

CANADA'S ARMY

IN KOREA

THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS, 1950-53,
AND THEIR AFTERMATH

A SHORT OFFICIAL ACCOUNT
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P R E F A C E

This summary of the Canadian Army's part in the United Nations Operations in Korea, 1950-53, and its subsequent activities there, is published for the information of the people of Canada. It does not pretend to be a complete or a final account, but it is based upon official records and the compilers have been able to profit by the comments and suggestions of many officers who served in Korea.

The Korean campaigns were a great international undertaking conducted by the navies, armies and air forces of many free nations. In this little book it is out of the question to do justice to the gallant fighting men of Canada's allies. Our main concern has had to be with the part played by the Canadian Army.

An attempt has also been made to outline the work of the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force.

This brief history was originally published serially in five quarterly numbers of the *Canadian Army Journal*, beginning in January 1955. It is now reprinted, with some additions and corrections, in the present form. It is largely the work of Captain F. R. McGuire, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, who served in Korea in 1952-3 as Historical Officer with the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade.

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PART I

THE FIRST CANADIANS

IN KOREA

On 25 June 1950 the forces of the Communist state of North Korea launched a sudden invasion of South Korea. This aggression led to intervention by international armed forces - the first and, to date, the only United Nations "police action" in history.

The war which thus began turned out to be Canada's third most costly overseas conflict. In it Canadian soldiers served as part of a Commonwealth army formation and under a higher command which in the last analysis was not Canadian, not British and not American: it was a United Nations command.

Background of the Conflict

Korea is a mountainous peninsula about twice as large as Newfoundland, but with a population more than double that of the whole of Canada. At the end of the Second World War, as part of a Russo-American arrangement for accepting the surrender of Japanese forces in the country, it had been divided at the 38th Parallel. The Government of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), which in 1948 was established by popular vote under the auspices of the United Nations, was recognized by the U.N. General Assembly as the only valid government in the country. The North was a Soviet-sponsored state known as the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" and recognized only by the Communist powers.

Both during and after the withdrawal of their occupation troops, Russia and the United States trained and equipped Korean forces north and south of the 38th Parallel. At the time of the invasion of the Republic of Korea, the ROK army consisted of eight divisions armed only for border protection and internal security - no match for the North Korean People's Army, whose six divisions were supported by tanks, artillery and aircraft. Seoul, the South Korean capital, was doomed to fall before the end of June.

On the second day of action (25 June, North American time) the U.N. Security Council met in special session at the request of the United States. It passed a resolution demanding the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the North Koreans to the 38th Parallel, and calling upon all U.N. countries to "render every assistance in the execution of this resolution". "In these circumstances", the President of the United States announced two days later, "I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give Korean Government troops cover

and support". Within a few hours of Mr. Truman's statement the Security Council again met, and recommended that "the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."

On 28 June the British Government announced that it was placing its naval forces in Far Eastern waters at the disposal of the United States, to operate on behalf of the United Nations. Russia, whose delegate had absented himself from the Security Council's meetings since January, denounced the resolutions concerning Korea as illegal.

On the 30th Mr. Truman made his second crucial decision regarding American participation in the Korean conflict: he authorized the commitment of his country's ground forces. Accordingly the 24th Infantry Division of the Eighth United States Army (then engaged in the occupation of Japan) was sent to Korea by air and by sea.

American troops first made contact with the enemy on 5 July, some 30 miles south of the ROK capital. The NKPA was vastly superior in fire-power as well as numbers. The result was a long, bitter and costly delaying action, of which no adequate account can be given here.

In the first month of hostilities several other U.N. members provided or offered land, sea and air forces. A third Security Council resolution, passed on 7 July, recommended that all such forces be placed under a unified command, the commander to be designated by the United States. Seventeen days later the "United Nations Command" was set up in Tokyo, with General of the Army Douglas MacArthur at its head. Thus, while the United States continued to provide the leadership and to shoulder the lion's share of the burden of Korean operations, the enterprise assumed a distinctly United Nations character.

Formation of the CASF

Among those countries which had offered assistance was Canada. On 30 June three Canadian destroyers were ordered to the Western Pacific, where (as the Secretary of State for External Affairs later explained to the House of Commons) "they might be of assistance to the United Nations in Korea". They were formally offered to the U.N. on 12 July. Eight days later No. 426 (Transport) Squadron RCAF was assigned to the U.S. Military Air Transport Service operating between the United States and Japan. Meanwhile the provision of Canadian ground forces was under consideration. Some delay was unavoidable; for unlike Britain and the United States this country did not already have forces in the Far East, nor were any Canadian troops readily available for foreign service. Furthermore, until the creation

of the U.N. Command, there had been no concrete arrangement for the organization and employment of international forces in the service of the United Nations. (Both the actual offer of naval support and the provision of the air transport unit, it may be noted, came *after* the Security Council resolution of 7 July.)

On 7 August 1950 Mr. St. Laurent announced the raising of an infantry brigade, plus certain supporting arms and services, "to be available for use in carrying out Canada's obligations under the United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Pact". This contingent was named the Canadian Army Special Force.

Enrolment in the CASF was voluntary, the term of service being 18 months or "such further period as may be required in consequence of any action taken by Canada pursuant to an international agreement or where the term of service expires during an emergency or within one year of the expiration thereof". Recruiting, which began only two days after the Prime Minister's announcement, proceeded with great haste. The machinery being initially the same as that used for examining and screening applicants for regular service, many legal and administrative difficulties arose. Certain of these were overcome by special legislation, but most were met by improvising. That the inevitable confusion was kept within such reasonable bounds reflects most favourably on planning and recruiting staffs alike.

By 26 August the number of enlistments had reached 8000. A number of the officers, NCOs and specialists were drawn from the Active Force, as the Canadian Army (Regular) was then called. Units of the CASF were first located near their Active Force counterparts, which became responsible for their organization, administration and early training.

The infantry component of the Special Force was made up of second battalions of the three existing regular regiments: The Royal Canadian Regiment, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and the Royal 22e Régiment. Other major units included "A" Squadron 1st/2nd Armoured Regiment, the 2nd Field Regiment Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, the 57th Independent Field Squadron RCE, the 25th Brigade Signal Squadron RC Sigs, No. 54 Transport Company RCASC and No. 25 Field Ambulance Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps.

The Fighting in 1950

During July the ROK Army had been reconstituted and the American commitment substantially increased. The field formations of both countries were now under operational control of Lieut.-General Walton H. Walker's Eighth U.S. Army, whose

headquarters had moved to Korea from Japan and was responsible to the U.N. Command in Tokyo. The United Nations air forces, which already included an Australian squadron, dominated the skies. Meanwhile American and British naval units blockaded the Korean coast and, without enemy interference, continued to land reinforcements and supplies for the ground forces.

Thus strengthened and effectively supported from air and sea, General Walker's troops were able to offer increasing resistance and even, on occasion, to strike back at the North Koreans. Nevertheless they continued to withdraw until, in the first week of August, they held only the south-east corner of the peninsula. This position, which embraced Taegu (the temporary ROK capital) and the port of Pusan, was known as the "Pusan Perimeter". Here the Eighth Army stood firm, beating off all further enemy attacks, recapturing some lost ground, and all the while building up for offensive operations.

On 15 September, by which time the NKPA was itself on the defensive, the 10th U.S. Corps made an amphibious landing near Inchon, 20 miles west of Seoul. The whole area of the former capital was recaptured before the month's end. Meanwhile the Eighth Army had broken out of the Pusan Perimeter to link up with the 10th Corps. At the beginning of October General MacArthur called on the North Koreans to surrender, but they did not do so. Less than a week later the enemy's last organized defences south of the 38th Parallel had crumbled, and elements of the ROK Army had advanced some 60 miles into North Korea.

The Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly now met to consider what action should follow. The Soviet bloc contended that hostilities in Korea should cease and all foreign forces quit the country. Most of the nations which had supported the intervention favoured a British resolution that "all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea". By this resolution (which the General Assembly accepted on 7 October) the U.N. Commander was, in effect, authorized to carry on operations north of the 38th Parallel.

On 9 October American troops crossed this line in an advance on Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. Two days later a ROK division captured the eastern port of Wonsan before the 10th Corps could deliver there a repetition of its Inchon landing which had been planned. On the third day Pyongyang fell to the Americans. While the Eighth Army swept up the west coast, the 10th Corps advanced inland from Wonsan. The advance in the western sector was the more spectacular; on 26 October, South Korean elements under General Walker's command reached the Yalu River, the north boundary of Korea. Elsewhere across the front resistance now increased and, before the end of the month, the

enemy counter-attacked. This resulted in a general withdrawal to the Chongchon River, about 60 miles south of the Yalu. From a tactical point of view alone, it was not surprising that the U.N. advance should suffer some setbacks; for, being largely roadbound, it had not been maintained on a continuous front. But a more formidable and significant factor was that Communist China, which had said earlier that it would not remain inactive if the United Nations entered North Korea, had intervened with substantial forces.

During November the U.N. forces again made advances and regained much ground. On the 24th General MacArthur started a general offensive intended "to end the war". On the 26th, however, the Chinese launched a massive attack in the west, followed two days later by one in the east. The battered 10th U.S. Corps established a defensive perimeter about the port of Hungnam, through which evacuation by sea was completed the day before Christmas. The Eighth Army also was forced to withdraw, and by the middle of December held positions along the Imjin River, 200 miles south of the Yalu.

No Canadian ground forces had taken part in these operations; though some were now in the theatre, and others were soon to arrive.

Canadian Troops in Action

In September 1950 Canada had established, in Tokyo, a Military Mission to provide liaison with the U.N. Command. The Mission was headed by Brigadier F. J. Fleury.* Its first major task was to prepare the arrival of Canadian troops.

An advance party of some 350 all ranks sailed from Seattle in the latter part of October. The intention that the main body should go to Okinawa for further training, thence to Korea. By the time advance party reached Japan, however, certain changes of plan developed. In view of the prospect of early victory and an apparent lessening in the need for further ground forces, the immediate Canadian commitment was cut to one infantry battalion.

Okinawa for training had been dropped in favour of an area in Korea. The advance party disembarked at Pusan on 7 November.

The Canadian unit selected serve in the Far East was the 2nd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel J. R. Stone. The Patricias left Seattle on 25

* * The appointment was subsequently held successively by Brigadiers J. P. E. Bernatchez, A. B. Connelly, R. E. A. Morton and C. B. Ware and Colonel E. D. Elwood.

November, aboard the American troopship *Pvt Joe P. Martinez*, and arrived at Pusan on 18 December. Here they "staged" for nine days, then moved to Miryang, between Pusan and Taegu. Being only Canadian unit in the theatre, the Patricias required certain administrative elements not normal for an infantry battalion; hence the formation of an "Administrative Increment", for which personnel were drawn from the CASF advance party. The remainder of the party, less certain personnel attached to British and American formations, rejoined the main body in North America at the turn of the year.

During the latter half of December the Eighth Army continued to hold its positions on the Imjin without any major contacts being made. But the New Year opened with another crushing offensive by the Chinese. The Eighth Army's right flank collapsed, forcing a further general withdrawal. Seoul again fell to the Communists on 4 January. During the next three days the left flank pulled back to a line 40 miles south of the former capital. This line, which was later extended to the east coast, marked the limit of the U.N. forces' withdrawal.

While these events were taking place the newly arrived Canadian battalion underwent such further training in weapons and tactics as it required before being committed to battle. A degree of realism was effected by the performance of limited operational tasks, such as anti-guerilla patrols. These discovered caches of ammunition and dispersed parties of enemy. In the third week of January company exercises were carried out, followed closely by battalion exercises.

In mid-February the Patricias moved from Miryang to join the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade in the line of battle. This formation consisted of two British battalions - the 1st Middlesex Regiment and the 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - and the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment. Artillery support was provided by the 16th New Zealand Field Regiment, and immediate medical care by the 60th Indian Field Ambulance. The British battalions had been the first Western troops, other than American, in the theatre.

The Chinese winter offensive having been halted, the Eighth Army was soon to launch another general advance towards the 38th Parallel. In the central sector the 9th and 10th U.S. Corps were already attacking. On 17 February, by which time it had reached a point immediately north of Yaju, the Commonwealth Brigade passed from operational control of the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division (of the 10th Corps) to that of the 9th Corps. On the same date the 2nd PPCLI, then ten miles to the south, came under command of the Brigade. Four days later the 9th Corps regrouped, resuming the advance with the 27th Brigade moving between the 1st

U.S. Cavalry Division (actually infantry) and the 6th ROK Division.

The PPCLI axis followed the valley which ran north from the village of Sangsok. The hills on either side ranged from 800 to 1400 feet. Wet snow had turned roads and tracks into quagmires, and as the advance continued a heavy fog descended. Only minor contacts were made during the first two days. On the third, the battalion faced a formidable height known as Point 419; and to the right stood a still more commanding feature (Hill 614). On 23 and 24 February Colonel Stone's companies attacked 419, but without success; and an attempt by the 3rd RAR to take 614 also failed. On the 27th the Australians again attacked, driving the enemy off the higher feature and thus obliging him to quit Point 419 as well. Next day the Canadians occupied the latter.

The next noteworthy action of the 27th Brigade occurred on 7 March, at which time the Brigade was under the 1st Cavalry Division. The objectives were Hills 410 and 532, the latter being assigned to the Patricias. The valleys, which hitherto had run north and south, henceforth cut across the axis of advance; each ridge afforded the enemy a natural line of resistance. At first it appeared that the Chinese (the 125th Division) intended to make a determined stand. The Canadians attained only a bare foothold on their objective. On the right, the RAR failed to take Hill 410; and on the left a Greek battalion also suffered a repulse. Elsewhere on the Corps front, American and South Korean attacks were similarly unsuccessful. During the night, however, the enemy withdrew.

In the days that followed it became apparent that the Chinese were retiring all across the front. Seoul was liberated by the 1st ROK Division on 16 March. Twelve days later the front extended along a line about ten miles south of the 38th Parallel.

The 24th U.S. Infantry Division was advancing towards the Parallel on an axis west of the Kapyong River. The Commonwealth Brigade joined in this advance at a point five miles south of the head of the Chojong valley. (The Chojong River flows generally southwards into the Pukhan, as do also the Kapyong and Kuun Rivers. The Pukhan itself continues southwards to join the Han 20 miles east of Seoul).

The mountains on either side of the Chojong rose to heights of between 2000 and 4000 feet. The axis to which the Patricias were allotted followed the crest line on the right. The shaded slopes were covered with over four feet of snow, while the line of the crest was broken by steep rock faces. The route being impassable to vehicles, close fire support was limited to one section of two 81-millimetre mortars. Supplies were brought forward through the almost superhuman efforts of Korean porters.

Fortunately the Canadian battalion did not encounter any serious resistance during this bold and arduous operation.

By the end of March the Brigade had reached the head of the Chojong valley. It then began to advance up the valley of the Kapyong. On 8 April the Patricias successfully attacked objectives across the 38th Parallel. At this time almost the entire Eighth Army front lay north of that line. As early as 28 March, in fact, South Korean troops operating along the east coast had advanced beyond the Parallel.

Before touching on certain political issues raised by the re-entry of the U.N. forces into North Korea, it is necessary to turn back to November 1950.

Political Aspects

The Chinese intervention of late October had two main political consequences. One was a series of U.N. attempts to negotiate with the Communist Chinese Government for the peaceful withdrawal of its forces from Korea. The other was the naming of Red China as an aggressor, which implied a reliance mainly on military means to achieve a settlement. Canada and India were among those nations which supported the former policy, and both were represented on a Cease Fire Committee approved by the General Assembly on 14 December 1950. The initial efforts of this Committee to reach an understanding with Peiping appeared to get nowhere. The United States then pressed its case for naming China an aggressor. A resolution to this effect, amended in such a way as not to close the door to further negotiation, was passed on 1 February 1951.

The Communist bloc within and outside the United Nations attempted to centre all discussion on alleged American aggression in Formosa. Peiping, moreover, regarded (or professed to regard) the U.N. action in Korea as a case of aggression by the United States. The result was much debating at cross purposes, which offered little prospect of an early peaceful settlement.

As his forces again drew up to the 38th Parallel, General MacArthur strongly and openly favoured pushing for a complete military victory in Korea and, in doing so, extending the conflict across the Manchurian border. An alternative to this policy, and one which enjoyed general support both among the United Nations and within the United States, was military stabilization coupled with further negotiation. Whatever else might be said concerning either view, the latter prevailed. On 11 April Mr. Truman announced that MacArthur had been relieved of his commands.

General MacArthur was succeeded by Lieut.-General Matthew B. Ridgway, then commanding the Eighth Army, and Ridgway by Major-General James A. Van Fleet. The previous Army Commander, General Walker, had been killed in a road accident shortly before Christmas.

The Patricias at Kapyong

The military stabilization which the United Nations were prepared to accept did not imply an immediate reversion to the defensive. The advance which had begun in February 1951 continued. But meanwhile the enemy was building up for a counter-offensive, the aim of which appears to have been to recapture Seoul by attacks converging south and south-west along the river valleys leading to the city.

