding up until this point. Does that mean they have any facts behind the thesis? Sure, but does it mean that they also present any facts that disprove their thesis? No. Does it also mean that von Mellenthin's and/or von Manstein's observations are invalidated? Certainly not. I am sure you can find plenty of papers saying how von Mellenthin's observations are spot on.

Surely too, you have to know that von Mellenthin was writing those final observations in the 1950s as an advisement to "the western world" on how to fight the Soviets. For what reason does he have to make them seem less capable than they were? It would be counter productive if he was, given that his whole purpose at the end of the book is to convince "the western world" that the Soviets are going to be a threat that have to be countered, and in reality, he did not "trash" them in his observations. Ironically, or truthfully, the Soviets had these same basic traits throughout the Cold War, so I doubt that they were something reinvented after the war ended. Interestingly enough, in my time in the US Army we trained along the very lines that the Soviets / a Soviet style force adhered to doctrine and had no creativity or flexibility at the tactical level. Was that a bad thing? No, it was just one of their many traits which is primarily what von Mellenthin was stating. He also compliments them quite well, and conveys the idea that they are to be respected and feared / taken very seriously because they are "immense and well organized", adaptive and cruelly efficient.

But anyway, all that is useless text. What it really comes down to (why the change was made and why von Mellenthin's observations were used as means to justify the end and why the thesis/observations from Glantz and Wray are meaningless here in this context) is quite simple: In the _Alt, the Russians have quality in their tanks and artillery and other units, quality of assault ratings in almost all of their units, and quality in their quantity of force. With that being the case, something had to be done to make them a bit less powerful *because the ratings used for their tanks, guns and other units made them much more powerful than the stock game* so the common quality approach was initiated to give them a flaw, but also a trait in that they are this huge homogeneous and uniform entity, which is very effective but is otherwise not some sort of "western" type force in the traditional sense (quality versus quantity). If they have both quality in, well, their unit quality then they end up with a simple formula of:

quality (in morale and unit quality) + quality (in equipment and combat ratings) + quality (in quantity) force = much better than anything the Germans have

In other words, the Germans have absolutely no way that they can somehow be a numerically inferior force and in any way hope to have a chance at resisting the Russians when they are outmatched in every single way. This somehow doesn't seem to be historical.

That said, if you think that this somehow means that the _Alt makes the Russians ineffective, then you should probably try out Kursk'43_Alt, Korsun'44_Alt, Stalingrad'42_Alt, Minsk'44_Alt (and others) and see if you think differently after giving it a go. If I took any other approach and we take Maj Wray's word on how it was, then I guess these _Alt games wouldn't turn out in any way shape or form historical with B+ quality Russians effortlessly stampeding over the Germans in every campaign. Did the Russian's change from what they were in 1941 to what they were in 1943 and 1944? Of course they did, but the _Alt already represents this with increasing unit ratings, increasing numbers, and more Guard formations. Do Wray and Glantz make good points? Yes, but it doesn't exactly invalidate Wray's, Glantz's, von Mellenthin's or von Manstein's observations with what I have done in the _Alt. I could arguably go lower with the quality from von Mellenthin and von Manstein's observations, and I could go higher with Wray and Glantz's theses, instead it is more or less in the center.

*edited for typos*

thanks for the explanation, my quibble was more with historical issues in your wording in the docs than the actual mechanics of the scenarios, which I play and do balance well. I suppose one could arrive at the C ratings as an average of A through F in platoons or companies across a battalion or to account for logistics and other issues that would lead to C-level disruption levels.

I think the reality of the Eastern Front was that by 1944 the quality of the better Soviet units was on par with the Germans, which is one factor to why they won all the major engagements after Kursk.

Yes, my wording is not the best of choices. Going by my wording alone it would seem that I crippled the Soviets based on von Mellenthin's observations alone when, in reality, I simply standardized their unit quality to what they appear (as a majority) in the stock game (C and D) as a means to balance, and only used von Mellenthin's observation as an explanation. I guess I should reword that part of the notes one day.

Also, in 1943-1944, I have taken the approach of gradually dropping the quality of the German units so that it puts the Russians closer to that of the German. As mentioned in some of those notes, I avoid the quality "arms race" (the tendency to go higher and higher with the quality) and instead start the Germans on the decline since their defeat at Stalingrad and the decline of the original glory days of the Blitzkrieg. Factor in that the Russians now have more Guards formations and the fact that their equipment was constantly getting better (the late model T-34s, the JS-IIs, and so on), then they will definitely appear to gain a qualitative advantage by the end of the war.

Actually, there is a hidden quality advantage over the germans as well, one of fatigue. The germans usually have to be broken down into companies to guard the front, and so take 3 times the fatigue your Russian battalions do. Which means that their quality will suffer as they hit yellow and red fatigue.

Yes, that is an excellent point -- it is another reason why the Germans need to be rated higher like they are, so that they can split up and effectively hold a wider front like what was historically and most often the case.

Even in the alt version and I agree there would still be some more variation than shown the Ruskies have it too easy in M44 and can acheive a more than historical resuly in less time

actualy VM version has it about right IMO though I am working on my version after playing that fully. You need to play the game and not look at just the morale ratings .

It is a sad fact that pretty much until the end in terms of quality ( leadership, initiative . tactics - you name it ) The Germans had the edge, they must have done history bears it out. They lost the war once they lost mobility... Kursk a point you made , a non mobile battle decided by attrition, just likie STGD. It was not the quality of the units but the numbers ( attrition) + a good dose of air superiority and logistics and some good Army level commanders

There is no way in the M44 game more than a handful of Russian units can make it to B ( though I have a few but I also downgraded one or two to E like the Lithuanian Div) although I have plenty of HQ improvements for the Russians ( HQ are more important now especially the ranges) . The real killer in M44 is the artillery and the supply levels to high later in the game. That also need toning down by reducing the setup and late game supply reductions 9 for both side but mainly the Soviets ) i.

My new version will be posted soon and I will welcome any commenst on that...

Cav

sorry for any typos

Very interesting thread. I personally think that while probably not being perfect, Volcano Man's scenarios are very well-balanced and based on solid and well-established assumptions. The points von Mellenthin has made have been confirmed and validated by a lot of other people that cannot all be accused of being "pro-German". I think it is an historical reality that from June 1941 to to mid-1943, the average German soldier was better trained and the operational doctrine of the German army did favor personal initiative and leadership especially among NCOs. This was not as emphasized in Soviet doctrine, and the stiffening role of the political commissars also insured stricter discipline and esprit de corps at the expense of initiative and creativity. But of course, those are general facts that were proven wrong in some cases and in some units.

After Kursk, in late 1943 and especially in 1944, there were less and less well-trained and experienced NCOs in the Wehrmacht and Germany was hitting a demographic limit in its capacity in raising young and fresh recruits. This was simply the reflect of the toll a 4-year war was starting to have on the quality and level of the recruits of the Wehrmacht at that time. The level of losses inflicted on the German on the Eastern front (especially at Kursk and in the attrition battles leading to the Dnepr) certainly diminished the quality of the average German soldier, NCO and officer to a point where the best Soviet units were certainly as best or even better than the best German units. Although the Soviets did suffer from higher casualties than the Germans all that time, a larger demographic pool, increased war experience and much better availability of simple and reliable material and hardware allowed them to bridge the gap and become a match to any other army at that time.