On the night of 22-23 April, Chinese and North Korean forces struck a mighty blow in the western and west-central sectors. Both the 1st and the 9th U.S. Corps were ordered to withdraw. The 6th ROK Division (of the 9th Corps), falling back through the Kapyong valley, was in grave danger of being cut off and completely destroyed. To hold open a withdrawal route for the south Koreans the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, then in Corps reserve, was ordered to establish a defensive position north of the village of Kapyong.

Near the junction of the Kapyong and Pukhan Rivers the Kapyong valley is some 3000 yards wide, becoming narrower towards the north. Turning north-east in sweeping curves, it is overlooked by Hill 504 on the right and Hill 677 on the left. Continuous crest lines running west from 677 and east from 504, and connecting with north-south crest lines, provide avenues of approach - though no easy approach - to both these hills.

The 3rd RAR, with an American tank company in support, established itself between the Kapyong and Hill 504. The 2nd Patricias dug in on 677. The 1st Middlesex took up a position south of the PPCLI area. The 1st King's Own Scottish Borderers, just arrived in the theatre, were in the Brigade area but not in action. The leading elements of the Chinese 118th Division reached the Commonwealth Brigade area late in the evening on 23 April. The Australians were the first to come under attack. During the night both sides were reinforced. A company of the Middlesex and additional tanks joined the Australian battalion, but in the meantime the attacking force was built up to almost two full brigades. Next afternoon the RAR withdrew, under great pressure, to the Middlesex area. Its supporting tanks thickened the fire of the artillery on the pursuing enemy, and also did a commendable job of evacuating casualties.

While the Australians were thus engaged the Patricias energetically improved their own positions. The weight of the defence faced north-west, "A" Company holding the right, "C" the centre, and "D" the left flank. "B" Company, on the south-eastern portion of Hill 677, guarded the right rear. The extreme steepness of the slopes - however discouraging to the attacker - hampered the defence in that the placing of platoons in mutually supporting positions was very difficult, and artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire tasks were generally limited to the ridge lines.

Throughout the day the forward companies observed the Chinese building up for a major attack, and during the afternoon "B" Company reported enemy movement about the village of Naechon. At nine-thirty that evening (24 May) some 400 Chinese formed up for an attack on the right rear. The commander of "B" Company promptly called for artillery and mortar fire on the area. Despite this fire, the enemy surged up the hill to rush the foremost platoon position. The platoon disengaged itself, and by eleven had completed a withdrawal to the company defensive perimeter. The enemy did not press his attack in this area.

In the meantime, two smaller parties of Chinese had attempted to infiltrate at points still more to the south. Both were driven off by machine gun fire. The next attack was to come from west of the hill, in the rear of the PPCLI position. At half-past one "D" Company reported enemy movement off to the left, and the company commander called for defensive fire. Half an hour later the Chinese, about 200 strong, assaulted. One Canadian platoon was cut off, while another platoon position and a machine gun section were overrun. The company commander now called for supporting fire right on his own position. Blasted off his newly-gained ground by artillery and mortars, the enemy reorganized for a fresh attack. But this and further attempts, in which he persisted all night, were effectively countered by our supporting fire. As daylight approached on the morning of the 25th the Chinese withdrew, and thereafter contented themselves with harassing "D" Company with machine-guns and mortars. The isolated platoon remained where it was, while the position which had been lost was reoccupied.

Although he had failed even to close with the Patricias' main defences, the enemy now apparently surrounded the battalion position. His normal lines of communication cut, Lieut.-Colonel Stone requested air supply; and at mid-morning ammunition and rations were dropped on the area. Already the Middlesex Regiment had cleared enemy groups from the rear, and by two o'clock that afternoon the road leading into the PPCLI position was reported open. Additional supplies were ordered forward by vehicle. The battalion was now prepared to meet further Chinese

attacks, should any develop; but none did. The enemy had departed, leaving the ground so important to the Brigade's defence in good hands.

Canadian losses in this action numbered 10 killed and 23 wounded - much lighter than those of the Australians on Hill 504, and somewhat lighter than the Canadians themselves had suffered in an earlier, less significant engagement (the attack on Hill 532 in March, which had cost seven killed and 34 wounded). For their stout and successful stand at Kapyong the Patricias received the U.S. Presidential Citation. This distinction they shared with two other Commonwealth units: the Australian battalion and the 1st Gloucestershire Regiment (of the 29th British Brigade), who had been almost annihilated in a gallant action on the Imjin River to the north-west. "By their achievements," the Citation read in part, "they have brought distinguished credit on themselves, their homelands, and freedom-loving nations.@"

The 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, on being relieved by the 1st KOSB, were withdrawn from the theatre on "rotation". Almost immediately after the battle the Commonwealth Brigade's number was changed from 27 to 28.

By 1 May the enemy offensive had ended. The 1st and 9th Corps then held an irregular line up to 20 miles south of the 38th Parallel and forming an arc north of Seoul. For the next three weeks their front was relatively quiet. In mid-May, however, the Chinese launched an offensive in the eastern sector, driving the Eighth Army's right flank back some 25 miles.

Let us at this point return to the North American scene.

Training at Fort Lewis

The decision to dispatch only one Canadian battalion to Korea for the moment had left the question of the employment of the rest of the Force in the air. While awaiting final orders the Force was to undergo collective training. No existing Canadian camp readily lent itself to such a programme, especially during the winter months. Fortunately, at the time when it was assumed that the whole Brigade would move to Korea shortly, a suitable site in the United States had been reserved as a staging camp: namely Fort Lewis, Washington. This was now to serve the Canadians as a training area.

The bulk of the CASF concentrated in Fort Lewis between 11 and 22 November 1950. Supporting arms and services joined the three infantry battalions to form the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, under the command of Brigadier J. M. Rockingham.

To fill the gap soon left by the departure of the departure of the 2nd PPCLI for Korea a third battalion of the same regiment was created. Third battalions of the RCR and the Royal 22e also were raised, as reinforcement training battalions. All remained at Fort Lewis for the time being, though only the 3rd Patricias operated on the same training programme as the second battalions.

In the main, the training facilities were more than adequate. The armoured squadron, the artillery and the infantry battalions' anti-tank platoons carried out firing practices at Yakima, 80 miles from the camp. The services performed the same duties as would be required of them in operations. For the infantry, some further basic training proved necessary; but by the turn of the year Brigadier Rockingham was able to report good progress. The culminating point of the training was Exercise "Ignes Bellum", held during the first three weeks of February. The code name may have been doubtful Latin, but the exercise went well. It was highlighted by a brigade attack with live ammunition.

On 21 February the decision emerged that the whole Brigade Group was to go to Korea as originally planned. The preparation of vehicles for shipment overseas made it impossible to continue formation training beyond mid-March. The emphasis now passed to physical training, range work, practice patrols and night exercises. In this period Brigadier Rockingham visited the Far East in order to observe the battle front and to make various arrangements in connection with the arrival of his troops in the theatre. Towards the end of March he visited the 2nd Patricias, who were soon again to come under his command. He returned to Port Lewis early in April.

The Brigade Group (less the 3rd PPCLI and certain smaller elements) sailed from Seattle between 19 and 21 April, on the American troopships *Marine Adder*, *General Patrick* and *President Jackson*. The 3rd Patricias, together with the other third battalions, afterwards moved to Wainwright, Alberta; there they became part of a new training formation.

Although by the eve of its departure the Special Force had taken on over 10,000 men, its effective strength remained at approximately 8000 - the figure reached in the first three weeks of its existence. About 500 men were either absent without leave or had deserted, while another 1500 had been discharged. Such wastage was largely a by-product of the speed with which the force had had to be recruited.

The 25th Brigade Goes In

Two of the three ships carrying the 25th Brigade Group

docked at Pusan on 4 May. The third landed No. 2 Administrative Unit, No. 25 Reinforcement Group and other Canadian base units at Kure, Japan, two days later.

In the Pusan area the Brigade carried out a series of company exercises known as "Charley Horse", designed to harden the troops and to practice tactics and procedures for attacking in mountainous country. The armoured component, now designated "C" Squadron, Lord Strathcona's Horse, exchanged its self-propelled anti-tank guns for Sherman tanks, while the infantry battalions' anti-tank platoons adopted the 75-millimetre recoilless rifle to replace the 17-pounder.

Within two weeks of its arrival in the theatre the 2nd Regiment RCHA was committed to action. Supporting patrols of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade north of the Han River, the regiment fired its first operational round on 17 May.

On the 20th, the 1st U.S. Corps began to advance along the west coast. This move, intended initially to relieve enemy pressure on the opposite flank, presently became part of a general advance towards the most defensible ground in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel. Opposition was relatively light. In the first five days the 1st Corps reached a line three to four miles north of Munsan and about seven north of Uijongbu. The 1st ROK Division operated on the left, the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division in the centre, and the 25th U.S. Infantry Division on the right flank of the Corps. The 25th Canadian Brigade, with its own artillery again under command, took over the centre of the 25th Division's sector. On either side was a U.S. regimental combat team, and in front a tank-infantry battle group (Task Force "Dolvin") whose mission was to drive with all speed to the Parallel.

The next phase of the Division's advance (Operation "Initiate") began on 25 May. H Hour for the Canadians was 9:00 a.m. The brigade axis followed the valley of the Pochon River. One battalion, supported by a troop of tanks and a detachment of the 57th Canadian Field Squadron, advanced along the high ground on each side. In brigade reserve was the 10th Philippine Battalion, which had joined the Canadians on the eve of the action. (The Patricias were still under command of the Commonwealth Brigade.)

Both the 2nd Royal Canadian Regiment, advancing on the left of the valley, and the 2nd Royal 22e on the right made minor contacts on the first day with small enemy parties through which the fast-moving Dolvin Force had already passed. On the following day the RCR met and overcame some further resistance, while the "Vingt-deux" continued forward without enemy

interference. On 27 May the Brigade reached a line some 2500 yards south of the Yongpyong River at its junction with the Pochon. On the 28th it took over from "Dolvin" Force on the high ground immediately south of the 38th Parallel. A tank-infantry patrol of the Strathconas and the Philippine Battalion now proceeded six miles into North Korea, no contact being made.

Next day the Canadian Brigade as a whole was to advance beyond the Parallel.

Early RCN Operations

The three Canadian destroyers which had been assigned to the U.N. naval forces in July 1950 were first employed on escort and patrol duties. In August, HMCS *Athabaskan* bombarded enemy positions and took part in landings by ROK Marines on North Korean islands. The Inchon landings of September 1950 were the first operation in which all three ships were engaged as a unit. Here the Canadians joined forces with South Korean vessels to form a task group, whose job it was to protect a flank of the invasion area.

The general withdrawal of the U.N. forces from North Korea which began in November entailed the evacuation of base installations through the port of Chinnampo. In this operation Captain J. V. Brock, of *Cayuga*, commanded a force consisting of Canadian, Australian and American destroyers. The evacuation was carried out successfully, despite serious physical difficulties and the hazard of enemy mines. On 5 December, having completed this assignment, the destroyers bombarded the port, leaving it in flames.

In mid January 1951 *Cayuga* and *Nootka* (which had relieved HMCS *Sioux*) proceeded to Inchon, which was now in enemy hands. The Canadian destroyers joined in a U.N. bombardment of the port. Here, for the first time in the Korean conflict, Canadian ships came under enemy fire. *Nootka*, having received her "bleeding" in a brisk exchange with enemy shore batteries, was next assigned to patrol duties in the Yellow Sea. *Cayuga* remained for a time at Inchon, where she participated in a bombardment of the enemy's defences and installations.

HMCS *Huron* relieved *Cayuga* in March; and less than two months later *Sioux* returned to the theatre, relieving *Athabaskan*.

Part II

THE 25th BRIGADE IN ACTION,

1951

The 2nd RCR at Chail-li

On 28 May 1951 the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, advancing astride the Pochon valley, had reached a line immediately south of the 38th Parallel and relieved the 25th U.S. Division's Task Force "Dolvin". Next day the Brigade Group crossed the Parallel with open flanks and on a two-battalion front - the 2nd Royal 22e Régiment on the right and the 10th Philippine Battalion on the left, each with a troop of "C" Squadron Lord Strathcona's Horse in support. Abandoned stores of ammunition and gasoline discovered by the Strathconas indicated that the Chinese were withdrawing in some haste. There was no serious resistance until late in the afternoon, when the Vingt-deux came under mortar and machine-gun fire from the area of Hill 467. This feature became an objective of the 2nd Royal Canadian Regiment, which early next morning passed through the Royal 22e at the village of Tonaaji-kogae.

The plan of the battalion commander, Lieut.-Colonel R. A. Keane, was for "A" Company to seize the village of Chail-li, north of Hill 467; "B" Company to occupy Hill 162, in the valley of the Hantan River west of 467; "D" Company to take Hill 467; and finally "C" Company to capture Hill 269, between 467 and Chail-li. "A" Company, mounted on half tracks, was supported by a troop of the Strathconas. The 2nd Regiment RCHA was in direct support of the battalion, while the divisional artillery was available to the Brigade as a whole. Plans for air support had to be cancelled, owing to heavy rain and strong winds.

The operation began at six o'clock in the morning of the 30th. "B" Company took Hill 162 without opposition, thus securing the battalion's left flank, and "A" Company established itself in and around Chail-li. "D" Company, however, met strong resistance on Hill 467 and suffered several casualties from machine-gun fire. Early in the afternoon the enemy, while continuing to hold the hill, counter attacked the village with a company of infantry supported by artillery and mortars; Chinese tanks also were reported. Although "C" Company had reached Hill 269, in between these two points, the distances were so great that it could not give effective aid to either "A" or "D" Company. Furthermore, the situation throughout the Division was far from favourable - five miles separated the RCR from the foremost American elements on the right of the Canadian Brigade. Since it did not appear that the RCR could continue to hold

Chail-li or to take Hill 467, Brigadier Rockingham ordered Colonel Keane to withdraw his companies to form a defensive position in the area of what had been the start line; the withdrawal was completed by eight o'clock that evening. The day's action had cost the RCR six killed and 25 wounded. The hill and the village remained in enemy hands until 5 June, when it fell to the 65th U.S. Regimental Combat Team.

By the end of the war's first year, 21 nations apart from South Korea had placed fighting forces or (in five cases) medical units under the U.N. Command. In the Eighth Army's eastern sector, South Korean formations had advanced to Chodo-ri, but in the west the enemy still held a salient bounded by the "elbow" of the Imjin. Operations over the whole front had ceased to be in the nature of a pursuit; their next phase was to be a relatively static one featuring extensive patrol activity.

Political Developments During June 1951

While the long-term political aim of the United Nations with respect to Korea remained the unification of the country, the immediate object had become a cease-fire on the 38th Parallel. As the Secretary General, Mr. Trygve Lie, pointed out in an address in Ottawa on 1 June 1951, "...the main purpose of the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and July 7 will be fulfilled, provided that the cease-fire is followed by the restoration of peace and security in the area."

But what of the attitude of the Communist powers towards such a proposal? The first indication came on 23 June, when Mr. Jacob Malik, Russia's permanent delegate to the U.N., stated in a radio broadcast: "The Soviet peoples believe that as a first step discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th Parallel". Two days later the Peiping radio announced that Communist China fully endorsed the Russian stand. Thus both the United Nations and the Soviet bloc had come to agree, if only in principle, on the desirability of an early cease-fire and a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. That the termination of hostilities would not "ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea" (as expressed in the U.N. General Assembly's resolution of 7 October 1950) unless precautions were taken against a renewal of the conflict was fully realized by the major democratic powers. The proposed arrangement was only a step towards the ultimate objective of the U.N. in Korea; but the ROK President, Mr. Syngman Rhee, regarded it as an abandonment of that objective. South Korean opposition to a cease-fire was to prove a source of considerable embarrassment to the United Nations.

On the last day of June General Ridgway, having been authorized to enter into truce negotiations with the Communists, sent the following message to the NKPA Supreme Commander (General Kim Il Sung):

I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice.

Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired I shall be prepared to name my representative. I would also at that time suggest a date at which he could meet with your representative . . .

General Kim and the commander of the Chinese "volunteer" forces, General Peng The-Huai, whose reply was broadcast from Peiping next day, suggested that such a meeting be held between 10 and 15 July, on the 38th Parallel near Kaesong.

Cease-fire talks began on 10 July, but not until almost five months had elapsed were they to produce any apparent effect on military operations.

Canadian Operations During June and July

The American 65th Regimental Combat Team, relieving the 25th Canadian Brigade on 1 June, had taken under its command the 10th Philippine Battalion. This unit was replaced in the Canadian order of battle by the 2nd Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, which since its last major action-the Kapyong engagement-had been under command of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade. Almost immediately on rejoining its parent formation (then in 1st U.S. Corps reserve) the Canadian battalion was again attached to the 28th Brigade, now located in the area of the Imjin-Hantan junction. Its next task was to establish and hold a "patrol base" north of the junction, from which other Commonwealth troops would probe deeply into the heights beyond. The Patricias set up such a position on 6 June and held it until the 11th, when they were relieved by the Royal 22e.

By 18 June the Eighth Army had broadened its salient on the east coast and advanced about ten miles up the centre of the peninsula. Except in the western sector and to the east of Kumhwa, the line now held was to remain substantially the same until the end of the war.

The Canadian Brigade, coming under operational control of the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division (of the 1st Corps), took over a 7500-yard front stretching southwestward from Chorwon which, together with Kumhwa and Pyonggang (not to be confused with the North Korean capital), formed what was known as the "Iron Triangle". North-east of the brigade area stretched the Chorwon plain, and to the front was a network of hills and narrow

valleys. Brigadier Rockingham allotted the right half of the sector to the Royal Canadian Regiment, the left to the Patricias. The Royal 22e, having returned from the 28th Brigade, was in reserve.

On 21 June two companies of the RCR and two troops of the Strathconas' tanks, supported by a troop of the 2nd Regiment RCHA and accompanied by a tactical air support party, carried out the first in a series of large-scale patrols on the brigade front. While one company and one tank troop formed a firm base near Chungmasan, the remaining armour and infantry of the patrol advanced towards Hill 730. On finding three to four hundred Chinese dug in here, the patrol called for an air strike on the position, then withdrew to the brigade area. Subsequent patrols, in the main, followed a similar pattern and achieved much the same results. In wet weather a troop of the 57th Canadian Field Squadron was allotted, for without engineer assistance the supporting tanks and guns could not get over the numerous streams and ditches.

After one month in this role the Brigade, again under command of the 25th Division, was transferred southward to the Imjin-Hantan sector. The focal point of its new position, which lay in the path of any enemy threat to our main supply route in the Chorwon area, was a ferry crossing on the Imjin some 5000 yards above the junction. The RCR held a bridgehead covering the crossing, while the 2nd Patricias were stationed on the east bank of the Imjin. The 2nd Royal 22e Regiment, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Dextraze, occupied Hill 183, two and a half miles north-west of the RCR position. On the left of the Canadian Brigade was the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, and on the right the 27th U.S. Infantry Regiment. Scarcely had the 25th Brigade got into position when it was called on to assist in guarding the approaches to another ferry in the American regiment's sector. For this task Colonel Dextraze detached his anti-tank platoon and one rifle platoon; these, with one troop of the Strathconas, were deployed 4500 yards west of the second ferry and two-thirds of that distance north of Hill 183. This detachment was later increased to a company group.

On the night of 18-19 July a Chinese fighting patrol raided a Vingt-deux company position, but was repulsed in short order. Next night the enemy attacked in company strength, withdrawing after a three hour engagement. (The attackers were identified as members of the 64th Army's 192nd Division.) On the evening of the 20th the Chinese appeared to be preparing for a further attack, and before midnight unknown numbers of enemy had infiltrated between company localities and were working their way back towards their own lines. In the meantime, heavy rains which had started on the previous day were swelling the Imjin to dangerous proportions. The south ferry was put out of order and the north

one washed away completely, and telephone lines across the river were broken by drifting debris. Thus the Royal 22e and, in fact, all units and detachments west of the river faced the dual threat of an enemy attack and isolation by the flood. Fortunately, the story ends in anti-climax. The expected attack did not develop, communications were partially restored, and in less than a week the Canadian Brigade was withdrawn to a concentration area south of the lower Imjin.

Formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division

At the beginning of May the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Brooke Claxton), announcing the departure of the Canadian Brigade Group for the Far East, had stated that the force would form part of the 1st Commonwealth Division. This formation did not yet exist, though its creation had been under consideration by the British War Office as early as August 1950.

Divisional Headquarters began to assemble in Korea early in June 1951. The GOC designate, Major-General A. J. H. Cassels, was British, as were most of the original senior officers. The GSO I, however, was a Canadian **B** Lieut.-Colonel E. D. Danby. On 28 July the following major units came under General Cassels' command, to form the first Commonwealth Division in history:

8th Royal Irish Hussars

"C" Squadron 7th Royal Tank Regiment

"C" Squadron Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians)

2nd Regiment RCHA

16th Field Regiment RNZA

45th Field Regiment Royal Artillery

170th Light Battery RA [mortars]

11th (Sphinx) LAA Battery RA

28th Field Engineer Regiment (12th Field Squadron RE, 55th Field Squadron RE, 57th Independent Field Squadron RCE).

64th Field Park Squadron RE.

25th Canadian Infantry Brigade: 2nd Royal Canadian Regiment, 2nd Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, 2nd Royal 22e Régiment.

28th British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade: 1st King's Own

Scottish Borderers, 1st King's Shropshire Light Infantry, 3rd Royal Australian Regiment.

29th British Infantry Brigade: 1st Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, 1st Gloucestershire Regiment, 1st Royal Ulster Rifles.

The divisional "services" included both national units and Commonwealth units, the latter consisting of national sub-units.

For operations the Commonwealth Division was placed under the control of Headquarters 1st U.S. Corps, a relation which was to continue throughout its entire existence. For administration and other purposes it came under the Commander-in-Chief, British Commonwealth Forces Korea. More will be said about the command and administrative aspects at a later point.

The divisional front extended 11,000 yards westward from the Imjin-Hantan junction, between the 1st ROK Division on the left and the 25th U.S. Infantry Division on the right. Within the Commonwealth sector the 29th British Brigade was on the left, the 28th Commonwealth Brigade on the right, and the Canadian Brigade in reserve.

Across the Imjin

For both the 1st Commonwealth Division and the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division (which relieved the 25th Division at the end of July) the next month was a period of strong patrolling north of the lower Imjin and west of the upper Imjin. A battalion-size patrol carried out by the RCR in mid-August met with heavy opposition in the area of Hills 152 and 187 - an indication that the enemy's main defences lay along that line - but a week later the Patricias and the Royal 22e encountered only light resistance in raids against the same Hill 187, a more northerly 187 and Hill 208.

What was the moral effect, if any, of current cease-fire negotiations on the fighting forces? In the case of the RCR patrol action, neither the enemy nor our own troops displayed any lack of warlike spirit; though in this and in subsequent operations the Chinese suggested, by wireless or in writing, that a parley be held. Such overtures evidently were aimed at undermining the determination of the United Nations soldiers - there is little reason to suppose that the Chinese themselves had suddenly become war-weary.

That portion of the 1st Corps front which lay east of the Imjin-Hantan junction was known as the Wyoming Line, that to the west as the Kansas Line. During September and October the Corps carried out two operations in order to achieve defence in depth

and at the same time afford greater flank protection to the Seoul-Chorwon railway. In the first of these, code-named "Minden", it extended the Wyoming Line through the Imjin "elbow"; in the second (Operation "Commando") it established a new front line known as Jamestown. D Day for Operation "Minden" was 8 September. On this date the Commonwealth Brigade established on the north bank of the lower Imjin a firm base from which General Cassels' other two brigades were to advance three days later, the divisional objective being a line from Sanggorangpo to Chung-gol. Conforming advances were to be made on either flank by South Korean and American formations. By the 11th, the 1st Corps Engineers had built two bridges - "Pintail", at the first loop below the Junction, and "Teal", towards the second loop - and the divisional engineers had constructed or reopened roads through the area.

Now, while on its left the British Brigade advanced northwestward, the Canadian Brigade moved almost due north. Little or no opposition was encountered; and casualties, at least in the case of the 25th Brigade, were nil. Between 12 and 14 September the British and Canadian units effected various adjustments, one of which was the occupation, by a company of the Royal 22e, of Hill 222 (halfway between Hill 183, which the unit had held in July, and 152, an RCR patrol objective in August). From the middle of September to Operation "Commando", which began on 3 October, the 25th Brigade was engaged mainly in improving its positions and in routine patrolling.

The Sami-chon, which flows south-east into the lower Imjin, became the Commonwealth left boundary in "Commando"; the opposite boundary began at the southward bend of the upper Imjin. To the right of the latter were the American 1st Cavalry and 3rd Infantry Divisions, and on the Commonwealth Division's left, as before, the 1st ROK Division. About 8000 yards beyond the Wyoming Line ran an unnamed tributary of the Sami-chon - the stream and its valley have since acquired the area name "Nabu-ri" - and it was on the high ground overlooking this valley that the 25th Canadian and 28th Commonwealth Brigades were to establish their portions of the Jamestown Line. For Operation "Commando" the 29th British Brigade was committed, not as a formation, but rather by individual battalions allotted to the attacking brigades. In order that each might be more heavily supported by artillery the 28th and 25th Brigades launched their attacks on successive days. On D Day, while the Commonwealth Brigade struck off towards Hill 355, Brigadier Rockingham's battalions occupied features which would provide a more advanced start line. The RCR, in the centre, moved as far forward as Hill 152; on its left the 1st Royal Ulster Rifles (attached from the 29th Brigade) and on the right the Patricias made similar adjustments. The Royal 22e was in reserve in this phase of the operation.

The Royal Ulsters were to take the area between the villages of Yongdong and Chommal. The main objective of the RCR was the Hill 187 to which the unit patrolled in August, while PPCLI objectives included the other Hill 187 and Hill 159. H Hour for the Canadian battalions was set at 11:00 a.m. on the 4th. An hour and a half later the Ulsters began their attack and, with little difficulty, secured all their objectives that afternoon. By late afternoon next day the RCR and the Patricias had signalled success and the Royal 22e had relieved the British battalion on the left flank; thus ended the Canadian Brigade's share of Operation "Commando". The 1st ROK Division had secured all its objectives on D Day; the Commonwealth Division's part of the operation was completed on 8 October, with the 28th Brigade's capture of Hill 217; and the whole Corps operation reached a successful close on the 15th. Canadian casualties suffered on 4 and 5 October had numbered four killed and 22 wounded.

The 1st Corps' gains in the west were matched by advances in the east-central sector and on the extreme right; otherwise the front as it had existed since mid-June was to remain much the same until the end of hostilities in July 1953.

The "Rotation" of Canadian Troops

The units of the 25th Canadian Brigade Group, while most of the original personnel were governed by CASF terms of service, had from their very beginning belonged to the Active (or Regular) Force; in other words, the distinction between Special Force and Active Force applied on an individual rather than on a unit level. But by January 1951 even this distinction had begun to disappear. During the next 18 months over 2700 members of the CASF were converted to the status of regular soldiers. The remaining Special Force personnel were returned to Canada, and to civil life, as close as possible to the end of their term of service.

In July 1951 the Canadian authorities arrived at a "rotation" plan, whereby units and individuals would be repatriated after approximately one year in the Far East. The first Canadians to be "rotated" as a unit were the 2nd Princess Patricias, the relieving battalion being the 1st Patricias.

Two rifle companies of the 1st PPCLI arrived in the theatre on 5 October 1951. Battalion Headquarters, Headquarters Company and a third rifle company followed three weeks later, and Support Company and the fourth rifle company early in November. The C.O., Lieut.-Colonel N. G. Wilson-Smith, flew to Korea in time to meet his first two companies on their arrival in the divisional area. The incoming companies were accommodated at a reception

centre set up by the 2nd Patricia's south of the Imjin-Hantan junction, where the troops began a short course in weapon and tactical training.

On 14 October these companies relieved two of Lieut.-Colonel Stone's companies on the latter's "Commando" objectives. Only two nights previously the 2nd Patricia's had repulsed a counter-attack by an estimated battalion of the enemy, killing 17 - almost double its own losses of two killed and seven wounded. Facing the Commonwealth Division were the Chinese 64th Army's 190th and 191st Divisions. In order to inflict damage and casualties on the enemy and at the same time to obtain information regarding his lay-out, General Cassels ordered the 25th and 28th Brigades to carry out raids on certain known enemy positions. For these operations, which took place on 23 October, the Canadian Brigade provided one company of each battalion. Brigadier Rockingham named Hill 166 as the objective of the Royal 22e company, and allotted Hill 156 and another feature north of 166 to the Patricia's and the RCR, respectively. The PPCLI company selected was "A" Company of the first battalion, which had taken over from "D" of the second.

The three Canadian companies moved off independently between 5:30 and 6:30 in the morning. The Royal 22e company was stopped short of its goal by heavy machine-gun fire. The supporting tanks and artillery, however, destroyed two enemy bunkers on 166; and British anti aircraft guns firing in a ground role, the Canadian Brigade diarist was to record, "placed their shots with amazing accuracy directly in the crawl trenches". In the meantime, the RCR and PPCLI companies had reached their objectives in the face of relatively light opposition. Pioneers attached to the RCR company mined and booby-trapped Chinese bunkers and trenches. The Patricia's, having cleared Hill 156, directed artillery fire on other enemy-held features. All three companies were ordered to withdraw early in the afternoon, the move back being covered by a heavy smoke-screen. The operation had cost the Canadians five killed and 21 wounded, the enemy 37 known dead and as many more believed killed or wounded.

On the morning of 4 November "D" Company of the 1st Patricia's relieved "B" of the 2nd, and Colonel Stone's headquarters handed over to Colonel Wilson-Smith's. Support Company and the remaining rifle company of the 2nd PPCLI were to carry on under command of the first battalion until relieved by their "opposite numbers" on the 10th. On the day following the withdrawal of the main body, the 2nd Patricia's paraded before the Eighth Army Commander, General Van Fleet, who congratulated the unit on its achievements in Korea and presented it with the Presidential Citation which it had won at Kapyong.

Reinforcements who had joined the outgoing battalion too

late to qualify for rotation were held in No. 25 Canadian Reinforcement Group, in Japan, until they could be absorbed by the 1st Patricia's. In cases of later rotations by unit, the relieving battalions arrived in the theatre below their full strength, and the "ineligibles" of the departing units were absorbed immediately. Thus it was not uncommon for a soldier during his one-year tour of duty in the Far East to have served in two battalions.

Following its return home the 2nd PPCLI gradually reassembled at Currie Barracks, Calgary, to assume the former role of the first battalion in the defence of Canada. By this time the 1st RCR and 1st Royal 22e were preparing to relieve their second battalions in Korea.

Enemy Attacks During November

On the night of 2-3 November the Chinese mounted a strong attack on the centre of the 25th Brigade's front. A forward platoon of the 2nd RCR was forced to retire, but only after causing the deployment of the better part of a battalion. The surrounding hills, Lieut.-Colonel Keane's headquarters reported to Brigadier Rockingham's, were "alive with Chinese". Observed enemy movement and areas in which the Chinese were likely to reorganize for a further attack were vigorously engaged by artillery and mortars. Unable to exploit his initial success, the enemy withdrew; and the platoon position which had been overrun was reoccupied.

The enemy's next major attack fell on Hills 217 and 317, in the sector held by the 28th Commonwealth Brigade. The two hills eventually passed into Chinese hands after a bitter struggle. On the night of 5-6 November, while the fighting on the 28th Brigade's front was still in progress, the enemy launched repeated attacks on a company of the 1st Patricia's. The first was broken up by artillery and mortars, and a second and third repulsed by the fire both of supporting arms and the company's own weapons. After the failure of his third attempt the enemy retired.

The next action in which Canadian troops were involved was another company raid by the Royal 22e Régiment on Hill 166, on 9 November. A detachment of the Assault Pioneer Platoon accompanied the raiding force, and the Scout and Sniper Platoon carried out a subsidiary action. Support for the raid included Puerto Rican mortars of the 3rd U.S. Infantry Division. H Hour was 9:30 in the evening. By half-past two the company, in confused fighting, had reached a point within 100 yards of the top of the hill, and the Scout Platoon was already on the final objective. But now the enemy began to counter-attack; and the

whole force, having essentially completed its task, was withdrawn.

On the 22nd the Commonwealth Division turned over its right-hand sector - still the scene of heavy fighting - to the 3rd Division, which had relieved the 1st Cavalry Division. The 29th Brigade took over from the 1st ROK Division a portion of the line west of the Sami-chon, the 28th became divisional reserve, and the Canadian Brigade assumed responsibility for a front of almost four miles extending north-east from the Sami-chon. Brigadier Rockingham continued to employ three battalions forward-the RCR now on the left, the Patricias in the centre, and the Royal 22e on the right. The 22e's positions formed a right-angled triangle whose base ran due east to Hill 210, the hypotenuse extending northeastward to the saddle between Hills 227 and 355. At this time 227 was unoccupied, while Hill 355, which dominated the centre of the Corps front, was held by a battalion of the 7th U.S. Infantry Regiment.

Lieut.-Colonel Dextraze's companies completed occupation of their new areas on the morning of 22 November. During the afternoon the battalion came under shell fire, "D" Company, on the right (or most northerly) position, receiving particular attention. As the night passed, rain turned into wet snow, and snow into mud; and only with the greatest difficulty were the sappers of the 57th Field Squadron able to open and keep open the road across the Nabu-ri valley to "A" and "D" Companies next day.

Enemy shells continued to fall on "D" Company, and in much greater number on Hill 355. Late in the afternoon both positions came under attack - that of the Royal 22e by two companies, the Americans' by an estimated regiment. The Canadian company held its ground, but by early evening the bulk of Hill 355 was in enemy hands; and in the meantime the Chinese had reoccupied 227 as well. The loss of 355, if permanent, would constitute a serious setback for the 1st Corps and, indeed, the whole Eighth Army. Even the temporary presence of the enemy on this and on Hill 227 placed the Royal 22e in a precarious situation, but Colonel Dextraze calmly and confidently instructed all companies to cling to their positions.

At six o'clock the commander of "D" Company, Captain (Acting Major) Réal Liboiron, reported a second attack coming in; this was repulsed with the help of artillery and tanks. Throughout the night the company successfully withstood further attacks on either flank. On Brigadier Rockingham's order the Lord Strathconas, who already had two troops of tanks supporting the 22e, moved up an additional troop after midnight. Early next morning the 7th Regiment recaptured the greater part of Hill 355, and later in the day the 15th Infantry Regiment (also of the 3rd Division) secured the remainder. General Cassels and Brigadier

Rockingham, coming forward at mid-morning to observe the situation, congratulated Colonel Dextraze on the successful stand of his troops. These congratulations were somewhat premature; for within a few hours the enemy, having returned to Hill 227, struck again.

Two companies attacked at last light, dislodging one of Major Liboiron's platoons and surrounding another. By half-past nine, however, the Chinese had apparently withdrawn; and some hours later the Scout and Sniper Platoon, led by Corporal Leo Major (a DCM winner of the Second World War), occupied the position which had fallen. But in less than half an hour the enemy repeated his attack--this time 300 strong, outnumbering the platoon twenty to one. Over the platoon wireless set came the order, by Colonel Dextraze, to return to the battalion area. Corporal Major promptly suggested that his group withdraw only a short distance, and that the oncoming Chinese be engaged with mortars. The C.O. agreed on both points. Mortar fire came down, catching the enemy in the open and breaking up the attack. For "personal courage, coolness and leadership" throughout the action Corporal Major was awarded a bar to his DCM.

During the night of 24-25 November the situation on the right had taken another turn for the worse: the Chinese had recaptured a portion of Hill 355. Thus the Royal 22e again found its flank exposed until next morning, when elements of the 7th and 15th Regiments took back the lost ground. Prisoners taken by the Americans identified their own formation as one of the 192nd Division, and that on Hill 227 as the 568th Regiment, 190th Division.

The daylight hours of the 25th were relatively quiet for the Royal 22e, but in the evening "D" Company once more came under attack. Unknown numbers of Chinese, coming in from Hill 227, were beaten off by artillery and by the unit's 81-millimetre mortars.

This proved to be the last of seven attacks on the position in three days, in which time the battalion had suffered 49 casualties, including 15 killed; about half of these were members of "D" Company. Major Liboiron, who was awarded the DSO, attributed his company's successful defence to "the will to fight and good communications". Special mention must also be accorded the supporting arms, the battalion mortars, and the Scout Platoon.

Activity elsewhere on the Canadian Brigade's front between the 22nd and the 26th consisted mainly of patrolling. On the evening of 27 November, Brigadier Rockingham's headquarters received from General Cassels' the information that no further fighting patrols were to be dispatched, and that the artillery would be restricted to defensive fire and counter-bombardment

tasks - the first suggestion of substantial progress in the cease-fire negotiations.

The Political Front, July-December 1951

The first meeting of official representatives of the opposing commanders had taken place at Kaesong on 10 July. The U.N. delegation (headed by Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN) consisted of one South Korean and four U.S. officers, the Communist delegation of two North Korean and two Chinese officers. In his opening statement, Admiral Joy summed up the purpose of the talks as "the cessation of hostilities in Korea, under conditions which will ensure against their resumption". The U.N. delegation, he continued, would not discuss political or economic matters of any kind, or military matters not related to Korea. Most of July was devoted to the preparation of an agenda to provide a basis for detailed discussions.

By the sixth meeting only one major issue appeared to be obstructing these talks: the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. This point, which had been raised by the Communist delegation, was a political matter and therefore outside the scope of immediate negotiations; and moreover, such a step would violate the U.N. principle that South Korea must be protected against further aggression. The basic conditions for an armistice, the American Secretary of Defence stated, were:

...agreement upon a military line which will be defensible in the event of any renewal of hostilities ...agreement not to reinforce the troops now in Korea ...provision for adequate supervision and actual inspection by representatives of both sides to ensure against any preparations for a surprise attack and as a continuing evidence of good faith ...[and] a satisfactory agreement regarding prisoners of war....

The Communists modified their demand for the complete withdrawal of foreign forces, suggesting instead the established of a demilitarized zone on either side of the demarcation line. The U.N. delegation agreed, and the agenda was completed on 26 July.

The next point of difference was whether the proposed demarcation line should be on the 38th Parallel or along the existing front, the Communists insisting on the former. Disagreement on this question was aggravated by charges and counter-charges of violating the neutrality of Kaesong itself, each side accusing the other of lack of good faith, slander and deliberate sabotage. Twice during August the Communists suspended negotiations; the second break-off was to last for two months. Panmunjom, six miles south of Kaesong, was the site of subsequent truce talks.

On 25 October the Communists had dropped their insistence

that the 38th Parallel should serve as a demarcation line. The line which sub-delegations then agreed on closely followed with the existing front, passing slightly north of Munsan and Chorwon and through Kumsong, Mundung and Kosong; and the delegations themselves adopted this proposal on 27 November. Should an armistice agreement follow within 30 days, the line was to remain the same, regardless of any changes in the battle-line - otherwise a new demarcation line would have to be drawn.

Although within the Commonwealth Division it was understood that the opposing forces had agreed to refrain from offensive operations during the period for which the demarcation line as described was valid, the enemy continued to shell and mortar our positions and to send out patrols. Our artillery was soon authorized to resume its normal tasks, and the restrictions affecting the infantry were gradually lifted. On the night of 10-11 December a company of the Patricias raided Hill 227 and the RCR despatched a fighting patrol to Hill 166. Both groups reached their objectives, inflicted casualties on the enemy, and returned with useful information concerning the Chinese defences.

The period for which the demarcation line was to remain in effect passed without an armistice agreement being reached. By this time the negotiators at Panmunjom had begun to consider a question which was to prove even more troublesome: the exchange of prisoners of war. That subject merits separate treatment in a later chapter.

Part III

HOLDING THE LINE,

1951 - 1953

The First General Rotation

With the winter of 1951-52 a new phase of the Korean war began. Until the end of hostilities in 1953, the United Nations forces held and improved their positions, patrolled in No Man's Land and beat off local Communist attacks.

The 25th Canadian Brigade continued to hold the positions which it had taken over in November until the third week of January 1952. This period was one of what came to be called "normal" activity. Already the defensive layouts were assuming their final form and units were occupying and reoccupying the same familiar ground. The Canadians were relieved by the 28th Commonwealth Brigade and thereafter spent six weeks in divisional reserve. They then relieved the 29th British Brigade in positions astride the Sami-chon, with two battalions west of the valley and one to the east. The welcome end of winter saw some increase in enemy activity against the Commonwealth sector. On the night of 25-26 March a company of the Chinese 188th Division (63rd Army) surrounded and attacked a 1st Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry platoon position immediately west of the Sami-chon, but withdrew two and a half hours later, leaving behind 25 dead and one prisoner.

By this time preparations were well under way for the rotation of Canadian units in the theatre. Advance parties of some of the relieving units had already arrived by air, the main bodies following by sea. The first major unit to be relieved was No. 54 Transport Company RCASC, which completed "handover" to No. 23 on 11 April.

Between the 14th and the 19th the divisional boundaries were shifted eastward by two battalion frontages. The new right sector was taken over by the 29th Brigade, the 28th going into reserve. The 25th Brigade's right flank - the position east of the Sami-chon, held by the 2nd Royal 22e Régiment - became the left. The 2nd Royal Canadian Regiment and the 1st Patricias, on being relieved by battalions of the 1st U.S. Marine Division (which now held the 1st U.S. Corps' left flank), assumed responsibility for what became the centre and right, respectively, of the Canadian front.

While these adjustments were in progress the 1st RCR, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel P. R. Bingham, and Lieut.-

Colonel L. F. Trudeau's 1st Royal 22e began to replace their second battalions. Men not eligible for rotation with the 2nd RCR were concentrated in two rifle companies which were to come under Colonel Bingham's command, while the "ineligibles" of the 2nd Vingt-deux were absorbed into all four of Colonel Trudeau's rifle companies. The turn-over of the Royal 22e was completed on 24 April and that of the RCR next day.

The fourth major unit to leave Korea was No. 25 Canadian Field Ambulance, which gave place to No. 37 on 27 April. On the same date command of the Brigade Group passed to Brigadier M. P. Bogert, whom Brigadier Rockingham, on his return to Canada, was to succeed as Director General of Military Training. In May the 57th Independent Field Squadron RCE was relieved by the 23rd Field Squadron, and the 2nd Regiment RCHA by the 1st RCHA. The last of the original CASF units to depart was "C" Squadron Lord Strathcona's Horse, which was replaced by the Strathconas' "B" Squadron on 8 June. No. 2 Administrative Unit, No. 25 Reinforcement Group and other Canadian units in the Far East continued to function under the same names, though with new personnel.

Rotation and other developments had brought about many changes in the Commonwealth Division's order of battle. By the end of June 1952 the major armoured, artillery and infantry components were:

5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards

"B" Squadron Lord Strathcona's Horse

1st Regiment RCHA

14th Field Regiment RA

16th Field Regiment RNZA

61st Light Regiment RA*

[*Three mortar batteries and one locating and light anti-aircraft battery.]

25th Brigade: 1st Royal Canadian Regiment, 1st Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, 1st Royal 22e Régiment.

28th Brigade: 1st King's Own Scottish Borderers, 1st King's Shropshire Light Infantry, 1st Royal Australian Regiment, 3rd Royal Australian Regiment.

29th Brigade: 1st Royal Norfolk Regiment, 1st Welch

Regiment, 1st Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment).

Divisional Headquarters, which had become more widely "Commonwealth" in its composition, now included 27 Canadians. Lieut.-Colonel N. G. Wilson Smith was now GSO I, command of the 1st Patricias having passed to Lieut.-Colonel J. R. Cameron. The original Assistant Director of Medical Services (the senior medical appointment in a division), a British officer, had been succeeded by Colonel G. L. Morgan Smith, a Canadian.

Patrols Against the Boot and Hill 113

In the middle of May the 1st Corps began to dispatch strong fighting patrols - one from every forward battalion each week - in order to snatch prisoners.

The 1st Patricias sent out such a patrol to an enemy-held hill known as "the Boot" on the night of the 20th-21st. The party consisted of one officer and 32 men, including two snipers, two wireless operators and two pioneers, and was divided into a firm base group, a covering fire section and a fighting section; the last-named was made up of a headquarters, two Sten groups and two Bren groups. Supporting fire was provided by a troop of the Strathconas, a troop of the 1st Regiment RCHA, and the unit mortar and machine-gun platoons. The firm base group established itself on the floor of the Nabu-ri valley at eleven o'clock, the main body passing through at midnight. Reaching the base of the hill without interference, the covering fire section took up a position some 50 yards below the enemy's trenches, while the remainder continued on up the slope. But now, as the party came within 20 yards of his main position, the enemy opened fire with every platoon weapon. Five of the Patricias were wounded, one of whom later died; among the other four was the patrol leader, Lieut. D. A. Middleton.

His group outnumbered three to one in immediate fighting strength, Lieut. Middleton ordered a withdrawal. The second-in-command, Corporal J. G. Dunbar, supervised the recovery of casualties, and it was only at the last moment that he realized that the officer was wounded. Lieut. Middleton, anxious not to hamper the withdrawal, urged the NCO to leave him behind; but Corporal Dunbar insisted on carrying him to safety. At one point, exhausted, he laid the Officer down and called on another member of the patrol for assistance, whereupon that soldier picked Dunbar up and carried him some distance before the corporal could persuade him that he had the wrong man! In due course the party arrived back with all its wounded. Enemy losses indicted by the patrol were estimated at seven wounded or killed.

Unfortunately such patrols as this, in their very

aggressiveness and frequency, failed in their primary purpose; for as the enemy learned to anticipate our actions it became more difficult to take him alive. Perhaps the most nearly successful of these patrols was one dispatched by the RCR on 31 May. This party, 23 strong, was made up of two assault sections and a firm base group. Directly in charge of one section was the patrol leader, Lieut. A. A. S. Peterson, the other two groups being commanded by NCOs. Weapons included six Brens (two in each group), machine-carbines, grenades, and a 2-inch mortar in the firm base. The objective was Point 113, some 500 yards north-east of the point at which the raiders were to cross the Nabu-ri stream. The patrol's entering the valley, at about 8:30 in the evening, was coordinated with an air strike on the objective. On reaching the base of the hill, Lieut. Peterson called down prearranged artillery fire on the upper slopes, then led his men to the first of three lines of trenches. Finding no enemy here, he set up his firm base and moved on to the next line, his own section in the lead. The artillery fire was stopped before the raiders arrived dangerously close to it, further support being provided by tanks, whose direct fire enabled them to "shoot in" the patrol almost all the way to its final objective. The intermediate line of trenches also was unmanned, the defenders having taken to their bunkers. While the second section began to search the position, Peterson's group pressed on to the top of the hill.

The whole feature proved to be held by a reinforced platoon. The enemy in the uppermost position came out fighting, and those in the bunkers halfway down the hill were now giving battle to the patrol's second section. One Chinese surrendered, but later made a dash for freedom which cost him his life; four others were killed and as many more apparently wounded. The patrol managed to bring back all its own casualties - four wounded - and all its weapons, as well as much new knowledge of the enemy's defences.

Other actions of this series were similarly eventful, and all were a severe test of the soldier's courage, skill and resourcefulness; though none of the patrols succeeded in bringing back a live enemy prisoner. Between the 20th and the 24th the Patricia's sent out a platoon size patrol to Point 133, the RCR staged a company raid on 113, and the Royal 22e dispatched a patrol more than 40 strong to the "Sami-chon feature". None of these actions was successful, and the cost was high-52 casualties, of which nine were fatal. A novel aspect of the third operation was that the raiders wore body armour, partially splinter-proof vests provided on loan by the 1st U.S. Marine Division.

In May the Canadian Brigade carried out more than 480 patrols of all types-419 standing, 43 ambush, 20 fighting and two

reconnaissance-and during June almost 550. Casualties for the period totalled 21 killed, 109 wounded and one taken prisoner. Not all these losses occurred in patrol actions: a number resulted from the enemy's artillery fire, which was becoming heavier and more effective at this time.

The 25th Brigade turned over its positions to the 28th Commonwealth Brigade at the end of June. During the next six weeks, while in divisional reserve, the Canadians worked on the Wyoming and Kansas defences and underwent refresher training. Their tanks had a busy time firing on drifting debris and floating mines on the swollen Imjin, in an attempt to protect "Teal" and "Pintail" bridges against damage. Unfortunately the former was washed out; but by mid September, when the flood had abated, "Pintail" bridge still stood and "Teal" was being restored.

Canadian Troops on Kojé Island

On various offshore islands, South Korean and American troops were guarding many thousands of war prisoners, mostly North Koreans. Since the opening of truce negotiations the prisoners on Kojé Island (25 miles south-west of Pusan) had been staging riots, and had murdered more than 100 of their own number for anti-Communist leanings. Early in May they seized the American commandant of the camp and held him captive for three days. At the end of the month, when the command had passed to Brigadier-General Haydon L. Boatner, there began an operation to move some 40,000 prisoners into new, 500-man compounds where they could be more easily controlled. This turned out to be a difficult and dangerous task, and it soon became evident that the guard would have to be reinforced by other U.N. troops.

On 22 May, Eighth Army Headquarters issued an order calling upon the Commonwealth Division to furnish two rifle companies for this purpose - one British and one Canadian. The British detachment was provided by the 1st King's Shropshire Light Infantry, the Canadian by the RCR. The latter detachment, consisting of "B" Company and attached signallers, cooks and stretcher-bearers, left the brigade area in vehicles on the morning of the 23rd; it sailed from Pusan on the evening of the 24th, and reached the island the next morning. Meanwhile the Royal 22e, reinforced by a company of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, had extended itself to fill the gap in the Canadian defences.

The two Commonwealth detachments, of which the KSLI company commander served as co-ordinating officer, were placed under command of the American 92nd Military Police Battalion. General Boatner, greeting the Canadians on their arrival in the battalion

area, informed the detachment commander, Major E. L. Cohen, that his troops might have one week to get settled in and to undergo the necessary special training. An unexpected variety of goods and services had to be requested of the camp authorities, who "co-operated admirably, and without red tape". The special training which the Canadians received consisted mainly of riot drill and instruction on the American medium machine gun.

On 4 June the RCR detachment relieved the KSLI guard on Compound 66, which housed some 3200 North Korean officers. Both Commonwealth companies, working in 24-hour shifts, were employed here for three weeks. The time passed without any major incidents occurring in this particular compound, though in the same period Major Cohen accompanied troops of the 187th U.S. Airborne Infantry Regiment in what proved quite a bloody operation to transfer prisoners from another compound into smaller enclosures; the inmates resisted with spears, clubs and improvised grenades, killing some of their own men who offered to submit. The evacuation of Compound 66, on the other hand, proceeded in a quiet and orderly manner.

Among a number of distinguished visitors whom the camp received in this period was Canada's ex-Governor General, Field-Marshal the Earl Alexander, who was now Britain's Minister of Defence. Following a visit to the front, the Field Marshal arrived at General Boatner's head quarters on 16 June, and inspected a guard of honour provided by the two Commonwealth companies.

Towards the end of June these companies assumed security responsibilities for a new enclosure; this was divided into four sub units, each consisting of 500 to 550 prisoners. The reorganization had produced more than the desired effect: the captives were now not only docile but even friendly. Brigadier Bogert, visiting the camp early in July attended a prisoners' sports meet, after which one of the participants presented him with a wreath. Next day (the 8th) marked the end of the Commonwealth force's active duty on Koje. Two days later, to the apparently genuine regret of the prisoners, the RCR detachment left to rejoin its battalion. General Boatner was on hand at the dock to congratulate the troops on their fine performance, while the 187th Regiment's band played farewell. The relations between Canadian and other U.N. troops on Koje had been friendly throughout, and the detachment had apparently made a favourable impression on all concerned, not excluding the prisoners.

The decision to detach Canadian troops for this special duty had been made by the U.N. Command without the prior knowledge of the Canadian Government. This had aroused some political concern

and some discussion in Canada.

The RCR on Hill 355

Returning to the front between 8 and 10 August, the Canadian Brigade relieved the 29th British Brigade in the Commonwealth Division's right sector, opposite the boundary between the 39th and 40th Chinese Armies. The brigade front lay between what had been the villages of Paujol-gol and Kojanharisaemal, the Royal 22e being on the left, the Patricias on the right and the RCR, on Hill 355, in the centre. During the next three months the Brigade was to experience heavier shelling and mortaring than in any other period in the line. Heavy rains occasionally silenced the enemy's artillery, but would then further damage the trenches and bunkers; and as the skies cleared and the mud began to dry, the Chinese would resume shelling on a still greater scale. Attention was given to the improvement of defences; and at the end of the month the Canadians began once more to send out fighting patrols.

Early in September General Cassels turned over command of the Commonwealth Division to another British officer, Major-General M. M. Alston-Roberts-West. One of the first orders issued by the new divisional commander was that, in view of the continued enemy shelling, the forward troops should wear steel helmets at all times.

On 24 September the RCR sent a patrol consisting of Lieut. H. R. Gardner and five men of "B" Company to a known enemy position 1000 yards north-west of Hill 227. The party entered No Man's Land at approximately 3:30 in the morning and, by first light, had established a firm base some 200 yards east of its objective. Finding no one on the latter, Lieut. Gardner, accompanied by Corporal K. E. Fowler, made his way to the enemy kitchen area. Here they broke a telephone wire, and a Chinese signaller who came to investigate the failure of communications suddenly found himself their prisoner. Three would-be rescuers were killed or wounded by the firm base group. Although under fire from other Chinese, the entire patrol managed to get back safely, with the captive still in tow. The prisoner turned out to be from the 346th Regiment (of the 116th Division, 39th Army).

It was about this time that the Chinese began a series of limited attacks in the central and western sectors. Such operations did not for some time directly affect the Commonwealth Division, but an increase in hostile shelling early in October suggested that the enemy was soon to strike in this direction; another warning factor was his sharp reaction to our patrols. On the night of 12-13 October "B" Company of the RCR staged a raid against Hill 227, and was ambushed short of the objective. A

brisk firefight ensued, during which Major Cohen received the order to withdraw. The company's casualties in this action were two killed and 12 wounded. Three nights later a 25-man patrol of the Patricias, clashing with a Chinese platoon in the area of Hill 217, lost two killed and eight wounded.

Since early September the RCR had been guarding Hill 355 (referred to by the press as "Little Gibraltar") with five companies - the four normal rifle companies plus a fifth, known as "E" Company, specially created from unit resources. The company dispositions on the evening of 22 October were as follows: "A" in a line running due west from the summit of the hill; "B" immediately east of the saddle between Little Gibraltar and Hill 227; "E" Company to the left of "B"; and "C" and "D" Companies behind "E" and "A", respectively.

Between the 17th and the 22nd the enemy's artillery and mortars had been very active against the area which "B" Company occupied on the latter date. Consequently Major Cohen found the field defences very badly damaged and most of the telephone lines cut; and many of the weapon pits in which the reserve ammunition was stored had caved in. In view of the likelihood of an enemy attack the company maintained an almost total "stand to" all night, one occupant of each fighting slit watching while the other rested at the bottom of the trench.* One man of the left-hand platoon shot three members of an enemy patrol-one of several probing parties that were reported that night.

So grave was the state of the defences and shelters on the right that, on the morning of the 23rd, the company commander withdrew No. 6 Platoon from that flank and doubled it up with No. 5, in the centre. Enemy shelling during the day caused several casualties and kept most of the company underground; it made impossible any effective work on the defences or on line communications and wrought further havoc on both, and prevented ammunition and fresh rations from being brought forward. Plans to reorganize, refit and feed the company after dark came to nought; for shortly after six the enemy put down a very heavy artillery concentration - a thousand rounds within ten minutes on "B" Company alone - and then assaulted with infantry.

Owing to the darkness, the confused nature of the fighting

** Normally there would have been a 100 percent stand to only at dusk and first light, with perhaps one-third of the company standing guard while the remainder patrolled, worked or slept. Reliefs were so arranged, when feasible, as to permit each man to have two or four hours' sleep at night, in addition to what he might get by day (when only a skeleton force was required on the posts).

and the lack of communications, the situation unfolded itself only gradually during the next three hours. No. 4, the platoon on the left, had been dislodged by the first rush. Major Cohen, his last link with Battalion Headquarters gone, had transferred his command post to "A" Company's area, while the commander of No. 5 Platoon had established a position between his former area and the new company CP. The battalion's acting CO, Major Francis Klenavic, now ordered tank and mortar fire on the ground that had been lost, and called "D" Company forward for a counter-attack.

The counter-attack force, having turned over its position to a company of the 1st Royal Fusiliers, arrived at about nine o'clock; but Major Klenavic decided not to commit it immediately.

First he brought down all available supporting fire on "B" Company's former area to forestall a threatened attack on "E" Company, and ordered out a patrol from the latter to investigate.

The patrol, returning at about half-past eleven, reported light machine guns firing from "B" Company's bunkers. The counter attack went in towards mid night, one platoon of "D" Company moving up through "A", another through "E". The left-hand platoon encountered considerable resistance and suffered some casualties, but by the time the two groups reached the objective the enemy was no longer there.

The last troops to leave the position, however, were not the Chinese. Lieut. Gardner and some men of Nos. 5 and 6 Platoons had held out to the traditional "last round", and then played dead. Gardner himself, after having shot five of the attackers, had been wounded.

Through shelling during the day, and in the night's action, the unit had suffered 75 casualties-18 killed, 43 wounded and 14 captured. The enemy force, estimated at one battalion, had left nine dead behind and dragged away many others. Three days later one of our patrols discovered six more dead Chinese in or near six large bunkers, which apparently had served as a forming-up place for the attack and subsequently as a regimental aid post. Pioneers of the RCR blew up these bunkers.

On the night of 26-27 October the Commonwealth Division's right boundary was shifted westward, a battalion of the 1st ROK Division relieving the Patricias. The latter moved to a reserve position on the Wyoming Line. The RCR and the Royal 22e remained forward for five more days, after which the 28th Brigade took over the Canadian sector. Thus ended one of the Brigade's most trying periods of the war, and certainly its most costly-in less than three months the RCR had suffered 191 casualties, the Patricias 18, and the Vingt-deux 74.

The Patricias' Second Rotation

The withdrawal of the 1st PPCLI from the line marked the end of that unit's operations in Korea. Already encamped at Lieut.-Colonel Cameron's "B" Echelon was the replacement battalion, the 3rd Patricias, who had put to sea early in October. Their advance party, consisting of the CO (Lieut.-Colonel H. F. Wood) and certain of his officers, had flown to the theatre in the middle of the month; and each member was now living and working with his first battalion counterpart. Other officers and NCOs, having since landed with the main body, were attached as observers to all three battalions of the Brigade. On completion of the handover, on 3 November, the 1st and 3rd PPCLI interchanged positions; and eight days later the first battalion began its homeward journey.

This was but one of a number of rotations which had taken place within the Commonwealth Division since the early summer of 1952, as the list of infantry battalions now serving shows:

25th Brigade: 1st Royal Canadian Regiment, 3rd Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, 1st Royal 22e Régiment.

28th Brigade: 1st Royal Fusiliers, 1st Durham Light Infantry, 1st Royal Australian Regiment, 3rd Royal Australian Regiment.

29th Brigade: 1st King's Regiment (Liverpool), 1st Duke of Wellington's Regiment, 1st Black Watch.

The 29th Brigade, on the left of the 28th, held positions on either side of the Sami-chon. Flowing eastward into this river about 5000 yards above its junction with the Imjin was an unnamed stream; its valley was dominated by a crest-line which, running through a feature known as "the Hook", continued southeastward for a further 1500 yards to Hill 146. The 1st Black Watch was guarding this line with one company on the Hook, another on 146, a third company in between, and the fourth on Hill 121 (south of the Hook). One company of the Royal 22e, under command of the Highlanders, was in semi-reserve near Kulchon, midway between Hill 146 and the Sami-chon.

Standing two and a half miles north of Sanggorangpo, the Hook dominated much of our rear areas, for which reason it was a favourite objective of enemy attacks. In this same area the 1st Patricias, as we have seen, had repulsed an attack in March. The first operational role allotted their third battalion was that of counter-attacking the Hook and certain other Black Watch positions in the event of their loss to the Chinese.

On the night of 18-19 November the enemy, attacking in battalion strength, succeeded in gaining a foot-hold on the Hook.

The Black Watch company on Hill 146 mounted an immediate counter-attack, and while fighting was still in progress "C" Company of the 3rd Patricia's came forward to reinforce it if necessary; meanwhile "B" Company had taken over the defence of 146. By first light the Highlanders had completely cleared the main position, and the PPCLI counter-attack company occupied the feature without difficulty. British and Canadian soldiers now co-operated in the evacuation of casualties, both on the Hook itself and on an outpost immediately to the north. In attempting to search a second outpost position, however, a Black Watch soldier was killed and a Canadian platoon commander wounded by enemy small-arms fire. Sporadic shelling caused a number of other Canadian casualties. "C" Company remained on the Hook until 22 November, when it was relieved by a Black Watch company, and "B" Company continued to hold Hill 146 until the 24th. The battalion spent the rest of the month in training and in preparation for the 25th Brigade's return to the line.

Meanwhile, on the 12th, the 1st PPCLI had reached Pusan; here, at the U.N. Cemetery, it held a service in honour of both its own dead and those of the 2nd Patricia's. Next day the battalion set sail for Japan; and on the 22nd, after spending a week at No. 25 Reinforcement Group, it boarded a Seattle-bound ship. The unit subsequently reassembled at Calgary, where it resumed its former role in the defence of Canada.

Winter on the Hook

At the end of November General West began to redeploy his forces so that, instead of two brigades being forward and one in reserve, all three brigades were in the line and each had one battalion in reserve. The new arrangement afforded each brigade commander the advantages of a narrower front to control and of defence in depth; it also provided him with a ready counter-attack force. The 28th Brigade continued to hold the Division's right sector, the British Brigade side-stepped to take over the centre of the front, and the Canadians moved up on the left. Brigadier Bogert assigned the Royal 22e to the Yongdong feature and the Patricia's to the Hook, and placed the RCR (less one company under Lieut.-Colonel Wood's command) in reserve behind the PPCLI position.

The next two months proved to be a relatively quiet period, the chief activity being improvement of the defensive works, particularly on the Hook. This was a continuation of a project which the British had started early in November; and its importance had been demonstrated in the attack of the 18th-19th, prior to which the Chinese artillery had flattened the open

defences. The defenders, having tunnels in which to take shelter, had called down artillery fire on their own position and thus prevented its being overrun by the assaulting infantry. Immediately on the 25th Brigade's return to the front, a troop of the 23rd Field Squadron carried on with the tunnelling programme; and later the entire squadron, assisted by Korean labour, joined in. Although working in solid rock and frozen ground, in January 1953 alone they constructed over 70,000 cubic feet of tunnel. During the whole period in the line, the infantry - with RCE and Korean assistance - deepened and extended its trenches, reinforced command posts, observation posts and bunkers, and installed additional earthworks of all types.

Patrolling, while by no means neglected, was not as strongly emphasized as it had been in the early summer; nor, at least as far as the Canadians were concerned, did any more company raids take place. The enemy's artillery was considerably less active now than it had been in previous months, and his infantry refrained from attacks on any such scale as those against the RCR and the Black Watch in October and November. As a result of these conditions, Canadian casualties in December 1952 and January 1953 were 57 - 12 killed and 45 wounded - compared with 131 in May and June 1952 and 232 in September and October.

Towards the end of December the RCR relieved the Patricias, the latter becoming brigade reserve. As before, the reserve battalion contributed one company to the battalion defending the Hook. The Royal 22e remained on the Yongdong feature until 30 January.

Next day, for the first time in the 18 months since its inception, the Commonwealth Division was withdrawn into reserve; its new location was about seven miles south-west of the Imjin-Hantan junction. Only the divisional artillery remained forward, its role being to support the relieving force, the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division. (As it included a number of non-American units, this formation was sometimes referred to, unofficially, as the 2nd U.N. Division.) The Commonwealth Division remained in reserve until early April, during which time it carried out training exercises on battalion, brigade and divisional levels. In the largest of these exercises, one directed by Corps Headquarters and code-named "Eveready", Divisional Headquarters together with all its brigade and battalion headquarters and the whole of the 29th Brigade counter-attacked a hypothetical enemy penetration in the Chorwon sector.

Korean Personnel with the Canadian Forces

In their very early operations, the reader may recall, the 2nd Patricias had employed Korean labour to carry supplies over

the rugged and almost roadless terrain. This custom, which practically all the U.N. forces had adopted in order to conserve their own resources of manpower, remained in effect throughout hostilities. In Japan, as well, extensive use was made of "indigenous" labour. How gloomy and austere would any camp there have seemed without its Japanese waitresses and housegirls! Most drivers in the base also were Japanese, and these men were found to be extremely efficient and conscientious.

In the course of the campaign the Korean Service Corps, similar to a pioneer corps, was formed as a part of the ROK Army. The 120th Regiment KSC was attached to the 1st Commonwealth Division, one company being allotted to each infantry battalion and other companies to the engineers. Although their duties were of a non-combatant nature, it must not be overlooked that in carrying them out KSC details were frequently exposed to shellfire. Light domestic services were provided by Korean boys, many of whom were homeless war orphans. These little fellows soon developed a warm feeling towards the units which employed them, and wore their badges. In view of the numbers of attached Koreans it was necessary to engage still others as interpreters. Dealings between its own forces and those of other nationalities led the ROK Army to furnish additional interpreters and also English-speaking liaison officers. One such LO became, in effect, one of the longest-serving officers of the 25th Brigade - Lieut. Yung Jo Kim, whose association with Canadian units dated as far back as March 1951.

Shortly before its return to the line, in the spring of 1953, the Commonwealth Division was reinforced by 1000 Korean soldiers known as "Katcoms" (Korean Augmentation to Commonwealth). To help meet the special administrative problems posed by such an arrangement, the ROK Army attached a liaison mission to the Divisional Headquarters. The reinforcements were allotted-approximately 100 to each infantry battalion and 30 to the divisional signals-for all purposes except pay; thus, about the end of March, the Canadian Brigade received 300 Katcoms. Since these soldiers had been trained exclusively on American weapons it was necessary for their new units to give them a short course on Commonwealth small arms. They were then assigned to rifle companies, two or three to a section, and each was paired off with a Commonwealth soldier with whom he lived and carried out all duties. Despite language difficulties the scheme proved successful; for the Korean makes a good soldier, especially in night operations.

The Second General Rotation

The beginning of the Katcom programme coincided roughly with the Division's return to the front and with the second large

rotation of Canadian units. Towards the end of March the 1st Royal Canadian Regiment, No. 23 Transport Company and the 23rd Field Squadron handed over to the 3rd RCR, No. 56 Transport Company and the 59th Independent Field Squadron. The next major unit to be withdrawn was No. 191 Infantry Workshop RCEME, which had retained that title through the previous rotation; its relief was No. 23 Infantry Workshop. The 1st Royal 22e Régiment gave place to its third battalion on 21 April. Also on that date, Brigadier Bogert turned over his command to Brigadier J. V. Allard. The 81st Field Regiment RCA replaced the 1st Regiment RCHA on 22 April, and nine days later No. 38 Field Ambulance took over from No. 37. The last component to be affected was again the armour, "A" Squadron of the Strathconas taking over from "B" Squadron on 24 May. As in the first rotation, most other Canadian units in the Far East had changed their personnel without losing their collective identities.

* * *

With the exception of the Black Watch, whose place was taken by the 1st Royal Scots early in July, the composition of the Commonwealth Division (less services) from the end of May to the armistice stood as follows:

1st Royal Tank Regiment

"A" Squadron Lord Strathcona's Horse

16th Field Regiment RNZA

20th Field Regiment RA

81st Field Regiment RCA

61st Light Regiment RA

74th Medium Battery RA

28th Field Engineer Regiment
(12th Field Squadron RE, 55th Field
Squadron RE, 59th Independent Field
Squadron RCE)

64th Field Park Squadron RE.

25th Brigade: 3rd Royal Canadian Regiment, 3rd Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, 3rd Royal 22e Régiment.

28th Brigade: 1st Royal Fusiliers, 1st Durham Light Infantry, 2nd Royal Australian Regiment, 3rd Royal Australian

Regiment.

29th Brigade: 1st King's Regiment, 1st Duke of Wellington's Regiment, 1st Black Watch.

Between 6 and 8 April the Commonwealth Division had relieved the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division on Hill 355 and across the Sami-chon to the Hook. General West again employed all three brigades forward: the 28th Commonwealth on the right, the 29th British on the left and the 25th Canadian Brigade in the centre.

Within the Canadian sector the 1st Royal 22e and subsequently the 3rd RCR were on the right, on ground which the 2nd RCR had captured in Operation "Commando" in October 1951; on the left, now holding the 2nd PPCLI's "Commando" objectives, were the 3rd Patricias.

* * *

It is convenient at this point to review the contributions of various countries to the United Nations force. They were as follows: *United States*, the bulk of the U.N. naval and air forces, and in April 1953 approximately half of the Eighth Army (seven divisions and many other troops); *Britain*, one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, eight destroyers, and certain other naval, marine and air elements, plus about half the Commonwealth Division; *Turkey*, a brigade group; *Australia*, one aircraft carrier, two destroyers, one frigate, a fighter squadron, an air transport squadron, and two infantry battalions; *The Philippines*, a battalion combat team; *Thailand*, an infantry battalion, two corvettes and an air transport squadron; *France*, an infantry battalion and a patrol gunboat; *Greece*, an infantry battalion and an air transport squadron; *New Zealand*, two frigates and one regiment of field artillery; *The Netherlands*, a destroyer and an infantry battalion; *Colombia*, an infantry battalion and a frigate; *South Africa*, a fighter squadron; *Belgium* and *Ethiopia*, each an infantry battalion; and *Luxembourg*, one company (in the Belgian battalion). Canada, as we have seen, was represented by three destroyers, a brigade group and an air transport squadron.

South Korea, with a quarter of a million men now in the field, had become the greatest single contributor to the ground forces; and ROK sailors, marines and airmen also were serving the United Nations. Denmark, India, Italy (though not then a member of the U.N.), Norway and Sweden had provided medical units. (An account of the Norwegian Mobile Army Surgical Hospital's work in Korea mentions that it treated 1241 Canadians during its time there.) Japan, too, aided the cause in serving as a base.

Part IV

THE END OF THE FIGHTING

The Attack on the 3rd RCR

The period of front-line duty which the 1st Commonwealth Division began in April 1953 was its last of the Korean war. Although the closing months of the campaign were far from quiet, only one strong attack came against the 25th Canadian Brigade.

On the night of 19-20 April the 3rd Royal Canadian Regiment, entering the line for the first time, relieved the homeward bound 1st Royal 22e Régiment on the more southerly of the two Hills 187. To the left of this position, guarding the Yongdong feature and the Hook, was the 29th British Brigade. On the right was the 3rd Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, and to its right the 28th Commonwealth Brigade. The boundary between the 25th and the 28th Brigade lay opposite the right flank of the Chinese First Army and the left of the 46th Army.

The RCR position resembled the palm of a great, gnarled hand. Hill 187 itself represented the base of the thumb, from which three finger-like ridges ran westward, pointing towards the lower reaches of the Nabu-ri stream. The CO, Lieut.-Colonel K. L. Campbell, assigned "A" Company to 187 and "C" to the first "finger"; he placed "B" Company on the second and third fingers and "D" as at the base of a fourth. "C", his right forward company, had two platoons on Point 97 and its headquarters and the other platoon on Point 123. The battalion's defences had not suffered as badly either from enemy shelling or from the weather as had those of Hill 355 in the autumn of 1952, nor were they as well developed as the Hook position; they were representative of the divisional front in general.

In accordance with divisional policy, Colonel Campbell ordered that the wire be thickened, the trenches deepened and gaps in the system filled, and the fire bays and bunkers reinforced - especially in the case of "C" Company, whose position was a favourite target of the Chinese artillery and mortars. Enemy patrols, meanwhile, were treating No Man's Land almost as though it were their property, an impression which Commonwealth commanders resolved to correct by increasing the number of their own patrols. A patrol of "A" Company of the RCR, in fact, was out when the enemy struck. That was on the evening of 2 May.

The amount of hostile shelling and probing pointed to an attack in near future. There was little indication, however, that the Chinese had chosen this particular time for it-no sharp

increase in his patrol activity, no change in his shelling habits. For the RCR as a whole, 2 May was a quiet day; for "C" Company, as usual, it was one of fairly heavy shelling and mortaring. One man was killed in the afternoon when a platoon OP on Hill 97 received a direct hit, and three others were wounded early in the evening. The fighting strength of the company at this time was about 130, including 22 Katcom soldiers. Attached were some 60 members of the Korean Service Corps, of whom two-thirds were employed at digging and the remainder as porters.

The "A" Company patrol, 16 strong, passed through "C" at 8:30 p.m. and took up a position north of Point 97 and east of where the village of Chinchon had stood.* Its task was to ambush any enemy patrols that might come up the valley and attempt to penetrate between the RCR and the Patricias. No. 8 Platoon of "C" Company was prepared to reinforce it should the need arise; and the whole company was still standing to, for the moon had not yet come up. At about half-past ten the patrol came under attack by more than 60 Chinese, operating in three groups. The patrol leader was killed and half his men either killed or captured. Colonel Campbell ordered the remainder to withdraw and No. 8 Platoon to engage the enemy who were attempting to cut them off. The platoon commander took one of his sections forward, and soon this group also found itself in a losing fight.

At midnight, hours before the last remnants of these two parties had made their way back, the Chinese artillery put down a heavy concentration on Point 97. Then the enemy infantry assaulted. No. 7 Platoon's commander, 2nd Lieut. E. H. Hollyer, called for artillery fire right on his own position, catching not only the first wave of the attackers but a follow up force as well. Throughout the action he received the closest co-operation from Lieut. L. G. Coté (attached to the battalion from the RC Signals), who maintained communications under these extremely difficult and dangerous conditions. The other platoon on Point 97 came under attack as well, but held its ground with its own weapons. Threatened attacks on "A" and "B" Companies and on the Patricias were broken up by our supporting arms. To some 2000 shells which the enemy had fired, the divisional artillery replied fourfold; the 81st Canadian Field Regiment alone fired 4300 rounds. The RCR was also assisted by the PPCLI mortars and machine-guns, and by part of the 1st Corps artillery.

Shortly after half-past one the Chinese began to retire from Point 97, and the Commonwealth artillery, at Lieut. Hollyer's request, lifted its fire so as to harass the withdrawal. A few hours afterwards Colonel Campbell took "C" Company out of the

*A patrol of the 1st RCR had completely destroyed this village in May 1952

battalion area for a period of rest and refitting. Its relief was "D" Company, whose former position was now occupied by a company of the recently arrived 3rd Royal 22e. The night's action, a raid in battalion strength, had cost the enemy more than 80 fatal casualties. The RCR's losses were 25 killed, 28 wounded and seven taken prisoner, exclusive of 35 Katcom and KSC casualties. Chinese artillery fire had also killed two Patricias and two Canadian gunners, and wounded seven Patricias. There is no doubt that losses would have been heavier but for body armour, which, since its experimental use by patrols in the summer of 1952, had become standard equipment for forward troops of the Commonwealth Division.

Over the remaining 12 weeks of the war, enemy shelling and patrol contacts resulted in a further 104 Canadian casualties, of which 17 were fatal. The Canadian Army's final total was 1543 - 309 killed, 1101 wounded and 32 prisoners of war, plus 101 "battle injuries". There were 90 deaths other than in battle.

Political Developments, 1952-53

On 16 February 1952 the cease-fire negotiators at Panmunjom had agreed that:

...within three (3) months after the armistice agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference ...of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.*

But the delegates were again in deadlock with respect to concrete arrangements for a cease-fire and for the supervision of an armistice, while sub-delegates were wrestling vainly with the question of the post-war disposal of war prisoners.

By the end of April the U.N. forces were holding over 120,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners, and the Communists about 12,000 U.N. soldiers; only about two-thirds of the Communist prisoners wished to return to their homelands on release, as against all but a few hundred of the South Korean and other U.N. prisoners. The United Nations objected to a compulsory repatriation of prisoners, while the enemy insisted that all captives be returned whether they wished to be or not. The Reds, claiming their stand to be in line with the Geneva Convention of 1949, cited a clause which had been designed simply

*Admiral Joy's team stressed that "foreign" forces meant non-Korean, and that "etc." did not include matters outside Korea.

to ensure against forcible retention; but their real motive appears to have been to deny deserters or would-be deserters any hope of escape from Communism.

Between December 1951 and October 1952 the fate of war prisoners was the subject of bitter and fruitless debate, and on 8 October the U.N. Command called an indefinite recess in all armistice negotiations. But only two weeks later, the question was raised again in the seventh session of the U.N. General Assembly. Several resolutions, counter-resolutions and amendments were introduced and discussed before the end of November; but the only significant development was a proposal which the Indian delegation advanced, and which the Assembly adopted on 3 December over the objections of the Soviet bloc. It provided for a neutral commission to which all prisoners would be turned over. The commission would repatriate all willing prisoners, but would not use force either to carry out or to prevent such return; the disposal of unwilling prisoners would be referred to a political conference; and if after a certain time this conference had failed to solve the problem, "the responsibility for their care and maintenance and for their subsequent disposition shall be transferred to the United Nations, which in all matters relating to them shall act strictly in accordance with international law". Communist China and North Korea, whose foreign ministers received the text of the resolution, rejected these proposals; consequently no immediate settlement resulted. This resolution had, however, demonstrated the solidarity of the non-Communist members, and was to serve as the basis of the agreement that eventually was reached.

Towards the end of February 1953 General Ridgway's successor as U.N. Supreme Commander, General Mark W. Clark, wrote the Chinese and North Korean commanders that he was willing to begin an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners who were fit to travel, and who wished to be repatriated during hostilities. He received a favourable reply within a month, and with it the suggestion that full armistice discussions be resumed. The exchange was formally agreed upon at Panmunjom on 11 April, and was carried out during the next three weeks. (Among the prisoners returned were two Canadians.) Meanwhile the Foreign Minister of Communist China, Mr. Chou En-lai, had proposed that "both parties to the negotiations should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral state ..." and that while in neutral custody prisoners should be visited by explanation teams of their own nationality. This amounted to a qualified acceptance of the General Assembly's resolution of December 1952.

That member which had introduced the resolution became the

"neutral" state in question. It is true that India had contributed a medical unit to the U.N. forces, but she was an Asiatic power which had consistently remained aloof from American and Soviet influences alike.

The prospect of an early truce, far from slackening military operations, seemed to provoke some of the most bitter fighting of the war. In May the Turkish Brigade, under command of the 25th U.S. Infantry Division (which had relieved the Marines to the left of the Commonwealth sector), repulsed a strong Chinese thrust. Towards the end of the month the enemy again attacked the 29th British Brigade on the Hook, and was beaten off with losses estimated at over a thousand. In mid-July he mounted a series of attacks against the 1st ROK Division, north-east of Hill 355; these were broken up with the assistance of the 81st Field Regiment RCA. Among the heaviest and the very last actions of the campaign were two involving the Marine Division, which had returned to the area south-west of the Hook. Aided by the 2nd Royal Australian Regiment and Commonwealth artillery and tanks, the Americans held their ground. More effective attacks had come in the Eighth Army's central sector, principally against South Korean formations, reducing the Kum-song salient. Apparently the main reason behind the enemy's efforts here was that the Republic of Korea still opposed an armistice which would leave the peninsula divided.

On 18 June, without consulting the U.N. authorities, President Rhee had ordered the release of over 25,000 North Korean prisoners who did not wish to be repatriated. In reply to a Communist protest against this dramatic but untimely move, General Clark pointed out that the proposed armistice was a military matter, and the while the U.N. Command was in control of the ROK Army it had no authority over the Korean Government. At the same time a personal representative of the President of the United States persuaded Mr. Rhee to refrain from further acts which might upset the truce talks, and the U.N. Commander was then able to give appropriate assurances to the Communist negotiators. These assurances were accepted on 19 July, and the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed at Panmunjom eight days later.

The signing preceded by twelve hours the actual cease-fire, which took effect at 10:00 p.m. on the 27th; thus ended three years and one month of fighting. Millions of Korean civilians had been made homeless and many thousands of others killed or injured. The Communist Chinese forces had suffered an estimated 967,000 battle casualties, the North Koreans 624,000. U.N. (including South Korean) battle casualties numbered about 490,000.

In Washington, on the day following the cease-fire,

representatives of those U.N. countries whose armed forces had fought in Korea signed the following declaration:

We...support the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command to conclude an armistice agreement. We hereby affirm our determination fully and faithfully to carry out the terms of that armistice. We expect that the other parties to the agreement will likewise scrupulously observe its terms.

...We shall support the efforts of the United Nations to bring about an equitable settlement in Korea...and which call for a united, independent and democratic Korea. We will support the United Nations in its efforts to assist the people of Korea in repairing the ravages of war.

...We affirm, in the interests of world peace, that if there is a renewal of the armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we should again be united and prompt to resist.

Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia.

Administration Behind the Canadian Brigade, June 1951-July 1953

The Canadian administrative organization in the Far East served three special purposes: it equipped and supplied this country's troops mainly from Canadian and American sources; it enabled all elements to keep their Canadian identity; and it represented an appropriate contribution by Canada to the Commonwealth administrative effort.

The 2nd PPCLI's Administrative Increment, whose role was to continue while that battalion was the only Canadian unit in Korea, consisted of some 80 all ranks, including RCASC, RCOC, pay and records. Its headquarters was set up in Pusan, with the Commonwealth advanced base. Detachments were located in the main base (Kure, Japan), the forward maintenance area (later permanently located in Seoul) and the Commonwealth Brigade's area. When, early in June 1951, the Patricia's rejoined their recently-arrived parent formation, the Administrative Increment ceased to exist as such; its personnel were further absorbed into the Commonwealth organization.

During its first three months in the theatre, the 25th Canadian Brigade was maintained as well as employed as a brigade group. Brigadier Rockingham exercised command over the administrative units through his staff, which then included deputy assistant directors of the various services. The two major Canadian units in Japan - No. 2 Administrative Unit and No. 25 Reinforcement Group - were equally responsible to Brigade Headquarters. But on the formation of the 1st Commonwealth Division at the end of July, almost all other Canadian administrative units either were reallocated to the divisional services or to the Commonwealth line of communication and base organization. At the same time the establishment of Brigade Headquarters was modified so as to resemble more closely that of

a standard brigade. How did the brigade commander, who was still responsible to the Canadian Government for the administrative troops, continue to exercise control over them? An early measure to this end was to organize those serving in integrated units into all-Canadian accounting units whose commanders were responsible to Brigade Headquarters. One example was "Canadian Army Ordnance Elements 1st Commonwealth Division", under the Canadian commander of the integrated Ordnance Field Park. Another was "Canadian Section L of C and Base Troops BCFK", commanded by Lieut.-Colonel L. R. Crue, an original member of the Canadian Military Mission Far East (above, page 8).

At this point it must be mentioned that BCFK (British Commonwealth Forces Korea), though the term was commonly applied just to the base, properly embraced the Commonwealth component of the U.N. military, naval and air forces in Korea and Japan and also, until the Japanese Peace Treaty of April 1952 took effect, the Commonwealth occupation forces in Japan. The office of Commander-in-Chief, an Australian appointment, was held first by Lieut.-General Sir Horace Robertson. Liaison between the Commonwealth C-in-C and the U.N. Supreme Commander was provided by a subordinate headquarters in Tokyo. Here, as elsewhere throughout the base and L of C, elements of Colonel Crue's command were soon to be found.

We have seen that Canadian administrative units now fell into two categories: those which functioned as such, and accounting units whose members served in a number of integrated units. Thus in Japan there were four lieutenant-colonels' commands* and in the divisional are several majors' commands, all independently responsible in national respects to Brigade Headquarters. Distance alone, without the brigade commander's operational duties, would have made personal control impossible; this imposed many extra demands on individual commanders whom he detailed as co-ordinating officers, and on his own DAA&QMG. In July 1952, to assist the commander and his staff in such matters, a Colonel in Charge of Administration (Colonel W. J. Moogk) was assigned to Brigade Headquarters. This appointment was changed to "Commander Canadian Base Units Far East" in February 1953. Colonel Moogk thus represented Brigadier Bogert and later Brigadier Allard as commander of Canadian troops between Seoul and Tokyo; and his headquarters in Kure was the main administrative link between Brigade Headquarters, Headquarters BCFK, the base itself and Army Headquarters in Ottawa.

*No. 2 Administrative Unit, No. 25 Reinforcement Group, Canadian Section L of C and Base Troops and Canadian Section British Commonwealth General Hospital.

Let us turn now to the divisional services, the major units of which were as follows:

No. 54 Canadian Transport Company (to April 1952)
No. 23 Canadian Transport Company (April 1952 to March 1953)
No. 56 Canadian Transport Company (from March 1953)
No. 57 Company RASC
No. 78 Company RASC-RNZASC (to October 1951)
No. 10 Company RNZASC (from October 1951)
No. 25 Canadian Field Ambulance (to April 1952)
No. 37 Canadian Field Ambulance (April 1952 to April 1953)
No. 38 Canadian Field Ambulance (from May 1953)
No. 26 Field Ambulance RAMC
No. 60 Indian Field Ambulance
No. 25 Canadian Field Dressing Station
No. 20 Canadian Field Dental Detachment (in January 1952, redesignated No. 25 Canadian Field Dental Unit)
1st Commonwealth Division Ordnance Field Park
No. 10 Infantry Workshop REME
No. 16 Infantry Workshop REME
No 191 Canadian Infantry Workshop (to April 1953)
No. 23 Canadian Infantry Workshop (from April 1953)
1st Commonwealth Division Provost Company.

Headquarters Royal Army Service Corps was integrated, the commander being British and his second-in-command a Canadian. The RCASC transport company normally handled ammunition for the Division, and No. 57 Company RASC gasoline and lubricants. The New Zealand unit served as supply company for all but Canadian troops. American rations for Canadian units were delivered by the Canadian transport company; and courses in preparing them were later run at the 25th Brigade Cooking School (next to the

Brigade NCOs School, near Uijongbu).

Since May 1952 the office of Assistant Director of Medical Services had been a Canadian appointment; the deputy assistant director was British. The three field ambulances generally worked with the brigades to which they had formerly been attached. No. 25 Field Dressing Station eventually grew into a 200-bed hospital, with Canadian nursing sisters on its staff; here and in a similar installation in Seoul (integrated, under the control of BCFK) were treated many Commonwealth "minor sick and wounded" who otherwise would have had to be evacuated to Japan. Surgery was carried out by American and Norwegian mobile units and by No. 25 Canadian Field Surgical Team. As in past wars, the chief means of casualty evacuation were hand-carry and road transport; though whenever possible helicopters of the 1st Corps would pick up urgent cases. No. 38 Motor Ambulance Company RCASC provided transport between field ambulances and more rearward medical installations.

No. 25 Canadian Field Dental Unit was not of course the only dental element in the Division, but it was the largest; and detachments of it were located both at major Canadian units in the field and at the Reinforcement Group in Japan. These detachments provided comprehensive dental treatment for all Canadian personnel and also took care of emergency cases of other nationalities. The unit's headquarters assisted the 25th Brigade, administratively, by sharing its camp site with the Canadian field postal detachment and later with certain elements of Brigade Headquarters. (In April 1953 "Rear Brigade" joined "Main", and those subunits which could not conveniently be absorbed into the one headquarters were assigned to other locations.)

Headquarters Royal Army Ordnance Corps was British. The Ordnance Field Park, as we have seen, was an integrated unit under a Canadian commander, and consisted of an integrated headquarters, an integrated general stores platoon, a British platoon and a Canadian platoon. Other ordnance elements included two British shower sections, two Canadian shower sections, a British laundry and a Canadian laundry. Despite difficulties arising from the cosmopolitan nature of the force, the lack of Commonwealth corps or army ordnance troops in the theatre and the length of the L of C, the divisional ordnance services maintained a laudable standard of efficiency.

Both before and after the division was formed, the repair of weapons and vehicles was carried out largely on a brigade-group basis. All three major repair units, however, contributed men and resources to two units not normally found in a division: a telecommunications workshop and a recovery company. The

Second-in-Command of the Electrical and Mechanical Engineer Services was specifically responsible for recovery and also, being a Canadian, acted as adviser to the Canadian brigade headquarters on the employment of RCEME personnel in the Division.

The 1st Commonwealth Division Provost Company was made up of sections from the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, and was commanded by a Canadian officer. Its heaviest responsibility was traffic control - speeding alone accounted for over half the charges laid by the divisional police. Directly under the authority of the commander of the 25th Brigade, although located well behind the divisional area, was a Canadian detention barracks. Australia, Britain and New Zealand also were represented at this institution, both on the staff and among the "guests".

Commonwealth welfare officers, located at the various headquarters in Korea and Japan, co-operated with one another and with their American counterparts to bring films, concerts, canteen supplies and reading material to the troops, and to provide sporting goods. Nevertheless, in the last analysis, the success of the welfare programme depended on the energy with which the units themselves set up recreational facilities and used them. Every "B" Echelon included a unit theatre, canteen and shower-bath; and so many men would be taken out of the line each day in order that they might enjoy these amenities. There was also a divisional rest centre near Inchon. But the "feature attraction" of the recreational programme was a period of leave in Tokyo, which in the case of British and Canadian troops amounted to five full days.

In this short, general history it would not be practicable to treat more fully the services just described, or to cover such other administrative subjects as the pay, postal and chaplain services. The burden of all was greatly increased by the very wide dispersion of units, the absence of paved roads and the scarcity of roads of any kind, and by frequent rains and extremes of temperature. Yet every administrative problem was met and overcome with determination and resourcefulness, and where necessary through co-operation among the forces of a number of nations.

Supporting Arms

The following British and Canadian armoured units fought in Korea:

8th Royal Irish Hussars (to December 1951)

5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards (December 1951 to December 1952)

1st Royal Tank Regiment (from December 1952)

"C" Squadron 7th Royal Tank Regiment (to October 1951)

"C" Squadron Lord Strathcona's Horse (to June 1952)

"B" Squadron Lord Strathcona's Horse (June 1952-May 1953)

"A" Squadron Lord Strathcona's Horse (from May 1953).

The Korean terrain, with its rugged hills and boggy flats, did not favour the extensive or most advantageous use of tanks. The only exception which "C" Squadron of the Strathconas found was the Chorwon plain. Here it gave highly effective support to patrols, using an artillery technique for indirect firing: an observation officer with forward infantry elements. The same technique was employed in the limited advances beyond the Imjin in September and October 1951. During the static phase of the war, the tanks, sited unconventionally on the hilltops, sniped at enemy positions and covered the movements of our patrols. Attached to each Canadian battalion was a tank liaison officer who was empowered to order fire at his own discretion; thus the armour was in a position to engage targets with direct fire ahead of other supporting arms. When the Chinese attacked Hill 355 in October 1952, tanks of the Strathconas' "B" Squadron were the first support elements to fire in retaliation. Ten of that squadron's tanks assisted in repulsing the attack on the 3rd RCR in May 1953.

The Korean campaign has been aptly described as a "gunner's war". Between the inception of the Commonwealth Division and the end of the fighting in 1953, the divisional artillery included the following field regiments:

2nd Regiment RCHA (to May 1952)

1st Regiment RCHA (May 1952 to April 1953)

81st Field Regiment RCA* (from April 1953)

16th Field Regiment RNZA

45th Field Regiment RA (to November 1951)

*This unit was redesignated 4th Regiment RCHA, with effect from 16 October 1953.

14th Field Regiment RA (November 1951 to December 1952)

20th Field Regiment RA (from December 1952)

None of these units contained a mortar element; instead, the divisional artillery at first had a number of independent mortar batteries and troops. The winter of 1951-52 saw these and a small light anti-aircraft element succeeded by the 61st Light Regiment RA, of which the 42nd Light Battery (mortars) was allotted to the Canadian Brigade. In March 1953 the Division acquired a British medium battery from Hong Kong. Successive Canadian field regiments normally served in direct support of the 25th Brigade, the New Zealand gunners being associated with the 28th Brigade and the British with the 29th. From the end of January 1953 to the first week of April, while the Division as a whole was in reserve, the 1st Regiment RCHA supported the 38th U.S. Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division. No. 1903 Air OP Flight RAF, attached to the divisional artillery, included Canadian and Australian army pilots. Throughout the campaign, air and ground observers alike directed artillery fire on enemy forming-up places with such effect that many a Chinese attack failed to develop; and those few which achieved some initial success owed their final failure largely to the Commonwealth gunners. In the Hook engagement of May 1953 his last strong attack on a Commonwealth position-the enemy fired some 11,000 shells. The divisional artillery replied with over 32,000 and the heavy artillery of the 1st U.S. Corps with a further 6000.

Engineer units of the Commonwealth Division were as follows:

28th Field Engineer Regiment:

12th Field Squadron RE

55th Field Squadron RE

57th Independent Field Squadron RCE (to May 1952)

23rd Field Squadron RCE (May 1952 to March 1953)

59th Independent Field Squadron RCE (from March 1953)

64th Field Park Squadron RE.

The 12th Field Squadron included a section of New Zealanders and an Australian officer. In the Field Park Squadron were some 30 all ranks of the RCE - the field park element of an independent field squadron initially designed to support a brigade group. The allotment of Korean labour to the divisional engineers varied

between 1000 and 2000 men; and further assistance, including the support of a battalion of the 1st Corps engineers, was available to the Division from American sources. Of the many, varied tasks that faced the Commonwealth sappers, by far the largest was road work - 70 per cent of the engineer effort was devoted to constructing enough roads to bear the necessary traffic, and to keeping them passable under every adverse condition of weather and ground. Another major engineering task was mine laying. Tunnelling, such as was carried out on the Hook, was but one of many extraordinary requirements which the sappers had to meet.

The 1st Commonwealth Division Signal Regiment was all British except for the Canadian and New Zealand artillery signals and the signal component of the Canadian Brigade. (The 25th Brigade Signal Squadron had become "J" Troop of the divisional signals.) The abnormal distances between units and the nature of the intervening ground, with their limiting effect on wireless communications, greatly increased the amount of line to be laid and maintained. Road conditions and danger from guerillas dictated that dispatch riders should use jeeps rather than motorcycles, and should travel in pairs. In short, the signals organization faced much the same problems as did all arms and services of the Division, and on its efficient functioning depended the success of the overall effort.

Air Support and Supply

Early in the war, following the destruction of the North Korean air force, the U.N. forces enjoyed complete supremacy in the air. Even after the entry of Red China, which had a formidable air force, we operated with a wide margin of air superiority; for the Chinese seldom used aircraft except defensively. While our heavy bombers struck as far north as the Yalu River, the fighters continually hammered at the enemy's forward positions, forcing him to dig deeply and to move troops and supplies only at night. At the same time, we were able to move about freely on the ground and to reconnoitre from the air; we could fly out casualties and, where necessary, fly in supplies.

Twenty-two RCAF fighter pilots served with the Fifth U.S. Air Force. With the loss of one prisoner of war (Squadron-Leader A. R. MacKenzie) in December 1952, the Canadians destroyed or damaged some 20 hostile jet fighters and accounted for several enemy trains and trucks. Also attached to the Fifth Air Force were army officers on loan from various formations in the theatre, including the Canadian Brigade; from the back seats of unarmed, slow flying aircraft, these officers directed our fighter-bombers against enemy ground targets.

No. 426 Transport Squadron, which had been attached from the RCAF to the U.S. Military Air Transport Service in July 1950, operated between the State of Washington and Japan for eleven months. It then returned to its home base, at Dorval, from which it continued in the same role. (The move was occasioned in part by a decrease in the requirements of the Pacific airlift.) By 9 June 1954, when this assignment ended, the RCAF transport aircraft had flown 600 round trips over the Pacific, carrying over 13,000 passengers and 7,000,000 pounds of freight and mail without loss.

The RCN in Korean Waters, May 1951 July 1953

May 1951 saw the end of a long period in which Canadian destroyers were engaged in the monotonous but essential task of screening U.N. aircraft carriers in Korean waters. HMCS *Sioux*, one of the three "originals", re-entered the theatre in time for a return to more exciting duties. On the east coast, where the rugged terrain forced the railroads to skirt the shore in many places, enemy trains were a favourite target of naval guns. The Yellow Sea, with its many offshore islands, was the scene of much patrolling and a series of commando-type raids by ROK Marines and other U.N. forces.

HMC Ships *Nootka* and *Huron* departed for Canada in July and August, and the *Cayuga* and the *Athabaskan* arrived for a second tour of operations in the Far East. In February 1952 the *Nootka* again relieved the *Sioux*. The other two originals were replaced in May and June by the Canadian destroyers *Crusader* and *Iroquois*.

For the *Nootka*, operating in the approaches to Haeju, the latter half of July and the first five days of August were probably the busiest period of the war. Intelligence parties were landed and picked up daily, and on seven occasions the destroyer came under enemy shell fire. Nevertheless the RCN did not suffer its first and only battle casualties of the Korean war until 2 October 1952, when the *Iroquois* received a direct hit from a shore battery on the east coast. Three were killed and ten wounded.

In November 1952 the *Nootka* and the *Iroquois* left for Canada; *Athabaskan* returned to the theatre for a third tour, and HMCS *Haida* arrived for her first. The *Haida* was the eighth Canadian destroyer to fight in Korean waters. By the end of hostilities, more than 3500 officers and men of the RCN had taken part in operations; they had steamed some 725,000 miles and fired 130,000 shells.

The Toll of the War

We have already seen (page 78) that this so-called "little" war is estimated to have cost the combatants well over two million battle casualties, of which nearly 1,600,000 fell upon the Communists.

On the United Nations side South Korea of course suffered most heavily, the losses of all its armed forces having exceeded 325,000, over 60,000 being fatal. The United States came next; the American forces had 142,091 battle casualties in all categories, with 33,629 men losing their lives. The US Army had 109,958 casualties, the US Marines 28,205. Among the Commonwealth countries, the United Kingdom paid the heaviest price, its losses numbering 4592, at least 935 being fatal. The British Army had 4409 casualties in action. Of Canada's 1557 battle casualties, 312 were fatal. All but fourteen of the 1557 were suffered by the Army.

Part V

CONCLUSION

Main Provisions of the Armistice Agreement

For the last two weeks of Korean operations the 25th Canadian Brigade held Hill 159 and Hill 355 in the 1st Commonwealth Division's right sector; the 28th Commonwealth Brigade had taken over the left and the 29th British the centre.

Between the cease-fire and the end of July 1953, the Division withdrew to the Imjin River, occupying much the same area as it had on its inception two years before. This was in compliance with the Armistice Agreement, which began:

A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometres from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone...a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

The Demarcation Line, which followed the final line of contact, dipped close to twenty miles south of the 38th Parallel in the west and rose sharply to about forty miles north of it on the east coast.

Within sixty days after the signing of the Armistice Agreement, all prisoners of war were to be turned over to joint committees under the supervision of a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Five nations were represented in this body - Czechoslovakia, India, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland - the chairman being India's Lieut.-General K. S. Thimayya. By 6 September the Communists had returned about 12,750 captives (including the remaining 30 members of the Canadian Army), and the United Nations 75,000.

Prisoners who did not want to go home were to remain the responsibility of the Repatriation Commission for the next four months; the Commission entrusted their care to a special custodian force, the 190th Indian Infantry Brigade. Representatives of both sides were permitted to interview captives of their own nationality to explain to them their rights and to "inform them of any matters relating to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full freedom to return home to lead a peaceful life". This resulted in the exchange of some 620 more Chinese and North Koreans (out of 22,600) for nine out of 360 U.N. and South Korean prisoners. By January 1954 the political conference which was supposed to decide on a final disposition of the remaining captives still had not been held; nor did it appear that such a meeting would take place before the Repatriation Commission disbanded. Towards the end of the month, therefore, General Thimayya returned the "non-repatriables" to

their captors, who granted them civilian status and released them. The majority of the Chinese were admitted to Formosa; most of the North Koreans stayed in the Republic of Korea. In July 1955 three of 21 Americans who had chosen to live under Communism were returned to the United States at their own request.

The Repatriation Commission and the Indian custodian force duly left Korea in February 1954. But the release of war prisoners was still not quite complete. One Canadian remained a prisoner of the Communists until sixteen months after the cease-fire - Squadron-Leader A. R. MacKenzie of the RCAF. Fifteen American airmen were held until the summer of 1955. Whether other U.N. prisoners remain in Communist hands is not known.

Both sides had reached their peak strengths just before the end of hostilities. At that time the Communist Chinese forces in Korea included an estimated 57 divisions, and the North Korean People's Army 18 divisions and seven independent brigades. The final total enemy troop strength is believed to have been about 1,160,000-880,000 Chinese and 280,000 North Korean - plus a number of Russian technical troops. The United Nations ground forces in Korea included 25 divisions (sixteen South Korean, eight American or predominantly American, and the 1st Commonwealth Division), and numbered 550,000. These were made up as follows:

Republic of Korea.....	276,000
United States.....	237,000
Commonwealth.....	20,000
Other.....	17,000

Under the terms of the Armistice, neither side was to increase the number of non-Korean forces in the country after the fighting. This had certain effects on the rate and on the mechanics of rotation, but did not radically alter the policy. Troops entering or leaving the theatre were to do so only through certain authorized ports, five in South Korea and five in the North. Ports and other areas outside the Demilitarized Zone were the responsibility of a Neutral Nations Supervisory Council and Neutral Inspection Teams. To supervise and maintain the Demilitarized Zone itself a Military Armistice Commission was set up, composed of five senior officers from each side; these were assisted by ten Joint Observer Teams.

The Canadians After the Armistice

The three days immediately following the cease-fire saw the forward troops busily engaged in salvaging or destroying defence material in what became the Demilitarized Zone. The Commonwealth

Division then moved back to the Kansas Line, with the Sami-chon as its left boundary and its right in line with Hill 355. While the 28th Commonwealth and 29th British Brigades, now south of the Imjin, guarded "Pintail" and "Teal" bridges, the 25th Canadian Brigade maintained a divisional screen north of the river. This arrangement lasted approximately fifteen months. Should the war break out afresh, the 25th Brigade was to hold its ground for a limited time; it would next take over the defence of the two bridges and then, if necessary, withdraw into divisional reserve.

In the meantime, the Canadians were to report enemy activities opposite the divisional front and prevent unauthorized entry, by agents or troops of either side, into the Demilitarized Zone. (An example of *authorized* entry would be an unarmed party recovering any remaining dead for decent burial.) While minor infringements with respect to the Demilitarized Zone were not uncommon, no serious incidents occurred.

Work parties from all three brigades set about improving the Kansas defences. The rest of the troops were employed mainly on the construction of "semi-permanent" camps near the positions which they were to occupy in the event of a renewal of hostilities. For the infantry and armour, this meant a welcome change from bunkers to huts or winterized tents. Training received due attention. Considerable emphasis was also placed on sports, and the already liberal scale amenities was enlarged. Major-General Horatius Murray, who succeeded General West as GOC 1st Commonwealth Division in October 1953, was impressed with the high morale of his force. This he attributed to the troops' realization of the importance of their role, their readiness to man their battle positions on short notice and to carry out whatever operational tasks might be allotted to them, and to the increased emphasis on welfare. The spirit of the Canadian Brigade was further boosted by a feeling of being in the forefront.

One of five battalions of the Division to leave Korea on rotation between the cease-fire and the end of the year was the 3rd Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. Its relief by the 2nd Black Watch, plus a number of redesignations which took place at about this time, resulted in this apparently new Canadian order of battle in January 1954:

"A" Squadron Lord Strathcona's Horse

4th Regiment RCHA (formerly 81st Field Regiment RCA)

4th Field Squadron RCE (formerly 59th Independent Field Squadron)

3rd Royal Canadian Regiment

3rd Royal 22e Régiment

2nd Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada

No. 5 Transport Company RCASC (formerly No. 56)

No. 4 Field Ambulance RCAMC (formerly No. 38)

No. 25 Field Dressing Station RCAMC

No. 25 Field, Dental Unit RCDC

No. 40 Infantry Workshop RCEME (formerly No. 23).

The Canadians were now setting up a brigade recreation centre, to be known as known as "Maple Leaf Park". A brigade radio station was already operating, and a theatre, a gymnasium and a library were completed by the end of January. The centre was also to include a canteen, a gift shop and a hobby shop. But not even these amenities relieved units of the responsibility of conducting their own welfare programmes which, as we have seen, had proved so important during hostilities.

U.N. and ROK officials, civil and military, gathered at the Seoul airport on 7 March to meet an RCAF aircraft. As the machine landed, a Korean battery fired a 19-gun salute; for the principal passenger was the Canadian Prime Minister, on a world tour. Next morning Mr. St. Laurent laid a wreath at the Korean War Memorial and visited President Rhee. He then flew to the Commonwealth Division's area, and at a luncheon given in his honour at Brigadier Allard's headquarters met all the corps commanders of the Eighth Army, the commanders of neighbouring divisions, and representatives of all the Commonwealth forces. During the next 24 hours he called at Maple Leaf Park, where he unveiled a plaque dedicating the recreation centre to the use of the 25th Brigade, and visited various Canadian camps and observation posts. Returning to Seoul on the afternoon of the 9th, Mr. St. Laurent, accompanied by the Brigade Commander, attended a state dinner. He emplaned for Japan next day, while a ROK Army band played *Vive la Canadienne*.

In the third general rotation of Canadian troops, in the spring of 1954, the following newly-arrived units came under Brigadier Allard's command:

"D" Squadron Royal Canadian Dragoons

3rd Regiment RCHA

3rd Field Squadron RCP

4th Canadian Guards

2nd Queen's Own Rifles of Canada

No. 3 Transport Company RCASC

No. 3 Field Ambulance RCAMC

No. 42 Infantry Workshop RCEMES.

Brigadier Allard was succeeded mid-June by Brigadier F. A. Clift.

Canadian Troops Withdraw

Both during and after hostilities, the United Nations Command carried out an extensive reconstruction programme in South Korea. They also helped to build up the ROK forces to a point where these could fight successfully a defensive war if necessary. The member nations then began to cut their own commitments in the theatre-hence a gradual reduction of the 1st Commonwealth Division and the base, and of Canadian troop strengths both in Korea and in Japan. Between November 1954 and the following April, the Division's strength dropped from 20,000 to little more than 5000; by September 1955 it was down to 4000.

The full story of the reduction cannot yet be told, for at the time of writing (March 1956) the process is still not quite complete. We can however consider the main stages by which Canadian troops have been withdrawn from Korea.

Early in November 1954 the Commonwealth Division's right sector and the Canadian Brigade's covering position north of the Imjin became the responsibility of the 28th ROK Division. The 25th Brigade's operational role ended on the 8th. Already the 2nd Black Watch had sailed for Canada, and all but two of the remaining Canadian units in Korea-the Queen's Own Rifles and No. 3 Field Ambulance-followed close behind. Brigadier Clift, whose headquarters "closed down" on 2 December, was succeeded as Senior Canadian Officer in the Far East by the Commander of the Military Mission in Tokyo. On 1 February 1955, Brigade Headquarters, reestablished at Camp Borden, Ontario, was redesignated Headquarters 4th Infantry Brigade.

The 28th Commonwealth Brigade had passed into history at about the same time as the 25th Brigade. Units of either formation which were to remain in the theatre for a time came under command of the 29th British Brigade, whose headquarters was soon afterwards converted to an integrated divisional headquarters. The "Division" now consisted of:

42nd Field Regiment RA

55th Independent Field Squadron RE
1st Commonwealth Division Independent Signal Squadron
1st Dorset Regiment
2nd Queen's Own Rifles of Canada
1st Royal Australian Regiment
No. 10 [Transport] Company RNZASC
No. 3 Canadian Field Ambulance
1st Commonwealth Division Independent Ordnance Field Park
No. 16 Infantry Workshop REME
1st Commonwealth Division Independent Provost Company.

Not listed here are two British battalions which were to leave the theatre about the end of 1954.

The second stage of the withdrawal of Canadian troops took place in April 1955. The Queen's Own returned to Canada and were not replaced; other elements were rotated on an individual basis rather than as a body. Thus No. 3 Field Ambulance, already the only Commonwealth unit of its kind in Korea, became the only Canadian field unit in the theatre.

A third stage was announced on February 1956. The Commonwealth force in Korea was now to be reduced to a battalion group. To it Canada would contribute medical and dental personnel amounting to about 40 individuals.

During hostilities this country had sent 22,066 troops to the Far Eastern theatre. A further 7000 served there between the cease-fire and the end 1955.

Korea in Retrospect

The war in Korea was an incident unique in modern history and in the history of Canada, and it is worthwhile, even at this early date, to try to assess while, even at this early date, to try to assess its military and political significance.

* * *

The United Nations operations in Korea ended in a long

military deadlock followed by an armistice which did not represent a clear victory for either side. This produced a wide-spread feeling in the western countries that the whole episode was a discouraging failure. This was particularly the case perhaps in the United States, which had borne so much of the brunt of the fighting and had suffered so heavily. Nevertheless, seen in perspective, the Korean campaigns deserve to be considered in many respects a hopeful rather than a melancholy incident in international affairs.

In Korea the United Nations met a challenge and defeated it. The Communist attack on South Korea in June 1950 was an act of aggression, a local hot incident in the Cold War, which could not have been over-looked without risking the gravest consequences for the United Nations, the security of the western countries and the peace of the world. As it was, the United Nations, under the leadership of the United States, rallied to meet the threat with a degree of unity and effective organization which marks a turning-point in recent history. For the first time, an international force took the field under the flag of the United Nations. The forces of seventeen nations,* operating under a unified command, defeated the Communist attempt to overrun South Korea and saved that country's independence.

There can be no doubt that this result administered a severe shock to the leaders of international communism; and it may have made a considerable contribution to prompting them to adopt the more conciliatory attitude which has occasionally appeared in recent months. In June 1955 Mr. L. B. Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, speaking on a television broadcast marking the tenth anniversary of the United Nations, was asked what he considered the greatest single achievement of the Security Council and of the United Nations itself. He replied that the most important single achievement, certainly the most dramatic achievement, had been the organization's action in Korea. "It meant for the first time," he said, "the defeat of aggression by the armed conscience of the world."

On the whole, the command arrangements for the heterogeneous international force that fought under the blue and white United Nations flag in Korea worked extremely well. All coalition wars involve some difficulties, and this one was no exception. No doubt the arrangements for control could in some respects have been improved. In the same broadcast just quoted, Mr. Pearson said: "I think we have learned something from this campaign."

*These include the Republic of Korea (though not a member of the U.N.); but they do not include the five countries which provided medical units only.

There might well have been greater United Nations control of it - especially control of political strategy. But that, however, I think it is fair to say, would have required greater participation by more United Nations members. You cannot have collective control without genuine collective responsibility and collective participation. And, as it happened, in the Korean campaign the major part of the participation was borne by one country, the United States." The actual majority of the member countries of the U.N. made no contribution to the force; notably, of the large group of Latin American republics only one **B** Colombia - sent troops to Korea.

* * *

On the military side, the complaint was frequently heard, particularly from U.S. officers, that the United Nations forces had to fight the war under unnatural and artificial conditions. In particular, the Communists were able to use the territory of China beyond the Yalu River as a base, while our air forces were not permitted to strike at this area. This was certainly a considerable disadvantage to the U.N. forces. The limitation, however, was imposed by the political authorities for political reasons of the most compelling sort: the enormous importance of preventing the limited and local conflict in Korea from widening into a third world war. To have unleashed the air forces at the cost of bringing on such a war would have been poor policy indeed.

The United Nations troops found themselves facing formidable antagonists. The North Koreans gave the small U.S. forces a bad time in the early days; and the Chinese, who dominated the picture in the later phases, showed themselves courageous and resolute infantrymen. They were also vastly industrious, particularly as diggers; and their deep defences were extremely difficult to deal with.

Many westerners had undoubtedly assumed that the superior equipment and science of western armies would soon defeat Chinese and North Korean troops, however numerous. It was a shock to discover that this was not the case. The Chinese divisions were not so well equipped as our own. The enemy was never as strong as we were in artillery; he used very little armour; he was deficient in air support; and the Allied forces completely controlled the seas. Nevertheless, in the face of the great Chinese superiority in manpower, and the determination with which it was employed, the United Nations forces were able to achieve nothing better than a stalemate. The experience is worthy of note.

Equally significant is the fact that the Korean campaigns present us with an example of a war fought in the atomic age, yet

fought with conventional weapons and, basically, by the Army. The United Nations could have used atomic weapons; there were even some demands that they should do so; but they did not, chiefly, undoubtedly, because the controlling governments considered that the use of such weapons might extend the war. And it is worth observing that it was Army forces, in the main, that checked the aggressors. Air support was close, constant and invaluable; the campaign could not have been carried on at all without the navies; but the fighting was mostly done by soldiers, using the weapons of the Second World War or their more modern equivalents. The great need of the United Nations Command was for fighting soldiers; it was for them that it called upon the participating countries. The actual fighting done by Canadians was almost all done by the Army, as the casualty figures amply show.

These are matters of importance. There is no assurance, unfortunately, that the Korean war was the last, or that the next war, if there is one, will not be another "peripheral" and local conflict of the same sort, rather than a worldwide struggle fought with devastating nuclear weapons. Indeed, the former type of war is very much more probable, just because a nuclear war would probably mean a world conflict and virtually world suicide.

It was fortunate for the western nations that in 1950 they were in possession of the weapons to fight such a peripheral war, and not in a position where they could fight only with weapons which were likely to start a world war. As for Canada, thanks to her possessing forces and weapons suitable for intervention in Korea, she was able to make a contribution to the defence of the West, and in consequence has since been able to make her voice heard in the international discussions and settlements arising out of the Korean crisis.

* * *

As an episode in Canadian history, the war in Korea will have some importance. Except for the South African campaigns of 1899-1902 and the part played by Canadian voyageurs in the Nile Expedition of 1884-85, Canada's overseas wars have been fought in Europe, and in the main in North-West Europe, an area with which Canadians for many reasons have special connections. Apart from the defence of Hong Kong in 1941, in which two Canadian battalions took part, the fighting in Korea is the only Asiatic campaign in which Canadian troops have served.

The Korean war was not a major conflict, and the Canadian effort in it was in no sense parallel to that of the two World Wars. It was nevertheless considerable, and Canada made a larger contribution in proportion to her population than most of the nations which provided troops for the international force. It is

worth remembering that on this basis a brigade group from Canada was almost equivalent to four of the divisions sent to Korea by the United States, which in 1950 had eleven times Canada's population. And the quality of the contribution was excellent, as the Canadian troops' record in action testifies.

The Korean war is also an episode of some significance in the military history of the Commonwealth. The 1st Commonwealth Division was a unique formation. Although soldiers from various parts of the Commonwealth have long been accustomed to co-operating closely with one another, such a composite division had never been formed before. The experiment was triumphantly successful, but this did not surprise people who were acquainted with the history of the First and Second World Wars. The manner in which the Canadian Corps of 1915-18, and the First Canadian Army of 1942-45, operated as parts of British higher formations had set precedents, and established habits and patterns of co-operation, which were followed with excellent results in Korea.

* * *

Finally, it is right that we should turn our eyes once more to the cause that brought Canadian soldiers across the Pacific to fight and die among the mountains and rice paddies of Korea. In the days before 1939 Canada, like many other countries, attempted to isolate herself from world affairs in the hope that she could remain safe and untouched, no matter what might happen to "less happier lands" in Europe and Asia. The Second World War convinced Canadians that such ideas were illusions; and since 1945 Canada has committed herself to a policy of "collective defence"-of readiness to make political and military commitments in the interest of maintaining international peace and security. These commitments are expressed primarily in the United Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty.

In 1950 the country was called upon to honour her obligations under the Charter, and the soldiers who went to Korea were the means by which she honoured them. The international force in which they served inflicted a check upon aggression which had world-wide consequences. One may hope that it will do something for the peace and security of generations yet unborn. The Canadians who fell in Korea gave their lives in one of the best causes for which men have ever sacrificed themselves. If, as the old Roman said, it is sweet and fitting to die for one's country, it is certainly no less fitting to die for the future of mankind.

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ABBREVIATIONS (suite)

KOSB.....King's Own Scottish Borderers
KSC.....Korean Service Corps (Corps coréen de l'intendance)
KSLI.....King's Shropshire Light Infantry
LAA.....Light Anti-Aircraft (DCA légère)
LdSH.....Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians)
lt.....lieutenant
lt-col.....lieutenant colonel
ONU.....Organisation des Nations Unies
PPCLI.....Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
Q.G.....quartier général
R 22e R.....Royal 22e Régiment
RA.....Royal Artillery
RAF.....Royal Air Force
RAMC.....Royal Army Medical Corps
RAR.....Royal Australian Regiment
RCHA.....Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
RCR.....Royal Canadian Regiment
RE.....Royal Engineers
Rég't.....régiment
REME.....Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
RNZA.....Royal New Zealand Artillery
RNZASC.....Royal New Zealand Army Service Corps